LIBRARY 

OF  XHE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

GIFT  OFS 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN 


BY 


HERMAN  G.  A.  BRAUER,  M.  A. 


A   THESIS    SUBMITTED  FOR  THE   DEGREE  OP  DOCTOR    OP   PHILOSOPHY 
UNIVERSITY  OP  {WISCONSIN,  1902 


(Reprinted  from  the  Bulletin  of  the  University  of  Wisconsin, 

Philology  and  Literature  Series, 

Vol.  2,  No.  3,  pp.  205-379) 


MADISON,  WISCONSIN 
OCTOBER,  1903 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN 


BY 


HERMAN  G.  A.  BRAUER,  M.  A. 


A  THESIS  SUBMITTED  FOR  THE  DEGREE  OP  DOCTOR   OP   PHILOSOPHY 
UNIVERSITY  OP  WISCONSIN,  1902 


(Reprinted  from  the  Bulletin  of  the  University  of  Wisconsin, 

Philology  and  Literature  Series, 

Vol.  2,  No.  3,  pp.  205-379) 


MADISON,  WISCONSIN 
OCTOBER,  1903 


Co  fay  2>ear  fl&otber 

FROM  WHOM  I  HAVE  ALL  THAT  IS  BEST  IN  MY  LIFE 

I  DEDICATE  THIS    LITTLE  BOOK 

A   TRIBUTE    OF    LOVE 

AND  ESTEEM 


".: 

or  THE 

UNIVERSITY 
01 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN. 


CHAPTEK   I. 

INTRODUCTORY. 

"Kenan  pout  etre  defini  d'un  soul  mot,  qui,  heureusement, 
n'est  pas  une  formule:  ce  fut  Fhomnie  le  plus  intelligent  du 
XIXe  siecle."  fimile  Faguet,  in  the  Histoire  de  la  Langue  et 
de  la  Litterature  francaise,  Paris,  1899,  tome  VIII,  pp.  397. 
Of.  Monod:  Renan,  etc.,  40,  48.* 

"Personne  n'a  parle  d©  nos  jours  un  frangais  plus  savant  k 
la  fois  et  plus  simple,  plus  limpide,  plus  sincere,  a  travers  lequel 
s'apercoive  mieux  la  pensee."  Gaston  Boissier,  L'Academie 
Frangaise,  Recueil  des  Discours,  Rapports  et  Pieces  diverges, 
tome  I,  p.  808. 

On  the  two  qualities  emphasized  in  these  judgments  the  fame 
of  Renau  chiefly  rests:  the  clearness,  simplicity  and  sincerity 
of  his  matchless  prose,  and  the  extraordinary  fertility  and  com- 
prehensive culture  of  his  many-sided  mind.  In  this  paper  it  is 
from  the  side  of  his  thought,  and  not  of  his  style,  that  he  is 
approached. 

A  study  of  Renan  as  a  philosophic;  thinker  would  seem  to  re- 
veal a  third  quality  in  respect  of  which  he  stands  unexcelled, 
if  not  unequalled,  in  the  century  just  closed.  If  it  is  true  that 
he  was  the  most  intelligent  man  of  the  nineteenth  century,  it 
certainly  is  true  no  less  that  he  was  the  most  inconsistent. 
Even  more  remarkable  than  his  wonderful  fertility  in  ideas  is 
the  amazing  incongruity  of  these  ideas  among  themselves. 
Lest  this  should  seem  an  exaggeration,  I  hasten  to'  adduce  his 


*Fo'r  this  and  all  other  abbreviations  see  Appendix  C,  page  378. 


210  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

own  testimony  in  support  of  these  statements.  That  Renan 
was  abundantly  aware  of  the  many  contradictions  in  his  writ- 
ings, the  following  passage  alone  would  sufficiently  prove. 

"Bon  gre,  mal  gre,  et  nonobstant  tous  mes  efforts  conscien- 
tieux  en  sens  contraire,  j'etais  predestine  a  etre:  ce  que  je  suis, 
un  romantique  protestant  contre  le  romantisme,  un  utopiste 
prechant  en  politique  le  terre-a-terre,  un.  idealiste  se  donnant 
inutilement  beaucoup  de  mal  pour  paraitre  bourgeois,  un  tissu 
de  contradictions,  rappellant  Vhircocerf  de  la  scolastique,  qui 
avait  deux  natures.  line  de  mes  moities  devait  etre  occupee 
a  demolir  1'autre,  comme  cet  animal  fabuleux  de  Ctesias  qui 
se  mangeait  les  pattes  sans  s'en  douter."  Souv.,*  73.  Cf. 
Ibid.,  62,  116-7. 

This  confession  is  amply  endorsed  by  a  careful  study  of  Eo- 
nan's  writings,  except  ^perhaps  the  phrase:  "nonobstant  tous 
mes  efforts  conscientieux  en  sens  contraire,"  which  certainly 
does  not  accord  very  well  with  the  following  statement,  written 
about  the  same  time,  and  in  which  he  seems  rather  to  glory  in 
his  very  inconsistencies: 

ffln  utrumque  paratiLs!  fitre  pret  a  tout,  voila  peut-etre  la 
sagesse.  S'abandonner,  suivant  les  heures,  a  la  confiance,  au 
scepticisme,  a  Toptimisme,  a  Tironie,  voila  le  moyen  d'etre  sur 
qu'au  moins  par  momients  on  a  ete  dans  le  vrai."  F.  Det., 
396.  Cf.  A.  S.,  43.  Similar  utterances  abound  in  his  books, 
especially  those  of  the  later  period. 

Such  cavalierly  indifference  to  logic  might  seem,  at  first  sight 
to  be  only  an  expression  of  certain  moods  in  his  later  phase, 
when  experience  had  shown  that  his  "efforts  conscientieux"  at 
consistency  remained  stubbornly  fruitless.  But  such  an  ex- 
planation is  forbidden  by  the  facts.  For  nowhere  is  the  incon- 
sistency of  his  opposite  ideals  more  frankly  avowed,  or  the  pol- 
icy of  alternative  contradictory  assertion  more  deliberately  em- 
braced, than  in  his  earliest  writings. 

As  early  as  1845,  for  example,  in  a  personal  letter,  he  says: 

"J'ai  pris  la-dessus  franchement  mon  parti;  je  me  suis  de- 
barrasse  du  joug  importun  de  la  consequence,  au  moins  provisoi- 
rement.  Dieu  me  condamnera-t-il  pour  avoir  admis  simulta- 


BRATJER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.  211 

nement  ce  quo  reclament  simultanement  mes  different©®  fao- 
ultes,  quoique  j©  n©  puiss©  concilier  lours  exigences  contraires  f" 
Souv.,  321. 

This  casting  aside  of  the  importunate  fetters  of  logic,  reluc- 
tantly accepted  in  this  letter  as  a  provisional  compromise,  was 
destined  soon  to  become  a  settled  policy.  Three  years  later, 
in  the  Avenir  de  la\  Science,  the  impossibility  of  expressing  the 
whole  truth  within  the  limits  of  logical  consistency,  is  already 
proclaimed  in  a  very  different  tone: 

"Le  premier  pas  de  celui  qui  veut  penser  est  de  s'enhardir 
aux  contradictions,  laissant  a  Pavenir  le  soin  d©  tout  concilier. 
Un  homme  consequent  dans  son  systeme  de  vie  est  certainement 
un  esprit  etroit.  Car  je  le  den©,  dans  Petat  actuel  de  Pesprit 
humain,  de  faire  concorder  tous  les  elements  d©  la  nature  1m- 
maine.  S'il  veut  un  systeme  tout  d'une  piece,  il  sera  done 
reduit  a  nier  et  exclure."  A.  S.,  100. 

The  unhesitating  firmness;  of  tone  in  this  passage,  when  con- 
trasted with  the  apologetic  timidity  of  his  earlier  statements, 
seemjs  to  indicate  a  more  settled  conviction.  Unwilling  com- 
pulsion has  already  become  deliberate  choice. 

The  same  position  is  reaffirmed  in  his  first  published  book, 
L'Ave-rroes  et  I'averro'isme,  1852  : 

"L'inconsequence  est  un  element  essential  de  toutes  les 
choses  hwnaines.  La  logique  mene  aux  abimes.  Qui  peut 
sonder  Pindiscernable  mystere'de  sa,  propre  conscience,  et,  dans 
le  grand  chaos  de  la  vie  humaine,  quelle  raison  sait  au  juste  oil 
s'arretent  ses  chances  de  bien  voir  et  son  droit  d'affirmer??> 
Averr.,  1YO.  Of.  ibid.,  X. 

Kenan  does  not  mean  of  course  to  advocate  a  systematic 
disregard  of  logical  rules  as  such.  He  merely  contends  that 
the  various  "faculties"  and  "capacities"  of  what  w©  call  human 
nature  habitually  and  spontaneously,  and  perhaps  inevitably, 
tend  to  affirm  propositions  and  imply  points  of  view  which  can- 
not be  brought  into  logical  accord  with  each  other.  A  few  typ- 
ical passages  from  his  later  books  will  help  to  make  clear  his 
meaning,  and  incidentally  show  how  deliberately  and  persist- 


212  BULLETIN   OF   THE    UNIVERSITY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

ently  this  indifference  to  self-contradiction  prevailed  in  his  own 
practice. 

In  his  Discours  de  reception  before  the  Academ-ie  Frangaise, 
1878,  he  says: 

"Pestime  qu'il  est  des  sujets  sur  lesquels  il  est  bon  de  se  con- 
tredire;  car  aucune  vue  partielle  n'en  saurait  epuiser  les  in- 
times  replis.  Les  verites  de  la  conscience  sont  des  phares  a 
feux  changeants.  A  certaines  heures,  ces  verites  paraissent  e- 
videntes;  puis,  on  s'etonne  qu'on  ait  pu  j  croire.  .  .  Vingt 
fois  rhumanite  les  a  niees  et  afnrmees;  vingt  fois  I'humanite 
les  niera  et  les  affirmera  encore."  Disc.,  41-2. 

And  two  years  later,  in  his  address  before  the  Royal  Society 
of  London,  speaking  of  Marcus  Aurelius: 

"II  vit  bien  que  lorsqu'il  s'agit  de  1'infini  aucune  formule 
n'est  absolue,  et  qu'en  pareille  matiere  on  n'a  quelque  chance 
d^avoir  aper§u  la  verite  une  fois  en  sa  vie  que  si  1'on  s'est  beau- 
coup  contredit."  C.  d'Angl.,  237-8. 

In  his  Introduction  to  the  Book  of  Job  and  his  Essay  on  Ec- 
clesiastes,  once  more,  he  declares  that  consistency,  in  matters 
of  metaphysical  speculation,  is  a  mark  of  pedantry  and  narrow- 
ness, and  inconsistency  rather  a  sign  of  truth: 

"La  question  que  Fauteur  se  propose  est  precisement  celle 
que  tout  penseur  agite,  sans  pouvoir  la  resoudre;  ses  embarras, 
ses  inquietudes,  cette  fagon  de  retourner  dans  tous  les  sens  le 
noeud  fatal  sans  en  trouver  Tissue,  renferment  bien  plus  de 
philosophic  que  la  scolastique  tranchante  qui  pretend  imposer 
silence  aux  doutes  de  la  raison  par  des  reponses  d'iine  appar- 
ente  clarte.  La  contradiction,  en  de  pareilles  matieres,  est  le 
signe  de  la  verite."  Job,  LXVII.  Of.  Dr.  Ph.,  176. 

"Malheur  a  qui  ne  se  contredit  pas  au  moins  une  fois  par 
jour.  On  ne  fut  jamais  plus  eloigne  du  pedantisme  que  Tau- 
teur  de  1'Ecclesiaste.  La  vue  claire  d'une  verite  ne  Tempeche 
pas  de  voir,  tout  de  suite  apres,  la  verite  contraire,  avec  la 
mieme  clarte."  EccL,  24. 

I  have  purposely  quoted  at  length  from  Kenan's  own  words, 
in  order  to  leave  no  doubt  that  he  was  quite  aware  of  the  many 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.  213 

inconsistencies  in  his  own  writings,   and  that  he  was  rather 
proud  than  otherwise  of  their  presence. 

When  a  writer  thus  boldly  admits  logical  contradictions 
among  his  first  principles.,  it  of  course  becomes  a  difficult  task 
to  exhibit  his  thoughts  in  coherent  form.  "Abandon  logic  all 
who  enter  here,"  might  be  written  over  the  entrance  of  Kenan  s 
temple  of  philosophic  truth. 

In  the  present  instance  this  difficulty  of  exposition  is 
increased  by  the  fact  that  many  of  his  characteristic  doctrines 
are  most  clearly  developed  in  his  Dialogues  and  his  Drames 
Philosophiques ;  but  he  expressly  declines  to  be  held  responsible 
for  the  opinions  professed  by  his  interlocutors: 

"Je  me  resigne  d'avance  a  ce  que  Ton  m;attribue  directe- 
ment  toutes  les  opinions  professees  par  m|es  interlocuteurs, 
meme  quand  elles  sont  contradictoires.  Je  n'ecris  que  pour  des 
lecteurs  intelligent  et  eclaires,  Ceux-la  admettront  parfaite- 
ment  que  je  n*aie  nulle  solidarite  avec  mes  personnages  et  que 
je  ne  doive  porter  la  responsabilite  d'aucune  des  opinions  qu'ils 
expriment."  Dial.,  VII.  Cf.  Dr.  Ph.,  257;  Souv.,  377. 

From  most  writers  such  a  disclaimer  would  be  entirely  rea- 
sonable, or  rather  unnecessary.  But  Renan,  surely,  should  be 
the  last  of  all  men  to  repudiate  opinions  professed  in  his 
dramas  merely  on  the  ground  of  their  contradicting  each  other ; 
and  to  absolve  him  from  responsibility  for  those  opinions,  on 
that  ground  alone,  would  seem]  to>  be  going  counter  to  his  own. 
professed  principles. 

But  there  is,  in  fact,  a  special  reason,  in  his  case,  for  insist- 
ing on  this  responsibility.  It  would  not  be  hard  to  show  that 
every  doctrine  of  importance  developed  in  \hoDialogues  and  the 
Drames  PhilosopJiiques  is  put  forward  elsewhere  in  his  writ- 
ings, explicitly  or  implicitly,  by  himself  directly.  Cf.  Seailles, 
E.  R,,  280-1. 

The  following  example  is  typical.  In  his  preface  to  tihe 
Pretre  de  Nemi,  he  complains  that  certain  critics,  have  imputed 
to  him,  the  subversive  doctrines  of  Ganeo,  the  least  attractive 
character  in  the  play,  to  whom  he  himself  refers  in  the  same 
connection  as  "le  vil  coquin." 


BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

"Pai  mis  en  scene  Ganeo,  %  vil  coquin/  trouvant  un  dis- 
ciple digne  do  lui  dans  Leporinus,  et  lui  enseignant  la  derniere 
consequence  de  regoisme,  la  lachete.  C'est  la  doctrine  de 
Ganeo  qu'on  a  presentee  comme  la  mienne.  J'aurais  preche 
justement  ce  dont  j'ai  voulu  inspirer  le  mepris!  C'est  comme 
si  Ton  soutenait  que  les  Spartiates  montraient  des  esclaves  ivres 
a  leurs  eofants,  non  pour  les  lenr  f aire  prendre  en  horreur, 
mais  pour  les  engager  a  les  imiter."  Dr.  Ph.,  259. 

Now  what  is  this  doctrine  of  Ganeo,  so  indignantly  repudi- 
ated by  E-enan?  Briefly  this:  that  courage  in  battle  is 
frequently  punished  by  death,  and  cowardice  rewarded  by  es- 
cape from  death ;  the  brave  man  dies  on  the  field  while  cowards 
at  home  enjoy  the  fruits  of  his  bravery. 

"La  lachete  est  presque  toujours  recompensee;  quant  an 
courage,  c'est  une  vertu  qui  est  le  plus  souvent  punie  de  la 
peine  de  mort." 

"N'est-ce  pas1?"  continues  Ganeo,  "Le  vrai  vainqueur,  c'est 
celui  qui  se  sauve.  Vaincre,  c'est  ne  pas  se  f  aire  tuer.  On  a 
Tair  de  supposer  que  le  vainqueur  mort  jouit  de  sa  victoire. 
Mais  il  n'en  salt  rien.  Les  honneurs  qu'on  rend  a  son  cadavre, 
c'est  compne  si  on  les  rendait  a  un  tronc  d'arbre." 

"Mais  on  dit  que  les  dieux  aiment  les  braves,"  objects  Lepo- 
rinus. 

"Tant  mieux  pour  les  dieux,"  retorts  Ganeo,  "s'il  y  en  a. 
"J'aime  mieux  ma  peau  que  ramour  des  dieux.  Avec  ramour 
des  dieux,  on  pouirit  bel  et  bien  sous  terre." 

"On  a  a,ussi  Testime  des  hommes." 

"Oui,  1'estime  de  vos  deux  voisins  de  rang,  a  condition  qu'ils 
n'aieiit  pas  ete  tues  comme  vous." 

"Mais  il  y  a  la  nation," 

"Ah!  si  je  te  disais  que  la  nation  aussi  a  interet  a  etre  vain- 
cue.  Malheur  a  la  nation  victorieuse.'  .  .  .  Le  vain- 
queur est  le  pire  des  maitres,  le  plus  oppose  aux  reformes. 
O?est  au  lendemain  d^une  defaite  qu'une  nation  fait  des  pro- 
gres.  O?est  au  lendemain  d'une  defaite  que  Ton  est  libre,  heu- 
reux.  Dieu  nous  preserve  de  la  victoire !  Eh  bien, 


BRAUER THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF   ERNEST   REN  AN.  215 

reflechis  done,  mon  cher.  A  moins  de  conserves  rimmortalite 
de  Fame  pour  les  militaires,  1'essentiel,  dans  une  bataille,  est 
de  se  sauver."  ...  La  mort  est  la  faute  irreparable. 
.  .  ."  Dr.  PL,  355-358. 

Embarrassing  reflections,  truly;  reflections1  which,  encour- 
aged by  the  authoritative  pen  of  M.  1' Administrates  du  Col- 
lege de  France,  might  well  provoke  objections  from  French  pa- 
triots. But  in  what  respect  does  Ganeo's  doctrine  differ  from 
the  following  declaration,  published  by  our  author  himself  four- 
teen years  earlier? 

"L'interet  personnel  ne  conseille  jamais  le  courage  militaire; 
car  aucun  des  inconvenients  qu'on  encourt  par  la  lachete 
n'equivaut  a  ce  que  Ton  risque  par  le  courage.  II  faut,  pour 
exposer  sa  vie,  la  foi  a  quelque  chose  d'immateriel.  OT,  cette  foi 
disparait  de  jour  en  jour."  Kef.  Int.,  116.  Of.  Dr.  Ph.,  258. 

What  effort  did  Kenan  ever  make,  one  cannot  help  wonder- 
ing, to  encourage  men's  faith  in  a  future  life  ? 

The  further  assertion  of  Ganeo,  that  individual  welfare  is 
not  necessarily  proportioned  to  national  strength,  is  likewise 
endorsed  by  Kenan  directly: 

"Le  gouvernement  representative  est  etabli  presque  partout. 
Mais  des  signes  evidents  de  la  fatigue  causee  par  les  charges 
nationales  se  montrent  a  1'horizon.  Le  patriotisms  devient  lo- 
cal; Tentrainement  national  diminue.  .  .  Dans  cinquante 
ans  le  principe  national  sera  en  baisse.  .  .  II  est  devenu 
trop  clair,  en  effet,  que  le  bonheur  de  Tindividu  n'est  pas  en 
proportion  de  la  grandeur  de  la  nation  a  laquelle  il  appartient. 
.  .  ..."  A.  S.,  XY-XVI. 

The  truth  is<  that  Kenan's  disavowal  of  the  teachings  of  his 
interlocutors  whenever  they  contradict  his  own,  must  be  re- 
garded as  adding  another  contradiction  to  the  number,  for  in 
point  of  fact  they  never  do  contradict  him.  The  opposite 
points  of  view  which  these  characters  are  usually  made  to  es- 
pouse, in  reality  represent  the  opposite  conceptions  of  the  two 
lobes  of  his  own  brain.  His  very  reason,  indeed,  for  giving 
to  his  thoughts  the  form  of  a  dialogue  was  because  in  this  way, 


216  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVEKSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

as  he  himself  says,  he  could  best  give  expression  to  his  own 
two-sided  philosophic  beliefs. 

"Prive  de  mes  livres  et  separe  de  mes  travanx,"  he  writes 
in  the  preface:  to  his  Dialogues  pliilosopliiques,  "j 'employ ais 
ces  loisirs  forces  a  f aire  un  retour  sur  moi-meme>  et  a  dresser 
une  so-rte  d'etat  sommaire  de  mes  croyances  philosophiques. 
La  forme  du  dialogue  me  parut  bonne  pour  cela,  parce  qu'elle 
n'a  rien  de  dogmatique  et  qu'elle  permet  de  presenter  succes- 
sivement  les  diverses  faces  du  probleme,  sans  que  1'on  soit 
oblige  de  condom  Moins  que  jamais  je  me1  sens  1'audace  de 
parler  doctrinalement  en  pareille  matiere."  Dial.,  V-VI. 

But  on  the  next  page  in  the  same  preface  he  writes : 

"Chacon  de  ces  personnages  represente  .  .  .  les  cotes 
successif s  d'one  pensee  libre ;  aucun  d'eux  n'est  un  pseudonyme 
que  j'aurais  choisi  .  .  .  pour  exposer  mon  propre  senti- 
ment." 

These  statements,  taken  both  together,  can  only  mean  that, 
while  each  of  his'  interlocutors  represents  a  certain  phase  of  Re- 
nan's  own  dootrinei,  no  one  of  them  represents  that  doctrine  com- 
pletely. And  this  is  true.  Any  one  of  his  characters,  taken 
alone,  would  certainly  misrepresent  Kenan's  position.  But  the 
misrepresentation  would  be  due  not  to  a  real  contradiction,  but 
rather  to  the  consistent  advocacy  of  a  single  phase  of  the  ques- 
tion at  any  one  time. 

In  view  of  our  author's  protest,  however,  the  Dialogues  and 
the  Drames  philosophiques  are  quoted  in  this  paper  only  as  con- 
firming positions  taken  by  the  author  elsewhere,  which  they 
often  express  more  briefly  and  more  clearly. 

Few  men  have  been  more  written  about,  by  friends  and  by 
foes,  than  Kenan.  All  the  eminent  literary  critics,  and  many 
others,  have  had  their  say;  and  several  biographers  have  told 
the  story  of  his  life.  A  list  of  these  works  will  be  found  in 
Appendix  B. 

The  most  elaborate  attempt  yet  made  to  explain,  from  a  psy- 
chological point  of  view,  the  complex  personality  of  Kenan,  and 
the  many  contradictions  in  his  writings  resulting  therefrom,  is 


BKAUEE, THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EKNEST  BEN  AN.  217 

that  of  M.  Gabriel  Seailles:  Ernest  Renan,  Essai  de  Biogra- 
phie  psychologique>,  2e  edition,  Paris,  1895. 

This  writer  tries  to  show  that  Kenan's  inconsistencies  are 
the  logical  outcome  of  his  rejection  of  metaphysics,  and  his  ex- 
clusive reliance  upon  the  experimental  method. 

"Renan  attend  tout  de  la  science,  il  n'y  a  pas  une  verite  qui 
lie  vienne  d'elle,  il  lui  demande  non  settlement  les  faits  et  les 
lois,  mais,  plus  hardi  qu'A.  Comte,  Tidee  qui  domine  les  faits 

et  coordonne  les  lois  a  la  fin  ideale  de  1'univers 

II  etait  bon  que  cette  experience  fut  faite,  et  en  un  sens  elle 
a  ete  faite  pour  tous.  L'echec  de  Renan  n'est  pas  un  accident, 
il  est  le  terme  logique  d'une  philosophic  qui  se  reduit  a  1'his- 
toire,  demande  aux  faits  eux-memes  Tintelligence  des  faits,  et 
devant  leurs  dementis  ne  pent  que  renoncer  a  elle-meme  et 
desesperer.  ...  La  vie  intellectuelle  de  RJenan  est  une 
experience  faite  pour  tous,  elle  nous  apprend  ou  la  logique 
conduit  un  esprit  sincere  qui,  resolu  a  suivre  la  verite  jusqu'au 
bout,  Fattend  du  seul  temoignage  des  faits."  E.  R.,  VIII,  341. 

My  own  opinion  is  that  M.  Seailles  is  trying  too  hard  to 
refer  to  a  single  cause  what  in  truth  was  due  to  the  coopera- 
tion of  a  great  many;  and  that,  moreover,  he  has  approached 
his  author  too  exclusively  from  the  intellectual  side.  It  was 
not  so  much  Renan's  rejection,  of  metaphysics, — indeed,  he  did 
not  reject  it  in  the  sweeping  manner  assumed  by  M.  Seailles — 
but  rathecr  his  heterogeneous  temperament;  not  his  adherence 
to  the  experimental  method,  but  rather  his  frequent  and  capri- 
cious departure  from  that  method,  that  furnished  the  principal 
source  of  the  puzzling  contradictions  in  his  philosophical  writ- 
ings. But  further  discussion  of  this  point  must  be  reserved  for 
a  later  chapter. 

An  explanation  seems  called  for  in  regard  to  the  form  of 
the  exposition  here  attempted.  After  bringing  together  and 
comparing  with  one  another  all  Renan's  utterances  on  the  va- 
rious topics  discussed,  his  contradictions  were  found  to  be  so 
bold  and  so  unceasing,  that  it  seemed  impossible  to  avoid  mis- 
representation, or  to  convey  anything  like  a  true  idea  of  the 


218  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

nature  of  his  mind,  except  by  exhibiting  his  own  statements 
side  by  side,  and  making  discussion  and  criticism  incidental. 

This  mode  of  exposition  will  of  course  not  lend  itself  well 
to  continuous  narrative,  and  is  certain  for  that  reason  to  prove 
less  attractive  to  the  reader;  but  it  seemed  the  only  way  to 
avoid  arbitrary  exclusions.  Moreover,  this  method  has  the 
advantage  of  presenting  Kenan's  views  mainly  in  his  own  words, 
and  thus  provides  at  least,  in  convenient  groupings,  materials 
for  a  more  detailed  study  of  the  subject  at  somie  future  time. 
The  topics  are  accordingly  grouped  under  three  heads :  Nature, 
Man,  Society.  Under  the  first  will  be  found  Kenan's  ideas  on 
such  questions  as  evolution  vs.  special  creation,  law  and  miracle ; 
materialism  and  spiritualism;  theism:,  pantheism,  agnosticism 
and  positivism.  In  the  other  two  divisions  are  presented  his 
views  on  certain  questions  in  ethics  and  politics  respectively. 
The  concluding  chapter  suggests  the  direction  in  which  we  must 
turn  for  a  knowledge  of  the  psychological  factors  involved  in 
the  production  of  his  heterogeneous  personality. 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      219 


CHAPTER  II. 

I  NATURE. 

Of  Kenan's  nature-philosophy,  in  the  sense  just  described, 
the  most  characteristic  feature  is  its  thorough-going  evolution- 
ism!. As  early  as  1845,  fourteen  years  before  the  publication 
of  the  Origin  of  Species,  he  had  quite  abandoned  the  special- 
creation  hypothesis,  and  adopted  instead,  at  least  within  the 
limits  of  his  own  specialty,  the  principle  of  gradual  evolution 
in  accordance  with  natural  law.  Souv.,  251. 

At  least  as  early  as  1848  also,  he  had  developed  a  formula 
for  evolution  in  general,  recalling  that  which  has  since  become 
f  amous  in  the  wording  of  Herbert  Spencer.  It  may  help  the 
comparison  to  place  the  two  side  by  side.  Mr.  Spencer's  well- 
known  formula  runs  thus : 

"Evolution  is  an  integration  of  matter  and  concomitant  dis- 
sipation of  motion;  during  which  the  matter  passes  from  an 
indefinite,  incoherent  homogeneity,  to  a  definite,  coherent  het- 
erogeneity ;  and  during  which  the  retained  motion  undergoes  a 
parallel  transformation."  First  Principles,  §145. 

Kenan's  conception  is  not  expressed  in  such  definite  terms; 
it  is  less  abstract,  but  also  less  concise  and  less  comprehensive, 
being  restricted  to  living  forms.  He  writes  in  1848 : 

"Evolution  d'un  germie  primitif  et  syncretique  par  I'analyse 
de  ses  membres,  et  nouvelle  unite  resultant  de  cette  analyse, 
telle  est  la  loi  de  tout  ce  qui  vit.  Un  germe  est  pose,  renfer- 
mant  en  puissance,  sans  distinction,  tout  ce  que  1'etre  sera  un 
jour;  le  germe  se  developpe,  les  formes  se  constituent  dans 
leurs  proportions  regnlieres1  .  .  .  Mais  rien  ne  se  cree, 
rien  ne  s'ajoute.  Je  me  suis  sou  vent  servi  avec  succes  de  la 
comparaison  suivante  pour  faire  comprendre  cette  vue.  Soit 


220  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNTVEBSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

nne  masse  de  clianvre  homogene,  que  Ton  tire  en  cordelles  dis- 
tinctes ;  la  masse  representera  le  syncretisme,  oii  coexistent  con- 
fusement  tous  les  instincts;  les  cordelles  representeront  1'ana- 
lyse.  Si  Ton  suppose  que  les  cordelles,  tout  en  rest-ant  distinctes, 
soient  ensuite  entrelacees  pour  former  une  corde,  on  aura  la 
synthese,  qui  differe  du  syncretisme  primitif,  en  ce  que  les 
individuality  bien  que  nouees  en  unite  y  restent  distinctes." 
A.  S.,  313. 

This  conception  is  applied  by  Benan  to  the  evolution  of  the 
htiman  mind,  as  represented  in  languages,  literatures  and  re- 
ligions; and,  in  a  more  hypothetical  way,  to  cosmic  evolution 
at  large.  See  A.  S.,  301-318.  Herder,  Michelet,  and  Cousin 
are  frequently  mentioned  by  him  in  connection  with  these  views. 
So  extreme  was  Kenan's  enthusiasm  for  evolutionary  science 
in  this  early  period  of  his  life  that,  had  he  been  free  to  de- 
vote himself  to  biology  instead  of  theology,  as  he  often  declared 
in  later  days,  he  would  probably  have  anticipated  some  of  the 
demonstrations  of  Darwin.  Souv.,  262-3.  He  was  forced 
into  other  fields,  however;  and  so,  instead  of  an  Origines  des 
Especes,  it  was  Les  Origines  du  Christianisme  which  established 
his  famle  in  the  world. 

Writing  nearly  half  a  century  later  of  his  views  in  the 
forties : 

"J'avais  un  sentiment  juste  de  ce  que  j'appellais  les  origines 
de  la  vie.  Je  voyais  bien  que  tout  se  fait  dans  I'humaiiite  et 
dans  la  nature,  que  la  creation  n'a  pas  de  place  dans  la  serie 
des  effets  et  des  causes.  Trop  peu  naturaliste  pour  suivre  les 
voies  de  la  vie  dans  le  labyrinthe  que  nous  voyons  sans  le  voir, 
j'etais  evolutionniste  decide  en  tout  ce  qui  concerne  les  produits 
de  rimmanite,  langues,  ecritures,  litteratures,  legislations, 
formes  sociales.  J'entrevoyais  que  le  daniier  morphologique 
des  especes  vegetales  et  animales  est  bien  1'indice  d'une  geiiese, 
que  tout  est  ne  selon  un  dessein  dont  nous  voyons  1'obscur  cane- 
vas."  A.  S.,  XII-XIII.  Of.  ibid.,  170-2. 

But  the  truth  is  that  Benan  and  Darwin  approached  the  prob- 
lem! from  entirely  different  points  of  view.  Consistently  with 
his  clerical  antecedents^\Benan  approached  the  question  of  evo- 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.  221 

^ 

lution  from  the  side  of  its  theological  and  religious  significance. 
To  his  mind,  at  least  in  the  earlier  period,  the  assertion  of  evo- 
lution was  primarily  a  denial  of  the  biblical  account  of  creation, 
and  of  all  the  theological  dogmas  thence  derived. 
^In  a  world  governed  by  natural  law, — this  is  the  very  key- 
stone of  his  nature-philosophy — supernatural  agencies  have  no 
place.  In  the  endless  chain  of  cause  and  effect  which  formed 
his  conception  of  nature,  each  event  is  bound  to  its  neighbor 
by  a  tie  of  internal  necessity  which  is  never  broken  through  by 
interpositions  of  a  supernatural  or  extra-natural  power.  Dial., 
162;  Or.  Lang.,  241. 

"Une  chose  absolument  hors;  de  doute,  c'est  quo,  dans  1'uni- 
vers  accessible  a  notre  experience,  on  n' observe  et  on  11  a  jamais 
observe  aucun  fait  passager  provenant  d'une  volonte  ni  de 
volontes  superieures  a  celle  de  Phomme."  F.  Det.,  402 ;  also 
406. 

This  conviction  dates  back  as  far  as  1846,  and  was  apparently 
formed  under  the  influence  of,  or  at  least  in  co-operation  with, 
his  friend  M.  Berthelot.  In  all  his  life  Kenan  never  again 
changed  from  this  position.  Souv.,  337-8 ;  also,  371-2. 

Neither  is  there  any  such  thing  as  intentional  action  to  be 
discovered  in  the  operations  of  Nature.  Whatever  may  be  true 
of  the  government  of  the  universe  as  a  whole,  in  the  details  of 
this  planet,  if  we  except  the  actions  of  finite  beings,  there  is 
no  such  thing  as  intelligently  directed  action ;  nor  ever  has  been, 
so  far  as  man  can  ascertain.  The  unerring  precision  and  ab- 
solute constancy  of  natural  la,w,  making  it  possible  to  predict 
results  from  a  given  combination  of  known  materials  and  forces, 
is  alone  sufficient  ground,  he  affirms,  for  discarding  the  idea  of 
intelligent  or  intentional  action,  in  the  workings  of  Nature. 

"Le  ca,ractere  de  precsion  absolue  du  monde  que  nous  ap- 
pelons  materiel  suifirait  a  eloigner  1'idee  d'intention;  Pinten- 
tionnel  se  trahissant  presque  ton  jours  par  le  manque  de  geo- 
metrie  et  Fa-peii-pres."  ~F.  Dei,  404.  Cf.  Or.  Lang.,  241. 

In  the  present  state  of  the  universe,  intelligence  is  restricted 
to  a  middle  region:  both  above  and  below  finite  minds,  all  is 
night.  There  is  no  evidence  that  our  planet  has  ever  been  in- 


222  BULLETIN   OF    THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

fluenced  by  any  rational  being  higher  than  man.  A  God,  in 
the  ordinary  sense  of  the  word,  a  living,  acting  God,  a  Provi- 
dence, is  nowhere  discernible.  F.  Dei,  406-7.  And  this  ab- 
sence of  purposive  action  may  be  affirmed  without  hesitation, 
he  declares,  of  the  entire  solar  system,  and  even  of  the  whole 
universe,  so  far  as  planetary  motions  are  concerned.  There  is 
no  reasonable  doubt  that  the  other  celestial  bodies  likewise  fol- 
low laws  of  development  inherent  in  their  own  constitution. 
At  any  rate,  the  onus  probandi  rests  upon  those  who  deny  this.1 
F.  Det.,  405. 

Ren  an  does  not  mean  to  assert  that  a  conscious  ruler  of  the 
world  does  not  exist ;  but  merely  that  no  such  influence  is  dis- 
cernible in  the  details  of  the  world's  government  over  that  por- 
tion of  space  and  time  which  man  can  investigate.  Dial.,  20. 
In  other  worlds  or  other  ages,  interventions  by  outside  powers 
may  possibly  occur.  It  may  well  be  that,  compared  with  the 
totality  of  things,  the  portion  of  the  universe  accessible  to  the 
observations  of  man  is  a  mere  point;  and  what  is  true  of  this 
point,  need  not,  of  course,  be  true  of  the  whole.  At  all  events, 
with  respect  to  the  totality  of  things,  it  would  be  as  rash  to 
deny  as  to  affirm  intervention  by  superior  powers.  Dial.,  22 ; 
F.  Det.,  417. 

The  same  course  of  reasoning  applies,  mutatis  mutandis,  to 
infinite  time.  Between  our  phenomenal  universe,  which  we 
know  is  not  eternal,  and  the  primordial  universe,  of  which  we 
know  nothing  at  all,  there  may  be  infinitudes  of  intervals.  But 
if  we  admit,  as  Renan  thinks  we  must,  that  our  phenomenal 
world  is  but  a  finite  part,  of  an  infinite  whole,  everything  is 
possible,  even  God.  F.  Det.,  416.  The  day  may  come,  for 
^ught  we  know  or  can  do  to  the  contrary, .when  some  outside  in- 
fluence will  break  through  the  causal  nexus  of  our  world  and 
destroy  its  autonomy,  without  more  regard  for  our  theories  than 
we  show  for  the  microbes  in  a  clod  that  we  crush.  F.  Det.,  416. 
Imagine  an  atom,  unconscious  as  a  whole  but  inhabited  by  con- 
scious individuals  asserting  the  complete  autonomy  of  their 
little  world.  Suppose  that  chemistry  should  some  clay  succeed 
in  disintegrating  these  atoms.  And  is  it  quite  impossible  that 


BRAUER THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST   REN  AN.  223 

our  universe  should  have  similar  proof  some  day  of  the  possi- 
bility of  interventions  from  outside  powers?  F.  Det.,  414. 

But  plainly,  all  this  speculation  about  the  constitution  of  a 
supposed  primordial  universe  turns  on  mere  possibilities,  and 
between  posse  and  esse  the  gulf  is  too  wide  to  be  bridged  by 
the  fragile  fabrics  of  mere  fancy.  So  far  as  our  positive  knowl- 
edge of  nature  extends,  Reman  maintains,  inviolate  natural  law, 
unbroken  by  any  trace  of  supernatural  intervention,  reigns  su- 
preme in  the  universe.  Cf .  A.  S.,  170-1 ;  174. 

This  intense  constitutional  aversion,  as  it  must  be  called, 
for  anything  that  savored  of  miracle,  is  best  understood  from 
a  study,  of  his  childhood  environment. 

As  Mr.  Balfour  among  others  has  pointed  out,  one  of  the  most 
important  causes  of  belief,  because  the  most  irresistible,  is  the 
psychological  climate,  as  he  calls  it,  in  which  a  person  is  born. 
And  indeed,  a  little  reflection  will  show  that  none  of  o>ur  earli- 
est beliefs,  whether  in  religion,  philosophy  or  science,  can  be 
properly  called  the  product  of  our  own  reasoning  at  all.  A 
man  cannot  choose  the  first  beginnings  of  his  intellectual  life 
any  more  than  he  can  choose  his  parents  or  his  native  land. 
His  first  beliefs  are  matters  of  ethnical  geography,  and  are  de- 
termined by  what  may  be  called  the  moral  zone  or  psychological 
climate  of  his  early  surroundings.  In  the  words  of  Mr. 
Balfour : 

"Considered  from  the  side  of  their  origin,  a  man's  early 
beliefs  are  mere  products  of  natural  conditions,  psychological 
growths,  comparable  to  the  flora  and  fauna  of  continents  and 
oceans."  Found.  Bel.,  196;  Cf.  James,  Will  to  Bel.;  Bain's 
Ment  and  Mor.  Sci.,  especially  the  Appendix,  p.  80;  also 
Philos.  Rev.,  V,  p.  Iff. 

This  truth  is  well  exemplified  in  the  life  of  Ernest  Renan. 
His  native  town,  T'reguier,  had  grown  out  of  an  ancient  mon- 
astery, and  was  shrouded  in  an  atmosphere  of  mythology,  as 
dense  as  Benares  or  Jagatnata.  Souv.,  I.  He  calls  it  a  nest 
of  priests  and  nuns,  cut  off  from  all  trade  and  industry.  Secu- 
lar pursuits  were  looked  upon  as  vanity  and  vexation  of  spirit, 
while  all  about  the  town,  in  the  high  places  and  the  country  holy- 


424  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

wells,  Mab  and  Merlin,  the  fairies  and  the  witches,  had  their 
devotees.  Cf .  Mme.  Darmsteter,  Life  of  Renan,  pp.  4-5 ; 
Seailles,  K  R,  p.  4. 

A  large  pla,ce  in  the  lives  of  the  people  was  given  to  the  wor- 
ship of  saints,  most  of  them;  unkown  to  the  rest  of  Christendom, 
and  whose  solitary  little  chapels  stood  here  and  there  among 
the  moors  or  barren  rocks. 

These  local  deities  have  left  indelible  marks  on  the  mind  of 
Renan.  More  than  half  a  century  later  he  writes : 

"La  physionomie  etrange,  terrible,  de  ces  saints,  plus  druides 
que  chretiens,  sauvages,  vindicatifs,  me  poursuivait  comme  un 
cauchemar."  Souv.,  82. 

Among  other  virtues,  these  saints  were  reputed  to  possess 
the  power  of  working  miracles.  A  good  example  of  these  is  the 
miracle  by  which,  as  Kenan  was  taught  to  believe,  his  father 
was  cured  of  fever  whan  a  child.  Before  day-break,  the  child 
was  taken  to  the  chapel  of  the  saint  who  exercised  the  healing 
power.  A  blacksmith  arrived  at  the  sarnie  time  with  his  forge, 
nails  and  tongs.  He  lighted  his  fire,  made  his  tongs  red-hot, 
and  held  them  before  the  face  of  the  saint,  threatening  to  shoe 
him  like  a  horse  unless  he  cured  the  child  of  his  fever.  The 
threat  took  immediate  effect,  and  the  child  was  cured.  Souv., 
p.  86. 

A  still  better  test  of  credulity  was  the  miracle  performed 
once  a  year  by  Saint  Yves  de  Id  Verite,  the  patron-saint  of  Brit- 
tany, on  the  occasion  of  an  annual  festival  held  in  his  honor : 

;<La  veille  de  la  fete,  le  peuple  se  reunissait  le  soir  dans 
Teglise  et,  a  minuit,  le  saint  etendait  le  bras  pour  benir  1'as- 
sistance  prosternee.  Mais  s'il  y  avait  dans  la  foule  un  seul 
incredule  qui  levat  les  yeux  pour  voir  si  le  miracle  etait  reel, 
le  saint,  justement  blesse  de  ce  soupcon,  ne  bougeait  pas,  et, 
par  la  faute  clu  mecreant,  personne  n'etait  beni."  Souv.,  11. 

Renan  was  not  slow  to  discover  a  common  trait  in  all  these 
miracles:  the  credulity  of  the  witnesses.  "Das  Wunder  1st, 
Jes  Glaubens  liebstes  Kind." 


BRATJER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.  225 

With  this  environment  of  his  childhood  and  the  circum- 
stances of  his  early  life  in  view,  we  are  no  longer  surprised  to 
find  that  his  interest  as  a  theological  student  in,  Paris  should 
have  centered  in  the  subject  of  miracles,  and  that  throughout 
his  long  life  the  question  of  naturalism  vs.  supernaturalism 
should  have  been  in  the  fore-ground  of  all  his  philosophical 
speculations.  It  is  impossible  to  read  his  later  discussions  of 
miracles  without  being  reminded  of  the  wonder-working  saints 
of  his  early  surroundings. 

"II  y  a  des  miracles  quand  on  y  croit ;  ils  disparaissent  quand 
on  n'y  croit  plus."  Mor.  Or.,  194.  Cf.  V.  J.,  L-LII,  268; 
Dial,  14-22 ;  Q.  C.,  221. 

"Aucun  miracle  ne  s'est  produit  dans  des  conditions  vrai- 
ment  scientifiques,  en  presence  de  juges  competents."  Or. 
Lang.,  241;  Apost,,  37-42;  Fragm.,  318-19. 

Renan  insists  that  his  rejection  of  miracles  is  not  a  violation 
of  scientific  method,  nor  an  a  priori  procedure.  Rather  is  it 
the  inevitable  result  of  an  impartial  study  of  nature  and  his- 
tory. There  is  no  evidence  at  the  present  day  of  any  violation 
or  suspension  of  natural  law,  he,  maintains ;  and  as  for  the  mir- 
acles alleged  to  have  occurred  in  the  distant  past,  they  are  in 
the  same  class  with  sirens  and  centaurs.  What  reason  have  we 
for  disbelieving  either  the  one  or  the  other  except  that  they  have 
never  been  seen?  Dial.,  246.  Hence  the  burden  of  proof,  he 
insists,  lies  not  with  those  who  reject  miracles,  but  with  those 
who  affirm  them.  Science  is  not  called  upon  to  disprove 
groundless  assertions  gratuitously  made.  Quod  gratis  asseri- 
tur  gratis  negatur.  F.  Det,  405. 

"Chercher  a  expliquer  les  recits  surnaturels  ou  les  reduire  a 
des  legendes,  ce  n'est  pas  mutiler  les  faits  au  nom1  de  la  theo- 
rie;  c'est  partir  de  robservation  meme  des  faits.  .  .  Une 
observation  qui  n'a  pas  ete  une  seule  fois  dementie  nous  ap- 
prend  qu'il  n'arrive  de  miracles  que  dans  les  tem'ps.  et  les  pays 
ou  Ton  y  croit,  devant  des  personnes  disposees  a  y  croire.  .  . 
Ce  n'est  don<5  pas  au  nom^  de  telle  ou  telle  philosophiei,  c'est  au 
nom  d?une  constante  experience,  que  nous  banissons  le  miracle 

2 


226  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

de  riiistoire."     V.  J.,  L-LI;  Apost,  37ff;  Dial,  318-19. 

"C'est  par  les  sciences  historiques  qu'oni  pent  etablir  (et, 
selon  moi,  d'une  maniere  peremptoire)  .  .  .  qu'il  n'y  a 
jamais  eu  de  fait  surnaturel.  Ce  n'est  point  par  un  raisonne- 
inent  a  priori  que  nous  repoussons  le  miracle;  c'est  par  un  rai- 
sonnement  critique  ou  historique."  Souv.,  328.  Cf.  ibid., 
282. 

It  is  a  noteworthy  fact  that  Kenan  seldom  approaches  the 
question  of  miracles  without  citing  either  MaJebranche  or  Lit- 
tre.  The  influence  of  the  former  on  Renan  was  probably 
greater  in  this  matter  than  that  of  any  other  writer. 

The  conception  of  miracle,  according  to  Renan,  is  a  legacy 
from  an  unscientific  age,  and  entirely  without  rational  mean- 
ing today.  At  a  time  when  everybody  believed,  as  a  matter  of 
course,  in  spirits  and  their  intervention  in  human  affairs,  any- 
thing that  baffled  the  understanding  was  considered  sufficiently 
explained  by  calling  it  a  miracle,  that  is  to  say  the  work  of  su- 
pernatural powers.  A.  S.,  262.  But  to  a  modern  mind  such 
an  explanation  is  without  meaning.  To  call  an  event-  miracu- 
lous to-day  is  not.  to  explain  it,  but  rather  to'  class  it  as  unex- 
plained. 

"La  condition  mema  de  la  science  est  de  croire  que  tout  est 
explicable  naturellement,  meme  1'inexplique.  Pour  la  science, 
une  explication  surnaturelle  n'est  ni  vraie  ni  fausse;  ce  n'est 
pas  une  explication."  Q.  C.,  223. 

In  Rman's  sense  of  the  word  miracle',  indeed,  it  would  be  a 
contradiction  in  terms  to  speak  of  miracles  in  the  remote  past. 
The  miraculous,  as  he  conceives  it,  is  not  merely  the  inexpli- 
cable; it  is  a  formal  derogation  from  recognized  laws  in  the 
name  of  a  particular  desire.  A  thing  is  not  miraculous  merely 
because  it  is  unique,,  or  not  understood.  Apost.,  37-42 ;  Or. 
Lang.,  239. 

As  thus  denned,  a  miracle  is  a  comparatively  modern  con- 
ception, a  kind  of^  by-product  of  natural  science.  Obviously, 
there  must  be  a  conception  of  natural  law  before  we  can  think 
of  an  infraction  or  suspension  of  natural  law ;  or  rather  the  two 


BBATTER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  KENAN.  227 

conceptions,  law  and  miracle,  undifferentiated  in  primitive 
minds,  develop  together,  pari  passu,  as  the  idea  of  natural  law 
becomes  definite.2  Miracle  implies  law,  as  supernaturalism 
implies  naturalism.  They  are  correlative  terms,  and  only  have 
a  meaning  with  reference  to  each  other. 

The  opposition  of  law  and  miracle,  of  naturalism:  and  super- 
naturalism,  thus  represent  different  stages  in  the  evolution  of 
man's  ideas  about  nature.  Time  was  when  the  word  miracle 
explained  things,  in  the  sense  of  satisfying  curiosity,  just  as 
phlogiston,  chemism,  heredity,  electricity,  microbe,  even  evolu- 
tion itself,  have:  served  in  turn  to>  explain  almost  anything,  to 
unscientific  minds  of  a  later  day.  In  the  mythological  ages 
of  primitive  man,  spirits  were  as  real  as  bacteria  are  to-day, 
and  their  action  as  universal.  The  exact  nature  of  their  ac- 
tivity, its  limits  and  conditions,  nobody  stopped  to  examine  in 
detail.  Of.  A.  S.,  45-6 ;  also  V.  J.,  41. 

But  in  his  polemics  against  the  miraculous  Reman  seems  not 
to  have  realized  sufficiently,  at  least  in  his  earlier  days,  the  ne- 
cessity of  compromise  in  passing  from  the  one  regime  to  the 
other. 

"Tout  on  rien,"  he  exclaims1,  "supernaturalisme  absolu  001 
rationalisme  sans  reserve."  A.  S.?  49. 

But  who  could  expect  that  the  humian  race  should  pass  from 
mythology  to  logic  at  a  single  bound?  Should  we  not  call  it 
the  greatest  miracle  of  all  if  humanity  had  leaped  suddenly 
from  undoubting  belief  to>  unbelieving  doubt? 

JSTor  has  Renan,  in  his  crusade  against  supernaturalism,  al- 
ways kept  to  the  straight  and  narrow  path,  of  sound  logic. 
When,  for  example,  miracles  are  declared  impossible  because 
natural  law  is  absolute  and  universal  (A.  S.,  48,  169),  he  is 
plainly  assuming  the  very  point  at  issue.  Such  a  statement 
amounts  to  saying  that  miracles  cannot  happen  because  they  do 
not ;  a  position  which  he  has  himself  refuted  elsewhere : 

"Dans  le  milieu  que  nous  experimentons,  il  ne  se  passe  pas 
de  miracles;  mais,  au  point  de  vue  de  Tinfini,  rien  n'est  imh 
possible."  F.  Det,  418. 

Occasionally  also,  in  reply  to  a  certain  class  of  theologians, 


228  BULLETIN   OF    TILE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

and  presumably  on  the  biblical  principle  of  answering  the  fool 
according  to  his  folly,  he  has  repeated  the  well-worn  argument 
that  miracles  are  inconsistent  with  the  idea  of  an  all-knowing 
and  all-powerful  creator,  as  subsequent  interventions  would  im- 
ply that  the  original  plan  of  the  world  was  defective  and  needed 
occasional  correction.  Or.  Lang.,  239. 

But  in  such  quibbling  he  rarely  indulges.  Already  in 
L'Avemr  de  la  science  he  takes  the  ground  that  belief  in  super- 
naturalism,  like  belief  in  fetichism,  will  never  be  dispelled  by 
metaphysical  argumentation. 

"Le  seul  moyen  de  guerir  de  cette  etrange  maladie  qui,  a  la 
honte  de  la  civilisation,  n'a  pas  encore  disparue  de  rhumanite, 
c'est  la  culture  moderne.  Mettez  1'esprit  au  niveau  de  la  sci- 
ence, nourissez-le  dans  la  methode  rationnelle,  et,  sans  lutte,  sans 
argumentation,  tomberont  ces  superstitions  surannees.  .  .  . 
La  science  positive  et  experimentale,  en  donnant  a  Thomme  le 
sentiment  de  la  vie  reelle,  pent  seule  detruire  le  supernatural- 
isme,"  A.  S.,  48-9. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Itenan,  while  repudiating  mir- 
acles in  the  past  and  the  present,  admits  their  possibility  in  the 
future.  Supernatural  interventions  do  not  occur  at  the  pres- 
ent time,  because  there  is  no  supernatural  being  capable  of  in- 
tervening. Some  day,  however,  such  a  being  may  exist.  In 
the  remote  future,  when  evolution  has  run  its  course  and  the 
universe  attained  to  complete  self -consciousness,  personal  acts 
of  divine  will  may  take  the  place  of  natural  law,  even  to  the 
extent  of  becoming  the  normal  modus  operandi  of  nature. 

"Mais  le  miracle,  c'est-a-dire  ^intervention  d'un  etre  su- 
perieur,  qui  maintenant  n'a  pas  lieu,  pourra  un  jour,  quand 
Dieu  sera  conscient,  etre  le  regime  normal  de  Tunivers."  F. 
Det,  441.  Also  in  his  article  on  Amid,  F.  Det.,  392-3. 

Is  Renan,  then,  to  be  classed  as  a  materialist,  in  view  of  his 
disbelief  in  the  existence  of  a  conscious  ruler  of  the  universe? 
That  wo>uld  be  a  great  mistake.  Of.  Dial.,  143-4,  253,  141. 
The  truth  is  that  materialism  in  every  form,  whether  ra- 
tional or  temperamental,  was  repulsive  to  him.  As  for  onto- 
logical  materialism;,  the  doctrine  that  matter  is  the  one  eternal* 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      229 

self-existent  reality,  the  ultimate  Weltstoff,,  so  to  speak,  he  ex- 
plicitly rejects  it  as  a  palpable  absurdity.  A.  S.,  478.  Mat- 
ter, he  declares,  has  no  real  independent  existence.  It  is 
merely  the  form  in  which  the  true  substance  of  the  universe, 
whatever  that  may  be,  becomes  manifest  to  our  senses ;  a  bridge 
of  communication,  as  it  were,  between  spirit  and  spirit  in  the 
finite  world. 

"Je  ne  puis  trop  le  repeter,"  he  writes  in  1862,  "c'est  Tideal 
qui  est,  et  la  realite  passagere  qui  parait  etre."  Frag.,  250. 

"S'il  est  une  induction  qui  resulte  naturellemient  de  1'aspect 
general  des  f  aits,  c'est  que  la  conscience  de  1'individu  nait  et  se 
forme,  qu'elle  est  une  resultante,  mais  une  resultante  plus  re- 
elle  que  la  cause  qui  la  produit  et  sans  commune  mesure  avec 
elle.  .  .  .  Le  materialisme  est  done  un  non-sens  plutot 
qu'une  erreur.  II  est  le  fait  d'esprits  etroits  qui  se  noient  dans 
leurs  propres  mots  et  s'arretent  au  petit  cote  des  choses."  Mor. 
Cr.,  65. 

"L'amfi!  est  la  premiere  desi  realites  et  la  seule  pleine  realite. 
C'est  Tame  qui  est,  et  le  corps  qui  parait  etre."  Ibid.,  63.  Of. 
Dial.,  56,  141;  A.  S.,  261;  Or.  Lang.,  99;  V.  J.,  29;  Dr.  Phv 
22-3. 

Is  spirit,  then,  the  ultimate  reality,  the  true  substance  of  the 
world  2  There  are  numerous  passages  in  Kenan's  books  which 
would  make  it  appear  that  he  thought,  so,  as  for  example,  the 
statement  last  quoted.  That  is  not  his  meaning,  however.  In 
reality  he  takes  a,  middle  ground,  declaring  the  one  assertion  as 
unwarranted  as  the  other.  Neither  matter  nor  mind  are  abso- 
lute, independent,  self-existent  realities.  Rather,  our  ideas  of 
matter  and  spirit  are  both  of  them  negative  conceptions. 
"What  is  mind?  No  matter.  What  is  matter?  Never  mind." 
All  that  we  know  about  either  is  that  it  is  not  the  other;  mat- 
ter is  not-mind,  mind  is  not-matter.  "Tout  ce  qui  n'est  point 
prose  est  vers,  et  tout  ce  qui  n'est  point  vers  est  prose."  H&- 
nan's  only  advance  upon  this  tautology  consists  in  the  state- 
ment, little  more  than  a  guess,  that  matter  and  spirit  are  dis- 
tinct and  irreducible  modes  of  existence  in  which  the  real  real- 
ity, whatever  that  may  be,  becomes  manifest  to  our  senses. 


BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

This  view,  already  distinctly  expressed  in  the  Avenir  de  la  sci- 
ence, he  maintained  to  the  end. 

"Les  mots  de  corps  et  d'ame  restent  parfaitement  distincts, 
en  taut  que  representant  des  ordres  de  phenomenes  irredue- 
tibles;  mais  faire  cette  diversite  toiite  phenomenale  synonyme 
d'une  distinction  ontologique,  c'est  toimber  dans  un  pesant  re- 
alisme,  et  imiter  les  anciennes  hypotheses  des  sciences  phy- 
siques, qui  supposaient  autant  de  causes  que,  de  faits. 
Le  vrai  est  qu'il  y  a  un©  substance  unique,  qui  n'est  ni  corps 
ni  esprit^  mais  qui  se  manifeste  par  deux  ordres  de  phenomenes, 
qui  sont  le  corps  et  Tesprit,  que  ces  deux  mots  n'ont  de  sens 
que  par  leur  opposition,  et  que  cette  opposition  n'est  que  dans 
les  faits."  A.  S.,  4T8. 

In  his  reply  to  the  Discours  de  reception  of  M.  Pasteur  be- 
fore the  Academie  Francaise,  1882,  he  says: 

"Le  but  du  monde,  c'est  1'idee;  mjais  je  ne  connais  pas  un 
cas  ou  Fidee  so  soit  produite  sans  matiere;  je  ne  connais  pas 
d'esprit  pur  ni  d'oeoivre  d'esprit  pur.  .  .  .  Je  ne  sais  pas 
si  je  fruis  spiritualiste  ou  materialiste."  Disc.,  78.  Cf.  Dial., 
55-6;  Frag.,  253. 

It  i*  only  very  occasionally,  however,  that  Renan  adverts  to 
questions  of  this  order.  Ke  was  not  much  addicted  to  specula- 
tions about  the  essence  of  Being.  Metaphysical  speculations 
seemed  to  him1,  in  his  normjal  moods,  an  unprofitable  waste  of 
time,  an  intellectual  legerdemain  unworthy  of  a  serious  mind, 
and  completely  barren  of  results  so  far  as  the  advancement  of 
positive  knowledge  is  concerned.3 

"Si  la  philosophic  ne  veut  pas  rester  une  toile  de  Penelope, 
sans  cesse  et  toujours  vainement  recommencee,  il  faut  qu'elle 
devienne  savante."  Mor.  Crit,  81. 

"La  tentative  de  construire  la  theorie  des  choses  par  le  jeu 
dcs  formules  vides  de  1'esprit  est  une  prevention  aussi  vaine  que 
celle  du  tisserand  que  voudrait  produire  de  la  toile  en  faisant 
aller  sa  navette  sans  y  mettre  du  fil."  Mor.  Crit,  82.  Cf. 
Souv.,  250;  Averr.  IV,  323;  Lang.  Eem,,  505;  D;sc.,  39. 

But  although  the  ultimate  nature  of  reality  is  thus  unknown, 
and  presumably  unknowable,  Renan  is  very  positive  in  his 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  BEN  AN.      231 

numerous  assertions  regarding  its  aims.  An  essential  feature 
of  his  nature-philosophy  is  its  teleology.  The  universe  is  cer- 
tainly not  an  assemblage  of  undirected,  blindly  acting  forces, 
it  is  a  mechanism  moving  towards  a  predetermined  goal. 

"L'univers  a  un  but  ideal  et  sort,  a  une  fin  divine;  il  n'est 
pas  seulement  tine  vaine  agitation,  dont  la  balance  finale  est 
zero,"  Dial.,  XIV. 

This  is  inferred  from  the  fact  of  evolution  throughout  na- 
ture, the  universal  tendency  in  virtue  of  which  the  possible  de- 
velops into  the  actual,  the  actual  into  the  conscious,  and  the  con- 
scious intoi  progressively  higher  forms  of  self-consciousness. 
As  the  germ  of  an  animal  or  plant  tends  to  evolve  conformably 
to  its  ancestral  pattern,  so  does  the  evolution  of  the  world  as  a 
whole  follow  a  predetermined  course.  Dial.,  23—4 ;  Frag.,  177. 

This  belief  in  the  purposive  character  of  world  evolution  is 
not  by  any  m;eans  the  expression  merely  of  a  passing  mood,  or 
the  casual  flight  of  an  erratic  fancy.  It  is  repeated  again  and 
again,  in  a  great  variety  of  forms — essays,  speeches,  dialogues, 
histories,  plays, —  and  in  widely  different  associations.  It  is, 
in  fact,  one  of  the  few  constant  items  in  his  eminently  incon- 
stant creed.  Renan  thoroughly  believed,  in  his  more  serious 
moments  at  least,  in  some  "far-off  divine  event,  toward  which 
the  whole  creation  moves."  As  if  to  make  sure  of  being  taken 
in  earnest,  he  declares  his  belief  in  teleology  to  be  one  of  the 
only  two  propositions  in  philosophy  of  which  he  is  certain  be- 
yond a,  doubt,  the  other  being  his  belief  in  the  absoluteness  and 
universality  of  natural  law. 

"Autant  je  tiens  pour  indubitable  qu'aucun  caprice,  aucune 
volonte  particuliere  n'intervient  dans  le  tissu  des  f  aits  de  1'uni- 
vers,  autant  je  regarde  comme  evident  que  le  monde  a  un  but 
et  travaille  a  une  oeuvre  mrysterieuse.  II  y  a.  quelque  chose 
qui  se  developpe  par  une  necessite  interieure,  par  un  instinct 
inconseient,  analogue  au  mouvement  des  planter  vers  1'eau  ou 
la  lumiere.  .  .  Le  monde  est  en  travail  de  quelque  chose; 
omnis  creatura\  ingemiscit  et  parturit"  Dial.,  22.  Cf.  Frag., 
177,  179. 


232  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

If  we  ask  what  can  be  this  ulterior  goal  of  world-develop- 
ment, his  answer  is  ready:  It  is  the  production  of  Reason. 

"Le  but  du  monde  est  de  produire  de  la  raison.  Tout  lui 
est  bon  pour  cela.  Chaque  planete  fabrique  de  la  pensee,  du 
sentiment  esthetique  et  moral;  la  petite  recolte  de  vertu  et  de 
raison  que  produit  chaque  monde  est  la  fin  de  ce  monde,  comme 
la  secretion  de  la  granine  est  le  dernier  but  du  gommier.7' 
Dial.,  58-9. 

Again  in  his  letter  to  M.  Berthelot,  Frag.,  177 : 
"Deux  elements,  le  temps  et  la  tendance  au  progres,  ex- 
pliquent  Punivers.  Mens  agitat  molem.  .  .  Spiritus  Mus 
alii.  .  .  .  II  v  a  une  conscience  obscure  de  Punivers  qui 
tend  a  se  faire,  un  secret  ressort  qui  pousse  le  possible  a  ex- 
ister."  Frag.,  177-8.  Cf.  Dial.,  144;  Dr.  Ph.,  189. 

It  is  needless  to  observe  that  the  Reason  which,  according 
to  Kenan,  the  universe  is  destined  to  evolve,  is  not  human  rea- 
son, but  intelligence  or  mind  in  its  widest  sense,  including  all 
conscious  beings  of  whatever  sort,  past,  present  and  to  come. 
Human  reason,  it  is  true,  mjarks  the  highest  point  yet  reached, 
so  far  as  the  process  is  represented  on  this  planet. 

"Pour  moi  je  pense  qu'il  n'est  pas  dans  Punivers  d'intelli- 
gence  superieure  a  celle  de  Phomme,  en  sorte  que  le  plus  vaste 
genie  .  de  notre  planete  est  vraiment  le  pretre  du  monde, 
puisqu'il  en  est  la  plus  haute  reflection."  Frag.,  283.  Cf. 
Dial.,  20-1 ;  A.  SI,  note  14. 

Au  moyen  age,  le  plus  haut  resultat  du  monde,  au  moins  de 
la  planete  Terre,  etait  un  choeur  de  religieux  chantant  des 
psaumes.  La  science  de  notre  temps,  repondant  au  desir  qu'a 
le  monde  de  se  connaitre,  atteint  des  effets  bien  superieurs." 
Frag.,  430-1. 

But,  of  course,  evolution  does  not  stop  with  man.  Human- 
ity is  merely  a  transitional  link,  human  reason  only  a  phase 
in  the  evolutionary  movement  whose  ultimate  goal  is  the  pro- 
duction of  a  universal  reason  or  world-consciousness.  A.  S., 
XX ;  Dial,  118-23  ;  Frag.,  182-3  ;  A.  S.,  note  14.  In  a  single 
word,  evolution  is  a  deific  process.  The  development  of  con- 


BRAUEE, THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  KENAN.      233 

sciousness  is  the  development  of  God,  that  is  to  say  of  a  being 
who  will  one  day  permeate  and  govern  the  universe  as  the  soul 
its  body.  F.  Det,  430.  Of.  A.  S.,  37 ;  and  especially,  note 
42 ;  also  Dial.,  143  ;  Souv.,  XXI-II.  God  is  immanent  in  na- 
ture, and  in  all  its  products;  the  laws  of  nature  are  the  habits 
of  God.  Dial.,  25-6;  125;  Frag.,  248. 

"De  qui  est  done  cette  phrase.  .  .  "Dieu  est  immanent 
dans  I'ensemble  de  Funivers,  et  dans  chacun  des  etres  qui  le 
composent.  Seulement  il  ne  se  connait  pas  egalement  dans 
tous.  II  se  connait  plus  dans  la  plante  que  dans  le  rocher,  dans 
Tanimal  que  dans  la  plante,  dans  I'homnue  que  dans  1'ani- 
inal,  dans  1'hoiinme  intelligent  que  dans  1'homme  borne,  dans 
Thomme  de  genie  que  dans  1'homme  intelligent,  dans  Socrate 
que  dans  1'homme!  de  genie,  dans  Bouddha  que  dans  Socrate, 
dans  le  Christ  que  dans  B'ouddha,"  Voila  la  these  fonda- 
mentale  de  toute  notre  theologie.  Si  c'est  bien  la  ce  qu'a  voulu 
dire  Hegel,  soyons  hegeliens,"  Dial,  187  ;  310  ;  Dr.  Ph.  22-3  ; 
A.  S.,  188-9 ;  200-1 ;  Or.  Lang.,  99. 

Reman  insists,  that  his  teleology  is  not  open  to  the  objections 
properly  raised  against  the  Aristotelian  finalism  of  the  schol- 
astics. His  own  conception,  he  claimis,  does  not  imply  the  ex- 
istence of  a  conscious,  deliberating,  omnipotent  power.  The  re- 
alization of  nature's  aim  is  not  a  conscious  execution  of  a  pre- 
conceived plan.  Evolution  attains  its  purpose  without  special 
aimi,  by  a  succession  of  lucky  hits,  so  to  speak. 

"Les  objections  des  savants  qui  se  mettent  en  garde  centre 
ce  qivil  tiennent  pour  une  resurrection  du  finalismei  portent  a 
fond  centre  le  systeme  d'un  createur  reflechi  et  tout-puissant. 
Elles  ne  portent  en  rien  centre  notre  hypothese  d'un.  nisus  pro- 
fond,  s'exercant  d'unei  mianiere  aveugle  dans  lea  abimes  de 
I'etre,  poussant  tout  a  1'existence  a  chaque  point  de  1'espace. 
Ce  nisus  n'est  ni,  conscient,  ni  tout-puissant;  il  tire  le  meilleur 
parti  possible  de  la,  matiere  dont  il  dispose."  F.  Det.,429-30. 
Cf.  A.  S.,  258;  Souv.,  373. 

The  evolutional  impulse  is  an  unconscious  tendency  or  drift, 
ein,  'blinder  Drang,  groping  its  way  in  the  dark,  and  reaching 
its  goal  in  the  end.  in  spite  of  endless  blundering  and  countless 


234-  BULLETIN    OF    THE    UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

failures,  because  of  its  eternal  persistence  and  indefatigable  en- 
deavor. Imagine,  says  Renan,  an  insect  fluttering  about  in  a 
room  f roan  which  the  only  escape  is  through  a  hole  in  the  ceil- 
ing just  large  enough  for  the  creature  to  pass  through  if  it 
happens  to  strike  the  exact  centre  of  the  opening.  Allow  this 
insect  infinite  time  and  infinite  patience  and  perseverance,  and 
it  will  ultimately  succeed.  Such  is  the  universe;  always  young, 
always  enterprising,  never  discouraged,  and  with  a  supply  of 
material  for  experimentation  so  inexhaustible  that  waste  is  no 
loss,4 

But  how  can  these  positive  statements,  so  often  repeated  in 
Renan's  books,  be  made  to  accord  with  his  explicit  rejection  of 
metaphysics  ? 

"II  n'y  a  pas  de  verite,"  he  has  told  us,  "qui  n'ait  son  point 
de  depart  dans  I'experience  scientifique,  qui  no  sorte  directe- 
ment  ou  indirectement  d'un  laboratoire  oil  d'une  bibliotheque, 
etc."  Frag.,  283-4;  ibid.,  263,  265. 

"Comment, "  asks  M.  Seailles,  "Inexperience  scientifique 
Tauter ise-t-elle  a  conclure  que  Dieu  se  fait,  qn'un  jour  il  sera?" 
E.  R,  212. 

Kenan's  own  reply  is  that  it  does  not.  In  spite  of  his  fre- 
quent reiterations  of  the  deific  doctrine,  he  has  really  forestalled 
criticism  by  explicit  declarations  on  the  other  side  of  the 
question.  How,  for  example,  can  the  following  words  be  recon- 
ciled with  his  doctrine  of  deific  evolution,  when  taken  together 
with  his  rejection  of  metaphysics  ? 

"La  theodicee  n'a  aucun  fondement  experimental. 
Deonander   la    Divinite    a    Inexperience,    c'est    done   s'abuser." 
Frag.,  318-20. 

And  again  in  his  preface  to  the  Dramas  Philosophiques, 
written  in  1888 : 

"La  philosophic,  an  point  de  rafftnement  on  elle  est  arrivee, 
s'aceomode  a  merveille  d'un  rnbde  d'exposition  ou  rien  ne 
s'afiirme,  o-u  tout  s'induit,  se  fond,  s'oppose,  se  nuance.  On 
n'en  est  plus  a  perfectionner  les  regies  du  syllogisme,  ni  a 
fortifier  les  preuves  de  1'existence  de  Dieu  ou  de  Fimmortalite 
de  Tame.  L'homme  voit  bien,  a  Fheure  qu'il  est,  qu'il  ne  saura 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.      235 

jamais  rien  de  la.  cause  supreme  de  1'univers  ni  de  sa  propre 
•destinee."  Dr.  Ph.,  III. 

Two  years  later,  in  another  preface, — all  his  prefaces  are 
written  with  special  care — we  have  the  two  opposite  views  ex- 
pressed in  almost  the  same  breath : 

"Rien  ne  noois  indique  quelle  est  la  volonte  de  la  nature, 
ni  le  but  de  Punivers.  Pour  nons  autres>,  idealistes,  une  seule 
doctrine  est  vraie,  la  doctrine  transcendante  selon  laquelle  le 
but  de  riiumanite  est  la  constitution  d'une  conscience  superi- 
eure,  ou,  commie  on  disait  autrefois,  la  plus  grande  gloire  de 
Dieu."  A.  S.,  XVI. 

Here  we  learn  that  our  author  distinguished  between  scien- 
tific truth  and  transcendental  truth,  the  one  for  all  mien  and  the 
other  reserved  for  idealists;  but  how,  again,  is  this  "doctrine 
transcendante' '  to  be  reconciled  with  his  rejection  of  metaphys- 
ics? Is  not  his  theory  one  thing,  and  his  practice  quite 
another  ? 

With  regard  to  his  theory,  one  is  curious  to  know  what  stage 
this  God-evolving  process  may  have  reached  in  our  own  day. 
May  we  say  that  God  is,  as  well  as  that  he  will  le?  In  a  letter 
dated  August,  1862,  written  in  answer  to  this  very  question, 
Reiian  says: 

"En  dehors  de  la  nature  et  de  Phomnie,  y  a-tril  done  quelque 
•chose  ?  me  demandez-vous. 

"II  y  a  tout,  repondrai-je.  La  nature  n'est  qu'une  appa- 
rence,  1'homme  n'est  qu'un  phenomene.  II  y  a  le  fond  eternel, 
il  y  a  Finfini,  la  substance,  Tabsolu,  1'idea.l ;  il  y  a,  selon  la  belle 
expression  miusulmane,  celui  qui  dure ;  il  y  a,  selon  Fexpression 
juive,  plus  belle  encore,  celui  qui  est.  Voila  le  pere  du  sein 
duquel  tout  sort,  au  sein  duquel  tout  rentre."  Dial.,  252. 

This  is  not  merely  ironical  jargon  employ ed.  to  put  off  in> 
pertinent  questions.  The  statement  is  repeated  in  many  dif- 
ferent connections.  In  the  lecture  Rome  et  le  Christianisme, 
for  example,  we  read : 

"La  vie  nous  parait  un  court  passage  entre  deux  longues 
nuite.  .  .  .  line  seule  chose  est  certaine,  c'est  le  sourire 
paterael,  qui,  a  certaines  heures,  traverse  la  nature,  attestant 


236  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

qu'  nn  oeil  nous  regard e  et  qu'un  coeur  nous  suit,"  C.  d'Angl.r 
200-1.  Cf.  Souv.,  376. 

And  again  in  his  article:  la  Metaphysique  et  son  avenir: 

"Dans  la  nature  et  Phistoire  je  vois  bien  mieux  le  divin  que 
dans  des  formules  abstraites  d'une  theodicee  artificielle  et  d'une 

ontologie  sans  rapports  avec  les  faits L'infini 

n'existe  que  quand  il  revet  e  une  forme  finie.  Dieu  ne  se  voit 
que  dans  ses  incarnations."  Frag.,  310;  ibid..,  250. 

These  are  explicit  statements.  Unfortunately,  however,  for 
logical  consistency,  he  is  equally  explicit  on  the  other  side  of 
the  question.  Contrast,  for  example,  the  passage  last  quoted 
with  the  following,  taken  from  the  same  article: 

"La  theodicee  n'a  aucun  fondement  experimental.  Loin  de 
reveler  Dieu,  la  nature  est  immorale ;  le  bien  et  le  mal  lui  sont 
indifferents.  .  .  .  L'histoire  de  meme  est  un  scandale 
permanent  au  point  de  vue  de  la  morale."  Frag.,  319.  Cf. 
Disc.,  pp.  75,  134. 

And  again: 

"La  conscience  est  peut-etre  une  forme  secondaire  de  1'exist- 
ence.  Un  tel  mot  n'a.  plus  de  sens  quand  on  veut  1'appliquer 
au  tout,  a  Tunivers,  a  Dieu.  Conscience  suppose  une  limitation, 
une  opposition  du  moi  et  du  non-moi,  qui  est  la  negation  meme 
de  rinfini.  Ce  qui  est  eternel,  c'est  Pidee."  Dial.,  140-1. 

In  his  article  on  Amiel  he  speaks  of  the  "conscience  generale 
obscure"  as  being  "tout  a  fait  insoucieuse  des  individus" 
(F.  Det,  391)  ;  and  repeatedly  he  declares  that  the  process 
of  deific  evolution  is  still  very  far  from  its  goal,  which  per- 
haps it  may  never  attain.  Compared  with  the  omnipotence  and 
omniscience  which  the  world-soul  is  probably  destined  some 
day  to  attain,  its  present  condition  is  comparable  to  the  semi- 
consciousness  of  an  oyster. 

"La  conscience  du  tout  parait  jusqu-ici  bien  obscure.  Elle 
ne  seonble  pas  depasser  beaucoup  celle  de  Phuitre  et  du  polypier, 
mais  elle  exist© ;  le  monde  va  vers  ses  fins  avec  un  instinct  sur." 
Dial.,  23-4;  cf.  F.  Pet.,  442-3. 

It  would  be  interesting  to  know  how  Henan  would  have  us 
reconcile  the  ff*ovrire  paternel  .  .  .  attestant  qu'un  oeil 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.      237 

nous  regarde  et  qu'un  coeur  nous  suit"  with  this  oyster-con- 
sciousness of  the  over-soul  in  its  present  stage. 

A  third  statement  of  his,  it  is  true,  supplies  a  connecting 
link;  but  this  statement  appears  under  the  heading  Reves: 

"Croyez-mjoi,  Diem  est  une  necessite  absolue.  Dieu  sera,  et 
Dieu  est.  En  tant  que  realite,  il  sera;  en  tan,t  qu'ideal,  il 
est.  Deus  est  sitrwl  in  esse  et  in  fieri.  Cela  seul  pent  se  deve- 
lopper  qui  est  deja.  Comment  d'ailleurs  imaginer  un  deve- 
loppemen-t  ayant  pour  point  de  depart  le  neant."  Dial.,  145-6. 
Of.  F.  Det,  XV— XVII. 

Without  entering  here  on  a  discussion  of  the  grounds  upon 
which  even  the  ideal  existence  of  God  is  affirmed  in  this  inter- 
mediate statement,  it  is  clear  that  it  does  not  remove  the  con- 
tradiction between  the  other  two.  Even  here  the  existence  of 
God  as  an  actual  and  completed  present  reality  is  distinctly 
denied.5 

A  very  provoking  mannerism  of  Kenan,  whenever  he  touches 
these  questions,  is  the  substitution  of  vague,  grandiloquent 
phrases  for  coherent  ideas.  What,  precisely,  does  he  mean  by 
ffle  fond  eternel,  t'infini,  la  substance,  V Ideal,  I'abime  de  I'eire," 
and  so  forth? 

"Kenan  abuse  de  la  mythologie,"  suggests  M.  Seailles,  "il  fait 
des  etres  avec  des  mots.'7  E.  R,  282,  note  2 :  Cf.  ibid.,  192-3. 

Much  of  Kenan's  religious  philosophy  is  in  fact  mere  rheto- 
ric, His  language  reminds  one  of  Napoleon's  famous  har- 
angue to  his  soldiers  in  Egypt :  "Soldats,  du  haut  de  ces  monu- 
ments quarante  siecles  vous  contemplent !"  The  emptiest  rhet- 
oric will  serve  when  minds  are  made  up  in  advance.  It  is  so 
in  philosophy  and  religion,  Glittering  sophistries,  from  the 
lips  of  a  good  or  great  man,  real  or  supposed,  are  often  more 
powerful  than  truth  itself  as  inducements  to  noble  and  heroic 
living. 

Stripped  of  its  rhetoric,  Kenan's  belief  in  a  God  amounts 
to  little  more  than  a  consciousness  that  our  phenomenal  world 
is  probably  not  the  whole  of  existence.  Some  deeper  reality, 
beginning  and  end  of  all  things,  most  probably  exists ;  but  con- 


238  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

ceirning  its  ultimate  nature  and  attributes  nothing  whatever  is 
known. 

"La  tentative  d'expliquer  Pineffable  par  des  mots  est  aussi 

desesperee  que  celle  de  Fexpliquer  par  des  recite  ou  des  images : 

la  langue,  condamnee  a  cette  torture,  proteste,  hurle,  detonne. 

Toute  proposition  appliquee  a  Dieu  est  imperti^ 

nente,  une  seule  exeeptee:      II  est."     Frag.,  323-5. 

Renan  expressly  repudiates  the  assumption  that  any  conclu- 
sions can  be  drawn,  as  to  the  attributes  of  Grod,  from  the  bare 
assertion  of  his  existence,  or  even  from  the  pro-position  that 
he  is  a  spirit  Remembering  that  the  word  spirit  bears  a,  purely 
negative  meaning  in,  his  ontology,  we  are  prepared  for  the  fol- 
lowing reductio  ad  absurdum  of  scholastic  argumentation: 

"On  dit,  par  example,  Dieu  est  un  esprit,  il  a  tons  les  attributs 
des  esprits.  Esprit  signifiant  seulement  tout  ce  qui  n'est  pas 
corps,  ce  raisonnement  equivaut  a  celui-ci :  II  y  a  deux  classes 
d'aniiniaux,  les  chevaux  et  les  non-chevaux.  L'oiseau  est  un 
non-cheval.  Le  poisson  est  aussi  un  non-cheval.  Done  1'oiseau 
et  le  poisson  sont  de  la  meme  espece,  et  ce  qui  se  dit  de  I'oiseau 
peut  se  dire  du  poisson."  A.  S.,  note  192. 

On  questions  concerning  the  nature  and  attributes  of  what 
is  known  as  the  Absolute,  Renan  was  an  agnostic. 

"Des  voiles  impenetrables,"  he  writes  in  1859,  "nous  de- 
robent  le  secret  de  ce  monde  etrange  dont  la  realite  a  la  fois 
s'impose  a  nous  et  nous  accable;  la  philo'sophie  et  la  science 
poursuivront  a  jamais,  sans  jamais  Tatteindre,  la  formule  de 
ce  Protee  qu'aucune  raison  ne  limite,  qu'aucun  langage  n'ex- 
prime."  Mor.  Or.,  I— II;  Disc.,  216;  also  Preface  to  the 
Dial. ;  Hist,  rel.,  418. 

Again,  in  his  reply  to  the  Discours  de  reception  of  M.  Pas- 
teur, 1882: 

"Le  resultat  final,  c'est  encore  que  le  plus  grand  des  sages  a 
ete  TEcclesiaste,  quand  il  represente  le  monde  livre  a,ux  disputes 
des  hoonmies,  pour  qu'ils  n?y  comprennent  rien  depuis  un  bout 
jusqu'a  1'autre."  Disc.,  81. 

Already  in  his  first  book  he  takes  up  the  position  that  the 
human  mind,  developed  by  contact  with  the  phenomenal  world 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      239 

and  therefore  adapted  to  it  alone,  is  unable  to  apprehend 
"things-in-tbeonselves."  As  the  humlan  ear  is  adapted  to  the 
perception  of  sound  only  within  a  certain,  middle  region  of 
wave-lengths,  and  is  deaf  to  everything  above  or  below  its  range, 
so  with  reason :  both  the  infinitely  small  and  the  infinitely  great 
arei  beyond  its  reach.  Man  is  unable  to1  conceive  either  an  ab- 
solute beginning  or  an  absolute  end ;  a  first  cause  is  as  unthink- 
able as  a  last  effect.  Carry  ontological  speculation  beyond  a 
certain  limit,  and  you  are  brought  to  the  merest  tautology. 
Every  act  of  mind,  he  declares,  like  every  equation,  is  reduci- 
ble at  last  to  A  =  A.  See  A.  S.,  p.  477. 

"II  faut  renoncer  a  1'etroit  concept  de  la  scolastique, 
prenant  Pesprit  humain  commie  une  machine  parfaitement 
exacto  et  adequate  a  I'absolu.  Des  vues,  des  apergusi,  des  jours, 
des  ouvertures,  des  sensations,  des  couleurs,  des  physionomies, 
des  aspects,  voila  les  formes  sous  lesquelles  Pesprit  pergoit  les 
choses.  La  geometrie  seule  se  forme  en  axiomes  et  en 
theoremes.  Ailleurs  le  vague  est  le  vrai."  A.  S.,  58.  Cf. 
ibid.,  56;  152-153;  477;  and  note  26.  Also  Dial.,  VI,  147. 

"l^ous  ne  savons  pas!  voila  tout  ce  qu'on  peut  dire  de  clair 
sur  ce  qui  est  au-dela  du  fini.  ~Ne  nions  rien,  n'amrmons  rien, 
esperons.  Gardons  une  place,  dans  les  funerailles,  pour  la 
musique  et  Pencens."  F.  Det,  XVII.  Cf.  C.  d'Angl.,  6-7. 

TJie  question  whether  the  human  mind,  inadequate  and  un- 
satis factory  though  it  be  as  a,  measure  of  objective  reality,  is 
reliable  within  the  limits  of  perception  adapted  to  its  own  con- 
stitution, is  raised  by  Ren  an  at  the  bginning  of  his  Dialogues 
philosophiques : 

Phtialetke: 

"Force  nous  est  bien,  cependant,  d^essayer  de  construire 
d'apres  ce  que  nous  voyons  la  theorie  de  ce  que  nous  ne  voyons 
pas,  sons  peine  de  rassembler  a  P animal  qui,  courbe  vers  la 
terre,  ne  s'occupe  que  de  Pobjet  le  plus  prochain  de  ses  sens  et 
de  ses  appetits. 


240  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

Eutliypliron: 

"Soit,  ....  Mais  un  doute  superieur  plane  sur 
toutes  ces  speculations.  Le  doute  tient  a  une  question  insolu- 
ble. Notre  constitution  psychologique,  qui  est  1'oeil  par  lequel 
nous  voyons  la  realite,  n'est-elle  pas  elle-meme  trompeuse  ?  ISTe 
sommes-nous  pas  les  jouets  d'une  erreur  inevitable  £  Impossi- 
ble de  repondre  a  une  pareille  interrogation  sans  tomber  dans 
un  eercle  vicieux. 

Philalethe: 

"Je  me  suis  habitue  a  ne  plus  m'arreter  a  ce  doute,  qui  a 
jete  tant  de  philosophes  dans  une  voie  sans  issue.  Comme  1' in- 
strument de  la  raison,  manie  scientifiquement  et  applique  a  la 
facon  d'un  etalon  inflexible  de  la  realite,  n?a  jamiais  conduit  a 
une  erreur,  il  faut  en  conclure  qu'il  est  bon  &t  qu'on  pent  s'y 
fier.  Une  balance  se  verifie  par  elle-meme,  quand,  en  variant 
les  pesees,  elle  donne  des  resultats  constants."  Dial.,  6-7. 

The  further  question,  whether  man's  present  "faculties"  of 
perception  are  final,  whether  new  ones  may  not  in  time  be  de- 
veloped or  unknown  ones  discovered,  Kenan  seems  nowhere  to 
have  considered  explicitly,  though  an  affirmative  answer  would 
seem  to  be  implied  in  his  belief  that  the  evolving  God  is  devel- 
oping through  humanity. 

Concerning  the  future  of  religion,  Renan  is  in  complete  agree- 
ment with  Herbert  Spencer.  Positive  knowledge,  he  main- 
tains, can  never  fill  out  the  whole  region  of  possible  thought. 
Beyond  the  circle  of  the  known  lies  the  region  of  the  unknown. 
The  very  nature  of  intelligence  and  constitution  of  the  mind 
imply  that  around  this  circle  of  knowledge  must  always  ex- 
tend a  margin  of  ignorance.  The  greater  one's  knowledge,  in- 
deed, or  the  larger  one's  circle,  the  broader  the  outlook  upon 
the  surrounding  area  of  the  .unknown,  the  region  of  igno- 
rance and  wonder,  of  mystery  and  miracle.  Kenan  concludes 
from  this  that  man  will  always  be  religious,  for  he  will  always 
be  impelled,  by  the  very  nature  of  his  mind,  to  reach  over  into 
this  border-land  of  mystery,  and  seek  to  establish  communion 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REOSAN.  241 

with  what  he  regards  as  a  super-sensuous  world.  And  what  is 
this,  Renan  asks,  if  not  religion? 

"L'homime  en  face  des  choses  est  fatalement  porte  a  en,  cher- 
cher  le  secret.  Le  probleine  se  pose  de  lui-mieme,  et  en  vertu 
de  cette  faculte  qu'a  rhotmme  d7allor  au  dela  du  phenomene 
qu7il  percoit  :  tou jours,  en  face  de  Pmconnu, 

Thonime  ressent  un  douhle  sentiment,  respect  pour  le  mystere, 
noble  temerite  qui  le  porte  a  dechirer  le  voile  pour  connaitre  ce 
,Uii  est  au  dela."  A.  S.,  17-18. 

And  again  before  the  Academie  Fran^aise: 

"II  est  des  sujets  ou  Ton  aime  mieux  deraisonner  que  de  se 
taire.  Verite  ou  chimere,  le  reve  de  Tinfini,  nous  attirera  tou- 

jours En  pareille  matiere,  la  puerilite  meme 

des  efforts  est  touchante.  II  ne  f  aut  pas  demander  de  logique 
aux  solutions  que  rhomone  imagine  pour  se  rendre  quelque 
raison  du  sort  etrange  qui  lui  est  echu."  Disc.,  40-1.  Cf.  Dial., 
VI,  VII;  XIII. 

"La  religion  est  necessaire.  Le  jour  ou  elle  disparai trait, 
ce  serait  le  coeur  meme  de  Thumanite  qui  se  dessecherait 
La  religion  est  aussi  eternelle  que  la  poesie,  aussi  eternelle  que 
1' amour ;  elle  survivra  a  la  destruction  de  toutes  las  illusionsu 
Jamtais  Thomme  ne  se  contentera  d?une  destinee 
finie."  Q.  C.,  235;  ibid.,  414;  also  C.  d'Ang.,  6-7;  Ant, 
XLIX— LI. 

This  propensity  of  human  nature  to  "other-worldliness"  led 
Renan  to  the  position  of  Kant.  Cf.  Mor.  Grit.,  IV.  Besides 
the  pure  reaison  which  iserves  in  the  phenomenal  world,  there 
is  in  man,  he  believed,  a  mysterious  transcendental  faculty  or 
capacity,  in  virtue  of  which  he  is  enabled  to  hold  communion 
with  a.  super-sensuous  wo>rld.  This  capacity  he  variously  de- 
nominates r'Moral  Sense,77  "Categorical  Imperative,77  "Practi- 
cal Reason,77  "Conscience,77  "'Divine  Instinct,77  and  so  forth; 
but  called  by  whatever  name,  it  is  always  opposed  to  the  Pure 
Rieason.  It  is  the  pure  heart  that  sees  God;  pure  reason  is 
atheistic.  Dr.  Ph.,  279-80. 

"II  est  une  base  indubitable  que  nul  scepticisme  n7ebranlera 
3 


4  BULLETIN    OF    THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

et  011  I'homme  trouvera  jusqn'a  la  fin  des  jours  le  point  fixe  de 
ses  incertitudes :  le  bien,  c'est  le  bien ;  le  mal,  c'est  le  mal.  Pour 
hair  Tun  et  pour  aimer  1'autre,  aucun  systeme  n'est  necessaire, 
et  c'est  en  ce  sens  que  la  foi  et  1'amour,  en  apparence  sans  lien 
avec  I'inteliigence,  sont  le  vrai  fondement  de  la  certitude  morale 
et  1'unique  moyen  qu'a  I'homme  de  comprendre  quelque  chose 
au  probleme  do  son  origine  et  de  sa  destinee."Mor.  Cr,  II.  Of. 
Job,  XG— XCI. 

"Ce  qui  revele  le  vrai  Dieu,  c'st    le    sentiment    moral.     Si 
1'humanite  n'etait  qu'intelligente,  elle  serait  athee; 
Le  devoir,  le  devouement,  le  sacrifice,  toutes  chooses  dont  1'his- 
toire  est  pleine,  sont  inexplicables  sans  Dieu."     Frag.,  321-3. 
Cf.  Dial.,  30-1,  38. 

Nor  is  the  testimony  of  this  moral  sense  less  reliable  than 
the  deliverances  of  pure  reason,  or  the  verdict  of  sense-percep- 
tion. Kenan  would  admjit  that  moral  and  religious  intuitions 
cannot  b©  expressed  in  rational  speech,  nor  formulated  in  defi- 
nite logical  propositions ;  but  he  would  insist,  at  the  same  time, 
that  such  an  admission  in  no  wise  affects  their  veracity,  and  that 
ideas  are  not  necessarily  false  because  they  are  vagua  Once 
admit  that  there  is  or  can  be  such  a  thing  as  non-rational  truth, 
and  it  seems  impossible  to  avoid  acknowledging  symbolistic 
suggestion  as  legitimate  language  by  the  side  of  syllogistic 
assertion;  the  one  for  religion  and  the  other  for  science.6 

"La  spiritualite  de  Tame  et  1'existence  de  Dieu     .      .      . 
sont  des  choses  si  claires  qu'elles  n'ont  pas  besoin  d'etre  demon- 
trees,  011,  quand  on  les  prend  pa,r  1'analyse,  des  choses  si  obscures 
qu'elles  ne   sont   pas   demontrables."     Frag.,  2Y2.     Cf.    ibid., 
323. 

To  what  extent,  if  at  all,  Renan  was  influenced  by  contem- 
porary thinkers  of  the  agnostic  and  positive  schools,  with  whom 
he  agrees  in  the  main  in  miuch  of  his  religious  philosophy,  it 
is  impossible  to  make  out  with  sufficient  clearness  to  warrant 
positive  statements.  Cf.  Faguet,  Hist.  lit.  fr.,  410-11. 

As  for  positivism,  there  is  abundant  evidence  that  he  early 
became  familiar  with  the  doctrines  of  Comte  and  his  disciple 


BEAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAX.      243 

Littre,  though   neither    of  these  appears  to  have  been  sympa- 
thetically read  by  him, 

Com,tei  receives  frequent  mention  in  his  earlier  writings,,  but 
always  in  a  disparaging  tone.  In  ISAvenir  de  Id  science,  for 
example,  Kanan's  criticism  is  summed  up  in  these  words : 

"En  un  mot,  M.  Comfe  n'entend  rien  aux  sciences  de  1'hu- 
manite,  parce  qu'il  n'est  pas  philologue."  A.  S.,  151 ;  also  note 
117. 

And  again  in  the  Souvenirs: 

"J'eprouvai  une  sorte  d'agacenuent  a  voir  la  reputation  ex- 
ageree  d'  Augusta  Comte,  erige  en  grand  homme  de  premier 
ordre  pour  avoir  dit,  en  mauvais  francais,  ce  que  tous  les  esprits 
scientifiques,  depuis  deux  cents  ans,  ont  vu  aussi  clairement  que 
lui."  Souv.,  250. 

But  in  spite  of  his  unlaudatory  estimates  of  the  founder  of 
positivism),  there  can  be  no  question  that  Renan  was  deeply  imf 
bued  with  its  spirit,  and  this  appears  to  be  due  to>  the  influence 
of  Comte.  Cf.  Brunetiere,  Manl.  hist  lit  fr.,  482.  Mr.  Bab- 
bitt briefly  and  correctly  defines  Renan  asi  a  scientist  and  posi" 
tivist  with  a  Catholic  imagination.  Souv.,  Introd.,  IX. 

Far  more  important  than  the  influence  of  Comte,  or  of  any 
of  his  own  countrymen,  except,  perha.ps,  Malebranche,  was  the 
influence  of  the  Germans,  notably  Kant,  Hegel,  Fichte,  Herder, 
Goethe,  and  later  Schopenhauer  and  v.  Hartmann.  With 
Kant>  Herder  and  Hegel,  however,  Kenan  appears  to  have  had 
only  a  secondhand  acquaintance,  apparently  through  Cousin, 
and  Quinert*  His  scientific  work,  too,  in  history  and  biblical 
criticism,  was  mainly  built  up  on  the  results  of  German  schol- 
arship, as  he  often  himself  very  gratefully  acknowledged. 
Souv.,  58,  246,  291,  311,  385 ;  Bef.  Int,  V— VI;  Cf.  Hist  lit 
fr.,  456-7;  Platehoff,  E.  R.,  71;  Seailles,  E.  R,  244.  For 
Kenan's  criticisms  upon  Hegel,  see  A.  S.,  note  14;  also  p.  258; 
and  Lang.  Sem.,  505. 

We  have  comtpared  Kenan  with  agnostics.  But  here  again 
he  very  much  lacked  consistency.  Many  of  his  utterances,  es- 
pecially in  the  earlier  period,  are  as  far  as  possible  removed 


244  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

from  the  agnostic  creed.  Imagine  Huxley  or  Spencer  writing 
these  words: 

"Oui,  il  viendra  uii  jour  ou  Mmmanite  ne  croira  plus,  mais 
ou  elle  saura ;  un  jour  ou  elle  saura  le  monde  metaphysique  et 
moral,  comtme  elle  sait  deja  le  monde  physique."  A.  S.,  91. 

And  yet  an  agnostic  Renan  crtainly  was,  at  least  in  the  sense 
of  distinguishing  sharply  between  knowledge  and  opinion,  fact 
and  fable,  and  declaring  the  riddle  of  existence  unsolvable  by 
the  human  mind.  Cf.  Monod:  Renan,  etc.,  XIV. 

"On  ne  fait  pas  de  dialogues  sur  la  geometric;  car  la  geome- 
trie  est  vraie  d'une  facon  impersonnelle.  Mait  tout  ce  qui  im- 
plique  une  nuance  de  foi,  d'adhesion  voulue,  de  choix,  d'anti- 
pathie,  de  sympathie,  de  haine  et  d'amour,  se  trouve  bien 
d'une  forme  disposition  oil  chaque  opinion  s'incarne  en  une 
personne  et  se  comporte  comme  un  etre  vivant."  Dr.  Ph.,  II. 
Cf.  Dial.,  XIII— XIV;  Disc.,  75;  Mor.  Grit.,  I— II;  A.  S., 
53-4. 

"Refuser  de  determiner  Dieu  n'est  pas  le  nier;  cette  reserve 
est  bien  plutot  I'effet  d'une  prof onde  piete,  qui  tremble  de  blas- 
phemier  en  disant  ce  qu^il  n'est  pas."  Frag.,  317. 

There  are  two  kinds  of  agnosticism,  as  everybody  knows: 
that  of  flippant  indifference,  and  that  of  baffled  endeavor;  and 
between  the  two  there  is  a  contrast  in  spirit  and  aim  as  great 
as  that  between  tavern  and  temple.  Renan  belongs  very  em- 
phatically in  the  latter  class.  There  is  no  evidence,  however, 
of  any  direct  influence  on  Renan  from  contemporary  agnosti- 
cism. As  for  the  English  school,  there  is  nothing  in  his  writ- 
ings to  suggest  that  he  was  even  acquainted  with  their  works. 
Neither  Huxley,  nor  Spencer,  nor  Tyndall  is  once  mentioned 
in  any  of  his  books. 

This  chapter  must  not  close  without  at  least  a  passing  refer- 
ence to  Renan's  latest  phase,  in  which  his  philosophy  of  life 
fades  out  more  and  more  into  epicurean  indifferentism.  After 
a  long  life  laboriously  spent  in  the  quest  of  what  he  conceived 
to  be  the  truth,  he  falls  more  and  more,  like  his  model  the 
Preacher,  into  a  habit  of  discoursing  discouragingly  upon  the 
vanity  of  all  things. 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      245 

"La.  verite  est  sourde  et  froide;  nos  ardeurs  ne  la,  tou  client 
pas.  Die  neue  Philosophic,  die  neuere  Philosophic,  die  neueste 
Philosophic.  Mon  Dieu !  que  ces  surencheres1  sont  naives- ! 
Pourquoi  se  disputer  ainsi  la  priorite  do  Perre<ur  ?  Sachons  at- 
tendre;  il  n'y  a  peut-etre  rien  an  bout;  on  bien,  qui  salt  si  la 
verite  n'est  pas  triste?  Ne  soyons  pas  si  presses  de  la  con- 

naitre Mais,  chers  enfants,  c'est  inutile  de  se 

donner  tant  de  mal  a  la  tete,  pour  n'arriver  qu'a  diangea* 
d'erreur.  Aimusez-vons,  puisque  vous  avez  vingt;  ans ;  travaillez 
aussi.77  F.  Det,  X.  Cf.  Dr.  Ph.,  263. 

aJe  ne  peux  m'oter  de  Fidee  que  o'est  peut-etre  apres  tout  le 
libertin  qui  a  raison  et  qui  pratique  la  vraie  philosophie  de  la 
vie."  Souv.,  149-50. 

"Par  la  bouche  de  Eeiian  jeune,"  comments  M  Seailles  on 
this  philosophy.,  ala  jeunesse  repond  an  vieux  Renan:  'Malheur 
a  la  generation  pui  a  congu  la  vie  comme  un  repos  et  Tart  comtme 
une  jouissance!'  "  E.  K,,  318.  Cf.  Q.  C.,  301. 

The  only  redeeming  feature  in  this  indifference,  if  that  is 
the  word,  is  the  intellectual  hospitality  it  implies.  A  more  tol- 
erant mjan  than  Renan  never  was;  and  in  the  present  instance 
his  theory  seemis  inspired  by  his  practice.  He  repeatedly  de- 
clares that  the  most  cordial  and  most  genuine  toleration  is  that 
which  rests  on  the  broad  and  firm  foundations  of  universal  dis- 
illusionment: 

"La  plus  solide  bonte  est  celle  qui  se  fonde  sur  le  parfait 
ennui,  sur  la  vue  claire  de  ce  fait  que  tout  en  ce  monde  est 
frivole  et  sans  fond  reel.  Dans  cette  mine  absolue  de  toute 
chose1,  que  reste-t^il  ?  La  mechancete  ?  Oh  !  Cela  n'en  vaut 
pas  la;  peine.  La  mechancete  suppose  une  eertaine  foi  au 
serieux  de  la  vie,  la  foi  du  moins  au  plaisir,  la  foi  a  la  ven- 
geance, la  foi  a  1'ambition.  Neron  croyait  a  1'art;  Commode 
croyait  au  cirque,  et  cela  les  rendait  cruels.  Mais  le  desabuse 
qui  sait  que  tout  objet  de  desir  est  frivole,  pourquoi  se  donne- 
raitril  la  peine  d'un  sentiment  desagreable-"  Marc-Aur.,  483. 

"La  bonte  du  sceptique  est  la  plus  solide  de  toutes ;  elle  repose 
Cf.  Disc.,  75. 


246  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

sur  un  sentiment  profond  de  la  verite  supreme :  Nil  expedit." 
Eoci.  89;  repeated  P.  Isr.,  V:  159-60. 

If  these  statements  are  true,  it  seems  safe  to  predict  that 
"la  bonte  la  plus  solide  du  sceptique,"  this  universal  tolerance 
based  on  universal  indifference,  is  not  what  humanity  wants, 
or  will  permanently  accept.  Considerations  of  practical  useful- 
ness, rather  than  of  speculative  truthfulness,  will  doubtless  con- 
tinue to  preside  over  the  moral  evolution  of  the  race.  The  in- 
corrigible prejudices  of  virtuous  men  will  continue  to  count 
for  more  than  the  sceptic's  "verite  supreme:  Nil  expedit." 

It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  most  people  are  least  tol- 
erant precisely  in  the  sphere  in  which  positive  knowledge  is 
most  difficult,  not  to  say  impossible,  the  sphere  of  religion. 
Of.  James,  Var.  Rel.  Exp.,  338,  342-3 ;  also  P.  Is.,  II,  102, 
141.  Renan  was  the  very  reverse.  To  the  end  of  his  life  he 
was  always  willing  to  accord  to  his  fellowmen  the  same  free- 
dom of  belief,  whether  positive  or  negative,  which  he  claimed 
for  himself.  His  last  word  on  this  subject  is  contained  in  a 
little  after-dinner  speech : 

"Nous  autres  liberaux,  nous  ne  demandons  qu'une  seule  chose, 
<c'est  que  chacun  ait  la  liberte  de  batir  a  sa  maniere  son  roman 
de  1'infLni.  Tout  ce  qu'on  balbutie  en  pareille  matiere  revient 
a  peu  pres  au  meme  et  se  resume  a  dire  que,  sur  ce  qui  depasse 
notre  pauvre  monde,  on  ne  sait  pas  grand  chose."  F.  Det, 
124-5. 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      247 


CHAPTER  III. 


MAN. 


In  passing  from  Kenan's  philosophy  of  nature  to  his  moral 
philosophy,  we  are  not  progressing  to  something  m|ore  definite 
or  more  coherent.  On  the  contrary,  the  vagueness  which  char- 
acterizes all  his  philosophical  thought  becomes  increasingly 
prominent  in  his  utterances  concerning  the  moral  life.  It 
seems  to  have  been  one  of  his  favorite  convictions  that  a  com- 
prehensive  description  of  the  moral  life,  or  statement  of  moral 
principles,  cannot  be  given  in  a  series  of  definite  propositions 
logically  consistent  with  each  other. 

"Telle  est  la  veritable  forme  des  verites  morales:  c'est  les 
f ausser  que  leur  appliquer  ces  monies  inflexibles  des  sciences 
mathcmatiques,  nui  ne  conviennent  qu'a  des  verites  d'un  autre 

ordre,    acquises  par   d'autres   precedes Quand 

done  cesserons-nous  d'etre  de  lourds  scolastiques  et  d'exiger 
sur  Dieu,  sur  Tame,  sur  le  morale,  des  petits  bouts  de  phrases 
a  la  faeon  de  la  geometric?  Je  suppose  ces  phrases  aussi  ex- 
actes  que  possible;  elles  seraient  fausses,  radicalement  fausses, 
par  leur  absurde  tentative  de  definir,  de  limiter  1'infini :  Ah ! 
lisez-moi  un  dialogue  de  Platon,  une  meditation  de  Lamartine, 
une  page  de  Herder,  une  scene  de  Faust.  Voila  une  philoso- 
phie,  c'est-a-dire  une  f  agon  de  prendre  la  vie  et  les  choses." 
A.  S.,  54-55.  Cf.  ibid,  152-3. 

In  Averro'es  et  I'averro'isme,  we  find  the  same  doctrine  in  a 
more  elaborate  and  reasoned  form,  affirmed  in  opposition  to  the 
Averroasts  of  Padua : 

"Lii  verite  en  toute  chose  etant  extrememeoit  delicate  et  fugi- 
tive, ce  n'est  pas  a  la  dialectique  qu'il  est  donne  de  Tatteindre. 

Dans  les  sciences  morales  et  politiques,     . 
ou  les  principes,  par  leur  expression  insuffisante  et  toujours 


248  BULLETIN    OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

partielle,  posent  a  moitie  sur  le  vrai,  a  moitie  stir  le  faux,  les 
result  ats  du  raisonnement  ne  sont  legitimes  qu'a  condition  d'etre 
controles  a  chaque  pas  par  I'experience  et  le  boni  sens.  Le  syl 
logisme  excluant  toute  nuance  et  la  verite  residant  tout  entiere 
dans  les  nuances,  le  syllogisme  est  un  instrument  inutile  poui 
trouver  le  vrai  dans  les  sciences  morales.  La  penetration,  la 
souplesse,  la  culture  multiple  de  1'esprit,  voila  la  vraie  logique. 
La  forme  est,  en  philosophic,  au  moins  aussi  importante  que  le 
fond."  Averr.,  323 ;  170,  X.  Of.  Hist.  Eel.,  339-40. 

"Autant  vaudrait  essayer  d'atteindre  un  insecte  aile  avec  une 
massue  que  de  pretendre,  avec  les  serres  pesantes  du  syllogisme, 
trouver  le  vrai  en  des  matieres  aussi  delicates.  La  logique  ne 
saisit  pas  les  nuances ;  or  les  verites  de  1'ordre  moral  resident 
tout  entieres  dans  la  nuance.  Elles  s'echappent  par  les  mailles 
du  filet  de  la  scolastique."  Mor.  Crit,,  189.  Cf.  ibid,  312-13. 
13. 

Perhaps  the  simplest  and  most  direct  way  of  exhibiting  Re- 
nan's  speculations  in  moral  philosophy  is  to  plunge  at  once  m 
medias  res  and  begin  with  its  central  feature,  the  problem  of 
immortality.  It  is  impossible^  in  fact,  to  discuss  his  view  of 
morality  without  coming  around  again  and  again  to  this  ques^ 
tion.  In  his  writings  morality  is  practically  identified  with 
religion,  and  religion  with  immortality.  With  the  m)ost  untir- 
ing emphasis  he  insists  that  the  best  foundation  of  morality 
after  all,  its  only  effective  foundation  indeed,  is  the  belief  in  a 
future  life. 

"La  poesie  et  la.  morale  sont  en  effet  deux  choses  differentes ; 
mais  elles  supposent  1'une  et  1'autre  que  I'hoinme  n'est  pas  un 
etre  d'un  jour  sans  lien  avec  Tinfini  qui  le  precede,  sans  respon- 
sabilite  envers  Tinfini  qui  le  suit."  Mor.  Crit,  112. 

His  point  of  view  is  very  clearly  described  by  M.  Scherer, 
who  makes  it  his  own : 

"Ayons  le  courage  de  le  reconnaitrei :    la  morale  ne  peut 
se  passer  de  transcendance,  et  par  consequent  de  metaphysique. 
S'achons  voir  les  choses  comme  elles  sont:     la  mo- 
rale, la  bonne,  la  vraie,  Fancienne,  Timperative,  a  besoin  de  Tab- 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      24G 

solu;  .  .  .  elle  ne  trouve  son  point  d'appui  qu'en  Dieu. 
La  religion,  c'est  le  surnaturel.  Etj'ajoute:  la  mo- 
rale de  meme;  car  la  morale  n'est  rien  si  elle  n'est  pas  reli- 
gieuse."  Scherer,  Litt.  Cbnt,  vol.  8,  pp.  171,  182-3.  Cf.  also 
Prof.  James:  "Religion,  in  fact,  for  the  great  majority  of 
our  own  race,  means  immortality,  and  nothing  else."  Var. 
Eel.  Exp.,  524. 

The  problemi  of  immortality  early  engaged  Kenan's  atten- 
tion, owing  to  his  belief  in  universal  evolution.  He  tells  us 
that  ever  since  he  was  capable  of  thinking  for  himself,  it  was 
to  questions  concerning  the  origin  and  destiny  of  man  that  his 
thoughts  most  frequently  turned.  A.  S.,  160-1. 

In  1848  he  declares  that  the  question  relating  to  the  origin 
of  man  must  be  solved,  if  at  all,  by  the  observational  or  his- 
torical method ;  and  he  indicates,  in  a  manner  that  shows  a 
clear  grasp  of  the  situation,  the  numerous  preliminary  ques- 
tions to  be  answered  before  the  solution  of  the  general  problem 
is  possible.  A.  S.,  161-3.  For  some  years  previous  he  had 
been,  convinced  that  man  is  not  a  "special  creation,"  but  the 
cumulative  product  of  evolutionary  forces  still  at  work.  A.  S., 
161.  Cf.  ibid.,  note  75. 

To  what  extent  did  the  new  theory  of  man's  origin  affect  his 
conception  of  man's  destiny  ?  If  humanity  is  the  outcome  of 
a  long  development  reaching  back  to  the  first  beginnings  of 
life;  if  it  is  really  true  that  m!an  has  grown,  spiritually  and  in- 
tellectually as  well  as  physically,  from  the  brute  animal,  which 
in  turn  was  evolved  in  the  same  gradual  way  from  still  lower 
forms,  the  question  naturally  arises:  is  it  possible  to  continue 
affirming  the  immortality  of  man,  without  extending  it  also  to 
the  beasts  of  the  field,  and  even  to  fishes  and  worms  ?  At  what 
point  in  the  passage  from  protozoon  to  man  does  the  immortal 
soul  begin  ? 

He  clearly  shows  that  the  difficulty  arises  fromi  the  unbroken 
continuity  of  the  evolutionary  process.  If  evolution  is  indeed 
continuous,  leading  without  a  break  from!  the  lowest  forms  of 
life  to  the  highest,  it  must  be  impossible  to  draw  any  definite 


250  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVEKSITY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

line  of  separation  between  mortal  and  immortal  creatures.  It 
would  be  quite  arbitrary  where  such  a  line  should  be  drawn. 

A  similar  objection  against  the  traditional  creed  arose  from 
what  may  be  called  his  psycho-physical  conception  of  man. 
The  very  idea  of  body  and  soul  as  two  distinct  and  separate  en- 
tities, united  in  some  mysterious  way  during  life  and  by  their 
separation  marking  what  is  called  death,  is  an  idea  which 
he  believed  to  be  incompatible  with  evolutional  psychology. 
Where  is  the  evidence  that  body  and  soul  are  separate  exist- 
ences at  all?  Might  they  not  be  different  aspects  merely  of 
one  and  the  same  phenomenon  ?  And  if  they  are  only  differ- 
ent sides  of  one  and  the  same  thing,  what  sense  can  there  be  in 
the  statement  that  the  soul  may  continue  to  exist  though  the 
body  have  perished  ? 7 

These  were  some  of  the  thorns  which  evolutionary  science 
had  sown  in  the  once  fruitful  fields  of  theology,  in  which  lie- 
nan  was  so  earnestly  at  work.  With  these  and  kindred  difficul- 
ties he  grappled  and  struggled,  for  a  time  by  day  and  by  night. 
Tlhe  result  is  well  known.  Unable  to  reconcile  what  he  be- 
lieved to  be  the  teachings  of  science  with  those  of  the  creed,  he 
abandoned  the  priesthood  and  left  the  church.  He  was  then  a 
young  man  of  two  and  twenty,  and  he  lived  to  be  almost  seventy. 
Did  his  subsequent  labors  lead  him  to  any  deeper  insight  into 
this  momentous  question  of  human  destiny  ? 

In  later  years  his  position  on  the  question  of  human  immor- 
tality was,  like  most  of  his  philosophical  beliefs,  a  double  one. 
A  rationally  conceived  and  scientifically  established  fact,  he  in- 
sists on  the  one  hand,  immortality  most  certainly  is  not.  In- 
deed, he  strongly  inclines  to  the  belief  that,  so  far  as  scientific 
enquiry  and  demonstration  can  go,  individual  human  immor- 
tality is  very  probably  an  illusion. 

But  while  immortality  cannot  be  asserted  as  a,  fact,  neither 
can  it,  on  the  other  hand,  be  convincingly  shown  to  be  a  mere 
fiction.  Absolute  denial  would  be  as  misplaced  as  positive  as- 
sertion. F.  Det,  XV-XVIL 

In  Kenan's  philosophy   the   universe   is   divided    into  two 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      251 

spheres,  so  to  speak,  the  finite  and  the  infinite,  the  relative  and 
the  absolute;  and  the  criteria  of  truth  which  serve  in  the  one 
are  not,  lie  believed,  of  necessity  valid  in  the  other.  The 
idea  of  immortality  therefore,  though  an  entirely  gratuitous  as- 
sumption when  addressed  to  the  finite  reason,  may  yet  corre- 
spond to  reality  in  the  realm  of  the  absolute. 

"Les  deux  grands  postulate  de  la  vie  humaine,  Dieu  et  Timr 
mortalite  le  Tame,  gratuits  au  point  de  vue  du  fini  ou  nous  vi- 
vons,  sont  peut-etre  vrais  a  la  limite  de  Tinfini."  F.  Det.,  419. 

He  often  insists  that  belief  in  immortality  is  at  bottom  a 
corollary  from  faith  in  divine  justice.  A  just  God,  he  argues, 
cannot  allow  that  the  virtuous  should  wholly  die.  F.  Det., 
XV-XIX.  If  there  is  no  hereafter,  a  virtuous  life  is  an  im- 
position without  compensation,  and  not  worth  while.  The  idea 
that  virtue  mjust  meet  with  its  reward,  he  declares,  is  the  most 
logical  of  all  ideas  in  the  human  breast.  P.  Isr.,  IV,  277. 
Cf.  Dial.,  137. 

"S'il  etait  vrai  que  la  vie  humaine  ne  fut  qu'une  vaine  suc- 
cession de  faits  vulgaires,  sans  valeur  suprasensible,  des  la  pre- 
miere reflection  serieuse,  il  faudrait  se  donner  la  mort;  il  n?y 
aurait  pas  de  milieu  entre  Tivresse,  une  occupation  tyrannique 
de  tous  les  instants,  et  le  suicide."  A.  S.,  8 ;  411. 

And  again  in  his  lecture  before  the  Royal  Institution,  1880 : 

"Dire  que  si  ce  monde  n'a  pas  sa  contrepartie,  Phomme  qui 
s'est  sacrifie  pour  le  bien  ou  le  vrai  doit  le  quitter  content  et 
absoudre  les  dieux,  cela  est  trop  naif.  Non,  il  a  le  droit  de  les 
blasphemter.  .  .  Je  veux  que  1'avenir  soit  une  enigme ;  mais 
s?il  n'y  a  pas  d'avenir,  ce  monde  est  un  affreux  guetrapens." 
C.  d'Angl,  242. 

"S'il  n'y  a  pas  un,e  autre  vie  pour  reparer  les  iniquites  de 
celle-ci,  soutenir  que  Dieu  est  juste  et  ami  du  bien  est  le  plus 
pueril  des  paradoxes  ou  la  plus  niaise  des  contre-verites." 
Eccl.,  33. 

Again  in  his  Discours  de  reception  before  the  Academie 
Francaise : 

"L'homime  .  .  .  invinciblement  porte  a  croire  a  la  jus- 
tice et  jete  dans  un  monde  qui  est  et  sera  toujours  Tinjustice 


252  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

meme  .  .  .,  que  voulez-vous  qu'il  f asse ?  II  se  revolte  con- 
tre  le  cereiieil,  il  rend  la  chair  a  Pos  decharne,  la  vie  au  cerveau 
plein  de  pourriture,  la  lumiere  a  Poeil  eteint;  il  imagine  des 
sophisinies  dont  il  rirait  chez  un  enfant,  pour  ne  pas  avouer  que 
la  nature  a  pu  pousser  Pironie  jusqu'a  lui  imposer  le  fardeau 
du  devoir  sans  compensation."  Disc.,  41. 

Observe,  however,  that  these  statements  admit  of  two  very 
different  conclusions :  either  there  is  no  hereafter,  or  there  is 
no  just  God.  With  the  utmost  emphasis  he  affirms  that  in  this 
present  world  justice  is  not  done. 

"Loin  de  reveler  Dieu,  la  nature  est  immorale ;  le  bien  et  le 
mal  lui  sont  indifferents.  Jamais  avalanche  ne  s'est  arretee 
pour  ne  pas  ecraser  un  honnete  homme;  le  soleil  n'a  pali  de- 
vant  aucun  crime ;  la,  terre  boit  le  sang  du  juste  commie  le  sang 
du  pecheur.  L'histoire  de  meme  est  un  scandale  permanent 
au  point  de  vue  de  la  morale."  Frag.,  319.  Cf.  ibid.,  250; 
also  Disc.,  41 ;  Ecd.,  33 ;  Souv.  119,  316. 

The  assertion  that  virtue  is  rewarded  here  below,  he  declares, 
is  at  once  encountered  by  unanswerable  objections.  "The  asser- 
tion is  not  truei.  In  fact,  in  whatever  age  of  the  world,  and  in 
whatever  society  we  place  ourselves,  compensatory  justice 
is  constantly  violated.  More  versed  in  social  science  than  the 
ancients,  we  can  go  further,  and  assert  that  it  is  not  possible  it 
should  be  otherwise.  Injustice  is  to  be  found  in  Nature  itself. 

.  .  .  A  man  dies  in  the  devoted  attempt  to  save  another ; 
no  one  can  argue  that  absolute  justice  in  this  present  world  has 
been  displayed  in  the  fate  of  that  man."  P.  Isr.,  IV :  278. 

And  again: 

"In  history,  as  a  rule,  man  is  punished  for  the  good  he  does, 
and  recompensed  for  the  evil.  .  .  .  History  is  quite  the 
contrary  of  virtue  rewarded."8  P.  Isr.,  I:  331.  Of.  Kef., 
Int.,  XII:  "The  laws  of  history  are  the  justice  of  God;"  also 
Dr.  Ph.,  262. 

But  why  mniltiply  citations  ?  Statements  like  these  have  be- 
come platitudes.  And  yet,  if  they  are  really  true,  it  would 
seem  indispensible,  if  the  world  is  to  b©  grounded  in  justice, 
that  there  should  be  opportunity  for  retribution  and  compen- 


. 


' 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.  253 

sation  in  another  life.  But  where  is  Kenan's  proof  for  the  ex- 
istence of  such  a  life?  To  prove  that  justice  will  reign  in 
heaven,  something  more  is  required,  surely,  than  the  assertion 
of  its  notorious  absence  on  earth !  If  there  is  no  trace  of  di- 
vine justice  in  the  past  and  the  present,  as  Kenan  declares  there 
is  not,  what  ground  can  this  be  for  affirming  its  existence  in 
the  future  ? 

His  answer  is  supplied  by  his  theory  of  deific  evolution. 
The  destiny  of  man,  he  argues,  is  inseparably  bound  up  with 
the  destiny  of  God.  Whether  or  not  immortality  shall  some 
day  be  an  established  fact  depends  upon  whether  or  not  the  uni- 
verse succeeds  in  evolving  a  just  God.  At  present  paradise  is 
a  dream ;  billions  of  years  hence  it  may  be  a  reality.  F.  Det., 
419.  Immortality  as  an  essential  and  natural  property  of  the 
human  soul  is  a  myth,  to  be  sure;  we  shall  most  certainly  die, 
soul  and  body,  and  nothing  short  of  a  miracle  can  bring  us 
back  into  existence.  This  prodigious  miracle  may  take  place, 
however.  The  evolving  Over-soul,  having  attained  complete 
self-consciousness,  will  doubtless  be  just,  and  will  recall  to  ex- 
istence all  who  have  labored  in  behalf  of  its  own  evolution. 
And  then  will  immortality  be  established. 

"Qui  salt  si  le  dernier  terme  du  progres,  dans  des  millions 
de  siecles,  n'amenera  pas  la  conscience  absolue  de  Tunivers,  et 
dans  cette  conscience  le  reveil  de  tout  ce  qui  a  vecu?"  V.  J., 
288. 

"Quand  Dieu  sera  en  meme  temps  parfait  et  tout-puissant, 
e?est-a-dire  quand  romnipotence  scientifique  sera  concentree 
entre  les  mains  d'un  etre  bon  et  droit,  cet  etre  voudra  ressusci- 
ter  le  passe,  pour  eii  reparer  les  innombrables  iniquites.  Dieu 
existera  de  plus  en  plus;  plus  il  existera,  plus  il  sera  juste." 
Dial.,  135-6. 

"L'oeuvre  de  Phumanite  est  le  bien;  ceux  qui  auront  con- 
tribue  au  triomphe  du  bien  fulgebunt  sicut  siellae."  Dial., 
138. 

The  clearest  statement  of  this  doctrine  which  he  has  any- 
where given  occurs  in  his  article  on  Amiel: 

"IN'ous  eprouvons  un  invincible  besoin  de  supposer  dans  le 


254:  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UN1VEKSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

gouvernement  du  monde  la  justice  dont  nous  trouvons  la  dictee 
dans  nos  coeurs;  et,  comme  il  est  de  toute  evidence  que  cette 
justice  n'existe  pas  dans  la  realite  de  1'univers,  nous  arrivons 
a  exiger  absolument,  comme  condition  de  la  morale,  la  survi- 
vance  de  ehaque  conscience  humaine  au  dela  de  la  tombe.  Ici 
eclate  Tantinomie  supreme  de  la  nature  et  de  la.  raison.  Un  tel 
postulat,  en  effet,  est  la  chose  la  plus  necessaire  a  priori  et  la 
plus  impossible  a  posteriori.  ...  La  resurrection  serait 
un  miracle.  .  .  .  Elle  serait  Facte  final  du  monde,  le  fait 
d'un  Dieu  tout-puissant  et  tout-sachant,  capable  d'etre  juste 
et  voulant  Tetre.  .  .  .  Ce  serait  un  don  reserve  par  Petrer 
devenu  absolu,  parfait,  omniscient,  tout-puissant,  a  ceux  qui 
auraient  contribue  a  son  developpement."  F.  Det.,  390-2.  Cf. 
ibid.,  418;  P.  Isr.,  IV:  286-7,  284;  A.  S.,  220-1;  Dial.,  129- 
30;  142-3.  Dr.  Ph.,  262-3.  Souv.,  XXI-II. 

Renan  declares  he  can  see  no  force  in  the  objection  that  an 
immortality  to  be  inaugurated  ages  hence  is  too  remote  a  con- 
tingency to  afford  consolation  in  present  suffering.  Time  is  a 
purely  subjective  matter.  Succession,  which  is  a  category  of 
the  finite  mdnd,  has  no  place  in  the  realm  of  pure  spirit.  In 
the  timeless  eternity  of  the  spirit-world,  therefore,  a  sleep  of  a 
billion  years  is  no  longer  than  the  sleep  of  a  moment;  and  to 
shrink  from  the  long  interval  of  unconsciousness  between  death 
and  the  resurrection  is  like  dreading  the  length  of  a  night  which 
is  certain  to  be  passed  in  sound  and  dreamless  sleep.  F.  Det.,. 
419-20.  To  those  who  have  died  in  a  righteous  cause,  the 
reign  of  justice  in  heaven  will  seem  like  the  immediate  contin- 
uation and  triumph  of  the  very  cause  which  they  served  on 
earth.  P.  Isr.,  IV,  287. 

"Ceux  qu'une  tardive  justice  y  replacera  croiront  etre  morts- 
de  la  veille,  Comme  dans  la  legende  du  moyen  age,  en  pal- 
pant  leur  lit  d'agonie,  ils  le  trouveront  encore  chaud."  F. 
Det,  419. 

The  truth  is,  on  this  as  on  most  other  questions  of  the  same- 
order,  Renan  has  taken  both  sides  alternately.  At  one  time  we 
are  told,  if  virtue  and  vice  are  the  same  after  death,  if  saint 
and  sinner  alike  both  end  in  the  same  putrefaction  of  the  tombr 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.  255 

then  God  is  not  just.  And  then  again  we  find  him  refuting 
his  own  argument. 

"Je  n'admets  pas  comme  rigoureuse  la  preuve  de  rimmor- 
talite  tiree  do  la  necessite  ou  serait  la  justice  divine  de  reparer, 
dans  une  vie  ulterieure,  les  injustices  que  1'ordre  general  de 
Funivers  entraine  ici-bas.  Cette  preuve  est  conc/ue  au  point  de 
vue  de  1'individu.  Nos  peres  ont  souffert,  et  nous  heritons  du 
fruit  de  leurs  souffrances.  Nous  souffrons,  Tavenir  en  profi- 
tera.  Qui  sait  si  un  jour  on  ne  dira  pas:  'En  ce  temps-la,  on 
devait  croire  ainsi,  car  rhumajiite  fondait  alors  par  ses  souf- 
frances  1'etat  meilleur  dont  nous  jouissons.  Sans  cela  nos 
peres  n'eussent  point  eu  le  courage  de  supporter  la  chaleur  du 
jour.  Mais  maintenant  nous  avons  la  clef  de  Tenigmie,  et  Dien 
est  justifie  par  le  plus  grand  bien  de  Tespece.'  Pendant  que 
la  croyance  a  rimimortalite  aura  ete  necessaire  pour  rendre  la 
vie  supportable,  on  y  aura  cru."  A.  S.,  note  162. 

The  only  kind  of  immortality  that  he  unconditionally  affirms 
as  rooted  in  the  nature  of  things  is  what  may  be  called  the  sur- 
vival of  influence.  Man's  work  will  endure  as  long  as  the 
world.  A.  S.,  226,  223.  No  action  ever  dies.  The  immortals 
are  those  who  have  contributed  to  an  immortal  work.  F.  Det, 
441.  Cf.  Dial.,  131-2.  In  this  sense  the  very  worms  have 
a  place  in  the  eternal  chain  of  causation.  A.  S.,  223  ;  also  note 
42.  Truth  especially  is  imperishable;  he  that  adds  to  the  tem- 
ple of  truth  even  a  single  stone  may  justly  boast:  Exegi  mo- 
numentum  aere  perennius.  A,,  S.,  226. 

"L'immortalite  consiste  a  travailler  a  une  oeuvre  immortelle, 
telles  que  sont  Tart,  la  science,  la  religion,  la  vertu,  la  tradi- 
tion du  beau  et  du  bien  sous  toutes  leurs  formes."  Mbr.  Grit., 
140.  Cf.  ibid.,  63-4. 

This  doctrine  likewise  goes  back  to  his  earliest  days.  In  tho 
Avenir  de  la  science,  1848-9,  we  read: 

"II  f  aut  done  admettre  que  tout  ce  qui  aura  ete  sacrifie  pour 
le  progres  se  retrouvera  au  bout  de  Tinfini,  par  une  facon 
d'immortalite  que  la  science  decouvrira  un  jour,  et  qui  sera 
a  Pimmortalite  fantastique  du  passe  ce  que  le  palais  de  Ver- 


256  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

sallies  est  an  chateau  de  cartes  cPun  enfant."  A.  S.,  99.  Cf. 
ibid.,  note  42. 

In  a  famons  open  letter  to  his  friend  M.  Berthelot,  his  point 
of  view  is  presented  more  fully  and  more  clearly: 

"Nous  serons  cendres  depuis  des  milliards  d'annees,  les 
quelques  molecules  qui  font  la  matiere  de  notre  etre  seront  des- 
agregees  et  passees  a  d'incalculables  transformations  ;  mais  nous 
ressusciterons  dans  le  monde  que  nous  aurons  contribue  a  f  aire. 

Notre  oeuvre  triomphera L'ame,  la  personne, 

doivent  etre  congues  comme  choses  distinctes  de  la  conscience. 

L'aine  est  ou  elle  agit,  on  elle  aime.  Dieu 

etant  Pideal,  objet  de  tout  amour,  Dieu  est  done  essentielle- 
ment  le  lieu  des  ames.  La  place  de  Thomme  en  Dieu,  Topinion 
que  la  justice  absolue  a  de  lui,  le  rang  qu'il  tient  dans  le  seul 
vrai  mtonde,  qui  est  le  monde  selon  Dieu,  sa  part  en  un  mot 

de  la  conscience  generale,  voila  son  etre  veritable 

C'est  en  Dieu  que  Fhomme  est  immortel.  Les  categories 
de  temps  et  d'espace  etant  effacees  dans  Pabsolu,  ce  qui  existe 
pour  1'absolu  est  aussi  bien  ce  qui  a  ete  que  ce  qui  sera.  En 
Dieu  vivent  de  la  sorte  toutes  les  ames  qui  out  vecu.  Pour- 
quoi  le  regne  de  Pesprit,  fin  de  Punivers,  ne  serait-il  pas  ainsi 
la  resurrection  de  toutes  les  consciences  ?"  Frag.,  185-90.  Cf. 
Dial.,  139-43;  Job,  XCI ;  also  Seailles,  E.  E.,  208,  note, 

But  what  has  this  kind  of  immortality  in  common,  one  can- 
not help  asking,  except  the  name,  with  the  continued  existence 
of  individual  personality  after  death  ?  "C'est  en  Dieu  que 
Phomme  est  immortel.  En  Dieu  vivent  toutes  les  ames  qui 
ont  vecu."  Very  good*  but  do  not  these  words,  froon  Kenan's 
point  of  view,  convey  more  sound  than  sense?  For  God,  ac- 
cording to  our  author,  is  still  in  process  of  evolution,  and 
he  often  declares  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  our  planet 
may  not  fail  after  all  to  contribute  abiding  results  to  that  end. 
Hence  to  say  that  man  is  immortal  because  his  work  is  incor- 
porated as  a  link  in  the  endless  chain  of  cause  and  effect,  seems 
only  another  way  of  saying,  though  a  less  disagreeable  way, 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      257 

that  his  personal  destiny  after  death  is  that  of  the  worm  or  the 
waterfall.9 

In  short,  the  belief  in  immortality  represents,  according  to 
Kenan,  not  a,  fact,  but  a  hope:  and  fortunately  for  its  own,  sur- 
vival, is  independent  of  logical  proof.  Man  is  not  all  reason, 
nor  entirely  governed  by  reason.  On  this  truth  he  often  in- 
sists. For  ages  mien  have  believed  in  their  own  immortality 
without  intellectual  proof,  and  for  ages  to  come  they  will  con- 
tinue so  to  believe,  even  in  face  of  positive  disproof. 

"On  ne  fera  jamais  taire  les  objections  du  materialisme. 
II  n'y  a  pas  d'exemple  qu'une  pensee,  un  sentimient,  se  soient 
produits  sans  cerveau,  on  avec  un  cerveau  en  decomposition. 
D'un  a.utre  cote,  Phomme  n'arrivera  point  a  se  persuader  que  sa 
destinee  soit  semblable  a  celle  de  1'animal.  Meme  quand  oela 
sera  demontre,  on  ne  le  croira  pas,"  Eccl.,  87-8. 

Immortality,  in  a  word,  is  an  inevitable  postulate  of  human 
life.  Whatever  man's  theories  may  be,  in  practice  he  cannot 
assume  that  his  earthly  life  is  the  be-all  and  end-all  of  his  per- 
sonal existence^ 

"I  own  that  I  have  grave  doubts,"  he  writes  of  himself,  "as 
to  individual  immortality,  and  yet  I  almost  constantly  act  as 
if  I  held  in  view  things  beyond  my  life."  P.  Isr.,  IV:  285. 
On  this  point  he  is  very  emphatic. 

"L'histoire  demontre  cette  verite  qu'il  y  a  dans  la  nature 
humaine  un  instinct  transcendant  qui  la  pousse  vers  un  but 
superieur.  Le  developpement  de  Fhumanite  n'est  pas  explica- 
ble dans  Thypothese  ou  I'homme  ne  serait  qu'un  etre  a  destinee 
finie,  la  ve:rtu  qu'un  raffinement  d'egoi'sme,  la  religion  qu'une 
chimera"  Peup.  Sem,.,  42 ;  Cf.  F.  Det.,  420. 

"L?humanite  est  ainsi  acculee  a  cette  singuliere  impasse  que, 
plus  elle  reflechit,  mieux  elle  voit  la  necessite  morale  de  Dieu 
ot  de  rimmortalite,  et  mieux  aussi  elle  voit  les  difficultes  qui 
s'elevent  contre  les  dogm,es  dont  elle  affirme  la  necessite." 
F.  Det.,  434. 

"Une  voix  est  en  nous,  que  seules  les  bonnes  et  grandes  amfes 
savent  entendre,  et  cette  voix  nous  crie  sans  cesse:  ^La  verite 
et  le  bien  sont  la  fin  de  ta  vie ;  sacrifie  tout  le  reste  a  ce  but ; 
4 


258  BULLETIN"   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

et  quand,  suivant  1'appel  de  cette  sirene  interieure,  qui  dit 
avoir  les  promesses  de  vie,  nous  sommes  arrives  an  terme  on 
devrait  etre  la  recompense,  ah !  la  trompeuse  consolatrice ! 
elle  nous  manque."  Disc.,  91. 

The  note  of  scepticism  in  this  last  passage  is  one  that  is  fre- 
quently sounded  by  Renan,  especially  in  his  later  works  (Dial., 
26-29),,  though  it  is  already  suggested  in  passing  even  in  the 
earliest.  In  the  Eau  de  jouvence,  Prospero,  his  favorite  sage, 
suggests  that  this  f< sirene  interieure"  is  probably  a  device  by 
which  Nature  dupes  her  children  into  furtherance  of  her  own 
ulterior  aims.  That  Prospero  is  in  reality  presenting  the  au- 
thor's own  views  is  clear  from  Kenan's  repetition  of  the  same 
doctrine  in  the  article  on  Amiel.  And  indeed,  if  the  only 
evidence  for  a  life  to  come  is  entirely  non-rational,  as  Kenan 
maintains,  how  can  we  ever  be  sure  that  our  belief  in  that  life 
is  anything  more  that  the  survival  in  us  of  emotions  re- 
fleeting  the  erroneous  beliefs  of  primitive  man  ? 

"II  se  peut  que  cee  voix  interieures  proviennent  d'illusions 
honnetes,  entretenues  gar  1'habitude,  et  que  le  monde  ne  soit 
qu'une  amusante  feerie  dont  aucun  dieu.  ne  se  soucie.  II  f aut 
done  nous  arranger  de  mianiere  que,  dans  les  deux  hypotheses, 
nous  ri'ayons  pas  eu  completement  tort.  II  faut  ecouter  les 
voix  superieures,  mais  de  f  aeon  que,  dans  le  cas  ou  la  seconde 
hypothese  serait  la  vraie,  nous  n'ayons  pas  ete  trap  dupes.  Si 
le  monde;,  en  effet,  n'est  pas  chose  serieuse,  ce  sont  les  gens 
dogmatiques  qui  auront  ete  fri voles,  et  les  gens  du  monde,  ceux 
ques  les  theologiens  traitent  d'etourdis,  qui  auront  ete  les  vrais 
sages."  F.  Det,  394-5.  Cf.  Disc.,  245 ;  P.  Isr.,  IV:  287. 

Oddly  enough,  this  uncertainty  does  not  in  the  least  interfere 
with  positive  statements  on  the  same  question  elsewhere.  There 
are  passages  in  Kenan  that  would  do  credit  to  any  church- 
father.  One  is  tempted  to  urge  in  excuse  that  his  contra- 
dictions represent  his  belief  at  different  periods  of  life.  Such 
is  not  the  fact,  however;  they  appear  in  the  sarnie  chapter, 
and  even  on  the  same  page.  His  beliefs  seem  to  vary  not 
merely  with  his  moods,  but  even  with  the  requirements  of 
euphony  and  rhythm  in  literary  composition.  Cf.  Souv.,  363. 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.  259 

To  one  point,  however,  in  regard  to  religion,  he  has  con- 
sistently held  from  first  to  last,  and  that  is  its  social  utility. 
However  uncertain  its  doctrines  may  be,  there  can  he  no  ques- 
tion^  he  reminds  us,  of  the  beneficent  influence  of  religion  over 
men's  lives.  V.  J.,  184.  He  goes  so  far  as  to  affirm  that 
a  belief  in  immortality  is  an  indispensable  support  of  the  mioral 
life.  No  greater  calamity  could  befall  mankind,  he  declares, 
than  the  universal  abandonment  of  this  belief.  Fact  or  fiction, 
what  matter,  if  it  affords  inspiration  to  more  virtuous  liv- 
ing ?  In  such  matters,  practical  utility  is  more  important  than 
scientific  accuracy, 

"Let  us  not  deceive  ourselves,"  he  writes,  "man  is  governed 
by  nothing  but  his  conception  of  the  future.  A  nation  which 
en  masse  gives  up  all  faith  in  what  lies  beyond  the  grave  will 
become  utterly  degraded.  An  individual  may  do  great  things 
and  yet  not  believe  in  immortality ;  but  those  around  him  must 

believe  in  it,  for  him  and  for  themselves' Faith 

in  glory  and  all  our  pursuings  of  the  ideal  are  but  another  form 
of  faith  in  immortality;  .  .  .  every  noble  life  is  built^ 
in  great  part,  on  foundations  laid  in  the  life  beyond."  P.  Isr.,. 
IV:  285. 

"Eien  de  grand  ne  se  fait  sans  chimeres.  L'homme  a  besoin,. 
pour  deployer  toute  son  activite,  de  placer  en  avant  de  lui  un 
but  capable  de  1?  exciter.  .  .  .  Les  premiers  musulmans,, 
auraienthils  marche  jusqu'au  bout  du  monde,  si  Aboubekr  ne 
leur  eut  dit:  Allez,  le  paradis  est  avant.  Les  conquistadores, 
ffussent-ils  entreipris  leurs  aventureuses  expeditions  s'ils  n'eus- 
sent  espere  trouver  1'Eldorado,  la  Fontaine  de  Jouvence,  Oi- 
pango  aux  toits  d'or  ?  Alexandre  poursuivait  le$  Griffons  et  les 
Arimaspes.  Colomb,  en  revant  les  iles  de  Saint-Brandon  et 
le  paradis  terrestre,  trouva  TAmerique.  Avec  1'idee  que  le 
paradis  est  par  dela,  on  marche  ton  jours  et  on  touve  mieux  que 
le  paradis."  A.  S.,  409-10. 

This  vimv  is  maintained  in  all  his  writings.  A  disinterested 
moral  life  is  impossible  without  illusions,  and  the  most  impor- 
tant of  these  is  the  belief  in  a  life  ,to  come. 

"II  vaut  mieux  que  Thumanite  ait  espere  le  Messie  que  bien 


260  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

entendu  telie  endroit  d'Isaie  ou  elle  a  cru  le  voir  annonce; 
il  vaut  mieux  qu'elle  ait  cm  a  la  resurrection  que  bien  lu  et  bien 
oompris  tel  passage  obscur  du  Livre  de  Job  sur  la  foi  duquel 
elle  a  affirme  sa  delivrance  future.  Ou  en  serions-nous  si  les 
oontemporains  du  Christ  et  les  fondateurs  du  christianisme  eus- 
sent  ete  d'aussi  bons  philologues  que  Gesenius  ?"  Cant.,  XII — 

xm. 

One  of  his  last  utterances  on  the  subject  is  found  in  his 
preface  to  the  Avenir  de  la  science,  composed  nearly  half  a  cen- 
tury later  than  the  work  itself: 

"Ce  qu'il  y  a  de  grave,  c'est  que  nous  n'entrevoyons  pour 
1'avenir,  a  moins  d'un  retour  a  la  credulite,  le  moyen  de  donner 
a  I'humanite  un  catechisme  desormais  acceptable.  II  est  done 
possible  que  la  mine  des  croyances  idealistes  soit  destinee  a 
suivre  la  ruine  des  croyances  surnaturelles,  et  qu'un  abaisse- 
ment  reel  du  moral  de  I'humanite  date  du  jour  ou  elle  a  vu 
la  realite  des  choses.  A  force  de  chimeres,  on  avait  reussi  a 
obtenir  du  bon  gorille  un  efl?ort  moral  surprenant ;  otees  les  chi- 
mjeres,  une  partie  de  Tenergie  factice  qu'elles.  eveillaient  dis- 
paraitra,  Meme  la  gloire,  comme  force  de  traction,  suppose 
.i  quelques  egards  rimmortalite,  le  fruit  n'en  devant  d?ordinaire 
«tre  touche  qu'apres  la  mort.  Supprimez  Talcool  au  travail- 
leur  dont  il  fait  la  force,  mais  ne  lui  deanandez  plus  la  meme 
somme  de  travail. 

"Je  le  dis  franchement,  je  ne  me  figure  pas  comment  on 
rebatira,  sans  les  anciens  reves,  les  assises  d'une  vie  noble  et 
heureuse/'  A.  S.,  XVIII.  Cf.  V.  J.,  184;  Dr.  Ph.,  356-7, 
360. 

This  brings  us  to  Kenan's  remarkable  doctrine  Hiat  reason, 
inevitably  selfish  as  he  believed  it  to  be,  is  hostile  to  the  moral 
life.  Morality  has  nothing  to  gain  from'  a  clear  insight  into 
Nature's  ways,  and  it  has  everything  to  lose.  Philosophical 
Aufldaruvig  is  the  arch-enemy  of  virtue,  that  is  to  say,  of  un- 
selfishness. 

"L'homme  est  si  mediocre,  qu'il  n'est  bon  que  quand  il  reve. 
II  lui  faut  des  illusions  pour  qu'il  fasse  ce  qu'il  devrait  faire 
par  amour  du  bien.  Cet  esclave  a  besoin  de  crainte  et  de 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.  261 

mensonges  pour  accomplir  son  devoir.  On  n'obtient  des  sacri- 
fices de  la  masse  qu'en  lui  promettant  qu'elle  sera  payee  de 
retonr.  Uabnegation  du  chretieni  n'est,  apres  tout,  qu'un  cal- 
cul  habile,  un  placement  en  vue  du  royaume  de  Dieu."  M.- 
Aur.,  567.  Cf.  V.  J.,  457. 

This  doctrine  is  repeated  in  many  places  throughout  his  books. 

"Prejuge,  vanite,  voila  la  base  de  la  vie.  La  philosophic, 
qui  detruit  les  prejuges,  detruit  la  base  de  la  vie."  Dr.  PL, 
28. 

"L'homme  est  lie  par  certaines  ruses  de  la  nature,  telles  que 
la  religion,  1' amour,  le  gout  du  bien  et  du  vrai,  tous  instincts 
qui,  si  Ton  s'en  tient  a  la  consideration  de  Finteret  egoiste,  le 
trompent  et  le  menent  a  des  fins  voulues  hors  de  lui.  L'honune, 
par  le  progres  de  la  reflection,  reconnait  de  plus  en  plus  les 
roueries  de  la  nature,  demolit  par  la  critique  religion,  amour, 
bien,  vrai.  Ira-t-il  jusqu'au  bout,  ou  la  nature  Pempor- 
tera-t-elle?  Dial.,  43.  Cf.  P.  Isr.,  IV:  312. 

In  the  philosophy  of  Eenan  unselfishness  is  miade  the  very 
touch-stone  of  morality.  His  antipathy  towards  ethical  hedon- 
ism, so  marked  in  his  earlier  period,  springs  from  this  point 
of  view.  Whatever  is  done  for  pleasure,  he  contends,  is  with- 
out moral  value,  for  pleasure-seeking  is  always  and  inevitably 
self-seeking. 

"Le  plaisir,  essentiellement  egoiste,  est  par  consequent  la 
negation  du  divin,  Tinverse  de  la  religion."  Q.  C.,  470. 

And  again: 

"Ce  qui  fait  que  le  plaisir  est  pour  nous  une  chose  tout  a 
fait  profane,  c'est  que  nous  le  prenons  comma  une  jouissance 
personmlle;  or,  la  jouissance  personnelle  n'a  absolument  aucune 
valeur  suprasensible."  A.  S.,  405. 

Even  the  belief  in  a  future  existence,  the  very  foundation 
of  morality,  according  to  Eenan,  becomes  morally  worthless, 
he  declares,  if  embraced  in  consequence  of  rational  persuasion. 
If  heaven  and  hell  were  undoubted  realities,  the  coriduct  resultr 
ing  from  hope  of  the  one  or  fear  of  the  other  would  be  noth- 
ing more  than  pursuit;  of  self-interest.  And  to  be  sure,  it  is 
obviously  the  same  thing  in  principle  whether  the  pleasure  pur- 


262  BULLETIN   OF    THE   UNIVERSITY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

sued  is  happiness  on  earth  or  blessedness  in  heaven,  the  only 
difference  being  that  the  latter  policy  is  less  short-sighted.  A 
Simeon  Stylites,  enduring  pain  in  this  present  life  in  order  to 
escape  the  endless  tortures  or  secure  the  endless  joys  of  a  life 
to  come,  is  just  as  much  pursuing  his  own  greatest  ultimate 
good  as  the  veriest  libertine.  If  these  future  pains  and  pleas- 
ures are  regarded  as  actual  facts,  it  is  not  the  hermit  but  the 
libertine  who  fails  to  secure  for  himself  the  greatest  balance 
of  pleasures  over  pains  in  the  end. 

"Si  les  verites  morales  etaient  des  resultats  mathematique- 
ment  demontres,  elles  perdraient  tout  leur  prix ;  elles  cesseraient 
ineme  d'etres  morales,  puisqu/il  n'y  aurait  pas  plus  de  merite 
a  les  croire  qu'a  croire  la  geometric  et  a  s'arreter  devant  le  code 
penal."  Dial.,  331.  Of.  F.  Det.,  XV;  also  Dr.  Ph.,  260. 

"Supposons,  en  effet,  une  preuve  directe,  positive,  evidente 
pour  tous,  des  peines  et  des  recompenses  futures;  ou  sera  le 
merite  de  faire  le  bien?  II  n'y  aurait  que  des  fous  qui,  de 
gaiete  de  coeur,  courraient  a  leur  damnation,  Une  foule  d'ames 
basses  feraient  leur  salut  cartes  sur  table.  .  .  .  Qui  ne 
voit  que,  dans  un  tel  systeme,  il  n'y  a  plus  morale  ni  religion  ? 
Dans  Fordre  moral  et  religieux,  il  est  indispensable  de  croire 
sans  demonstration;  il  ne  s'agit  pas  de  certitude,  il  s'agit  de 
foi."  M.-Aur.,  264-5.  Of.  O.  d'Angl.,  p.  260. 

These  statements,  taken  together  with  those  previously 
quoted,  would  seem  at  first  glance  to  place  Renan  in  a  very 
paradoxical  position:  immortality  as  a  hope  is  indispensable 
to  an  unselfish  life,  immortality  as  a  certitude  is  incompatible 
wth  such  a  life.  In  this  case  the  contradiction  is  only  appar- 
ent, however.  For  even  admitting  that  believers  and  unbe- 
lievers alike  are  governed,  in  the  last  resort,  by  considerations 
of  their  own  greatest  ultimate  welfare,  it  is  plain  that  their 
respective  policies  would  lead  to  very  different  kinds  of  con- 
duct in  this  present  world.  The  one  would  bend  his  efforts 
to  secure  his  own  greatest  happiness  here  and  now,  regardless 
of  society  at  large,  or  showing  a  regard  for  the  good  of  others 
only  so  far  as  this  was  necessary  to  secure  his  own ;  while  the 
believer,  postponing  his  own  enjoyments  to  a  future  world,  is 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      263 

free  to  promote  his  neighbor's  welfare,  or  the  glory  of  God, 
quite  regardless  of  pain  or  pleasure  to  himself.  And  this  is 
all  that  Renan  really  means :  A  virtue  that  is  made  a.  matter 
of  policy  is  no  longer  meritorious,  because  it  no  longer  proceeds 
from,  unselfish  motives.  He  does  not  really  mean,  to  deny  that 
a  selfish  life  would  be  very  differently  ordered  in  fact,  accord- 
ing as  it  takes  account  or  not  of  a  life  after  death. 

No  doctrine  in  the  realm  of  moral  philosophy  is  more  em- 
phatically or  miore  persistently  affirmed  by  Renan  than  the 
proposition  that  morality,  or  in  other  words  altruism,  is  a  be- 
quest from  pre-rational  or  even  pre-human  times.  Unselfish- 
ness, he  believes,  is  always  a  non-rational  impulse.  Ascribe 
it  to  instinct,  to  family-  or  race  inheritance,  to  social  tradition, 
to  religious  belief,  to  what  you  will;  but  it  is  never  the  out- 
come of  rational  reflection.  So  far  as  true  altruism  is  still 
to  be  found  among  men,  it  represents  a  survival  from  pro- 
rational  or  even  pre-human  times.10  Of.  James,  Var.  Rel. 
Exp.,  431ff. 

"Aucune  mere  n'a  besom  d'un  sy sterna  de  philosophie  morale 
pour  aimer  son  enfant.  Aucune  jeune  fille  de  bonne  race  n'est 
chaste  en  vertu  d'une  theorie.  De  meme  aucun  homme  coura- 
geux  ne  court  a  la  mort  mu  par  un  raisonnement.  Nous  f  aisons 
le  bien  sans  etre  surs  qu'en  le  faisant  nous  ne  sommes  pas 
dupes ;  et  saurions-nous  de  science  certaine  que  nous  le  sommes, 
nous  ferions  le  bien  tout  de  meme."  Dr.  Ph.,  260-1.  Of. 
Dial.,  XVIII— IX;  ibid.,  32-3,  37,  39-40;  EccL,  88;  F.  Det, 
35,  426-7;  Mar.  Grit,  13 ;  Q.  C.,  128;  Souv.,  12,  342-3,  359. 

This  doctrine  that  morality  is  largely  a  result  of  past  ha.b- 
its  was  exemplified,  as  Renan  believed,  in  his  own  life.  Ever 
since  leaving  the  church,  he  often  declares,  he  subsisted  on  the 
fund  of  morality  which  he  had  accumulated  in  early  youth 
under  the  influence  of  beliefs  which  he  later  considered  illu- 
sory. Souv.,  12,  342-3,  346,  359 ;  Dial.,  XVIII— IX. 

In  discussing  this  question  Renan  follows  Kant  in  drawing 
a  sharp  distinction  between  man's  rational  and  his  moral  na- 
ture, and  he  adopts  the  terminology  of  his  German  original. 
The  Pure  Reason  is  contrasted  with  the  Practical  Reason, 


264  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

Pure  Reason,  he  maintains,  is  incapable  of  initiating,  or  even 
approving,  an  unselfish  act.  Altruism,  Religion,  Morality, — 
often  interchangeable  terms  in  Kenan — have  a  transcendental 
source,  which  is  called  by  many  names :  Practical  Reason,  Cat- 
egorical Imperative,  God,  Universe,  Mature,  la  Categorie  de 
PIdeal,  Abime  de  PEtre,  etc. 

"The  reasoning  of  Kant  remains  as  true  as  it  ever  was ;  moral 
affirmation  creates  its  object.  .  .  .  Without  the  hope  of 
any  recompense,  man  devotes  himself  to  his  duty  even  to  death. 

Justice,  truth  and  goodness  are  willed  by  a 

higher  power."  P.  Isr.,  I:  XXVII— VIII.  Cf.  Dr.  Ph., 
413. 

"Les  croyanees  de  la  religion  naturelle,  derivant  toutes-  de 
Pimperatif  categorique,  ont  Pair  d'un  filet  qui  nous  enlace,  d'un 

philtre  qui  nous  seduit La  religion  est  dans 

Phumanite  Panalogue  de  Pinstinct  maternel  chez  les  oiseaux, 
le  sacrifice  aveugle  de  soi  a  une  fin  inconnue,  vooilue  par  la  na- 
ture; .  .  .  ."  Dial.,  32.  Cf.  ibid.,  38,  30,  142 ;  also 
Kef.  Int.,  338. 

"Le  devoir  et  les  instincts  de  nidification  et  de  couvee  chez 
Poiseau  ont  la  meme  origine  providentielle.  .  .  Ces  voix, 
tan-tot  donees,  tantot  austeres,  d'ou  viennent-elles  ?  Elles  vien- 
nent  de  Punivers,  ou,  si  Pon  veut^  de  Dieu.  L'univers,  avec  qui 
nous  sommesi  en  rapport  comme  par  tin  conduit  ombilical,  veut 
le  devouement,  le  devoir,  la  vertu;  il  emiploie,  pour  arriver  a 
ses  fins,  la  religion,  la  poesie,  P amour,  le  plaisir,  toutes  les 
deceptions.  ...  La  religion,  resume  des  besoins  moraux 
de  Phomme,  la  vertu,  la  pudeur,  le  desinteressement,  le  sacri- 
fice, sont  la  voix  de  Punivers.  Tout  se  resume  en  un  acte  de 
foi  a  des  instincts  qui  nous  obsedent,  sans  nous  convaincre,  en 
Pobeissance  a  un  langage  venant  de  Pinfini,  langage  parfaite- 
ment  clair  ien  ce  qu'il  nous  commande,  obscur  en  ce  qu'il 
promet"  F.  Det,  425-7. 

As  already  observed  in  another  connection,  these  inner  voices 
of  morality  and  religion,  when  examined  from  the  point  of 
view  of  man's  relation  to  Nature's  ulterior  aims,  are  seen  to 
be  a  device  by  which  individuals  are  compelled  to  work  for 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.  265 

the  good  of  the  whole;  leading  eventually,  according  to  our 
author,  to  the  evolution  of  God.  The  kind  of  life  which  these 
voices  approve,  considered  apart  from,  the  satisfaction  derived 
from  this  very  approval,  is  not  that  which  leads  to  a  maximum 
of  enjoyment  for  the  individual  in  this  present  world.  Obey- 
ing this  oracle  man  is  exploited  in  behalf  of  a  cause  entirely 
foreign  to  his  own  personal  welfare.  Dial.  29  ;  also  ibid.  35-6. 

"La  nature  agit  a  notre  egard  commue  envers  une  troupe  de 
gladiateurs  destines  a  se  faire  tuer  pour  une  cause  qui  n'est 
pas  la  leur."  Dial.,  40 ;  also  cf.  129-30. 

"Nous  travaillons  pour  un  Dieu,  de  meme  que  Pabeille,  sans 
le  savoir,  fait  son  miel  pour  rhommje."  Dial.,  45 ;  30-1. 

"L'homme  est  comme  Touvrier  des  Gobelins  qui  tisse  a  1'en- 
vers  une  tapisserie  dont  il  ne  voit  pas  le  dessein."  Dial.,  28. 

This  idea  of  antagonism  between  Nature  and  man  seems  to 
have  been  taken  from  Schopenhauer.  At  any  rate,  both  Scho- 
penhauer and  Fichte  are  repeatedly  mentioned  in  connection 
with  the  doctrine.  Cf.  Dial.,  42;  also*  Seailles,  E.  R,  282, 
note  1.  But  while  accepting  the  premises  of  the  German  pes- 
simist, Renan  applies  them  in  a  very  different  way.  He  fully 
admits  that  man  is  exploited  by  Nature  for  certain  ulterior  aims, 
and  he  also  concedes  that  rebellion  against  this  arrangement 
is  useless.  But  he  differs  from  Schopenhauer  in  concluding  that 
precisely  this  conflict  between  Nature  and  man  is  the  source 
from  which  morality  springs;  for  morality  is  essentially  a 
cheerful  co-operation  with  the  deific  tendencies  of  the  universe. 

"La  moralite  se  reduit  ainsi  a  la  soumission.  L'immoralite, 
c'est  la  revolte  contre  un  etat  de  choses  dont  on  voit  la  duperie. 
II  faut  a  la  fois  la  voir  et  s'y  soumettre."  Dial.,  43. 

"'Le  mal,  c'est  de  se  revolter  contre  la  nature,  quand  on  a 
vu  qu'elle  nous  trompe.  .  .  .  Son  but  est  bon ;  veuillons 
ce  qu'elle  vemt.  La  vertu  est  un  amen  obstine,  dit  aux  fins  ob- 
scures que  poursuit  la  Providence  par  nous."  Dial.,  46 ;  but 
cf.  A.  S,,  9. 

"Pourquoi  dire  que  la  nature  nous  trompe,"  asks  M.  Seailles, 
usi  son  but  est  bon  ?  Que  1'utilitaire  s'indigne,  soit,  il  est  ex- 
ploite  !  mais  1'idealiste,  le  soldat  du  combat  de  Dieu  ? 


266  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

Est-il  besoin  de  faire  remarquer  1'incoherence 
mythologique  du  langage  de  Renan :  numina,  nomina. 
La  vertu  est  line  illusion  divine,  providentielle,  parce  qu'il  n'y 
a  ni  Dieu,  ni  Providence;  car,  dans  Fhypothese  ou  la  vertu 
serait  divine,  providentielle,  elle  ne  serait  plus  illusion."  E.  R. 
283 ;  318,  note. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  this  view  of  morality  as  being 
essentially  obedience  to  a  higher  power,  Renan  is  virtually  re- 
turning to  the  teachings  of  the  Church;  to  the  very  position, 
that  is,  which  in  L'Avenir  de  Id  science  he  repudiates  as  a  hu- 
miliating subjection  incompatible  with  the  dignity  of  man. 
Speaking  of  the  Christian  ascetic,  he  wrote : 

"Non  seulement  il  negligea  totalement  le  vrai  et  le  beau  (la 
philosophic,  la  science,  la  poesie  etaient  des  vanites)  ;  mais,  en 
s'attachant  exclusivement  au  bien,  il  le  concut  sous  sa  forme 
la  plus  mesquine:  le  bien  fut  pour  lui  la  realisation  de  la  volonte 
d'un  ctre  super ieur,  une  sorte  de  sujetion  humiliante  pour  la 
dignite  humiaine :  car  la  realisation  du  bien  moral  n'est  pas  plus 
une  obeissance  a  des  lois  imposees  que  la  realisation  du  beau 
dans  une  oeuvre  d'art  n'est  Texecution  de  certaines  regies." 
A.  S.,  9. 

Coiitrasting  this  earlier  position  with  his  latest  creed,  the 
principal  difference  appears  to  be  this:  while  in  both  phases 
morality  is  conceived  as  obedience  to  a  transcendental  author- 
ity, in  his  later  position  this  authority  is  no  longer  determinate ; 
the  moral  imperative  has  been  emptied  of  its  definite  content 
"Morality  is  no  longer  obedience  to  a  God  whose  will  is  defined 
in  a  bible  and  summarized  in  the  decalogue;  it  is  obedience 
to  a  Mature  who  commands  nothing  in  particular  yet  requires 
unconditional  surrender  to  her  commands;  a  Nature  of  whom 
nothing  is  known  save  that,  tyrant-like,  she  exploits  her  own 
children  for  her  selfish  ends  by  duping  them  into  unselfish 
lives.11 

But  is  this  "obedience"  to  Nature,  o<r  to  its  Author,  any-, 
thing  more,  after  all,  than  making  a  virtue  of  necessity? 
Renan  repeatedly  asserts  that  against  Nature's  dupery  man  is 
powerless.  Obedience  to  Nature  is  regarded  as  a  species  of 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.  267 

slavery,  in  which  the  slave  is  made  to  hug  the  very  chains  by 
which  he  is  held  to  his  task.  These  chains  are  his  instincts, 
his  desires,  his  aspirations,  especially  the  "other-profiting"  in- 
stincts by  means  of  which  individuals  are  duped  into  sacrificing 
their  own  present  pleasures  to  Nature's  ulterior  aims. 

"L'homme  depend  de  l'ensein>ble  de  1'univers,  lequel  a  un 
but  et  fait  tout  converger  a  ce  but,  L'homme  est  un  etre  sub- 
ordonne;  quoi  qu'il  fasse,  il  adore,  il  sert,"  ISP.  Hist.  Bel.,  XV; 
Dial.,  45. 

".  •  .La  nature  triomphera  toujours;  elle  a  trop  bien 
arrange  les  choses,  elle  a,  trop  bien  pipe  les  des ;  elle  atteindra, 
quoi  que  nous  fassions,  son  but,  qui  est  de  nous-  tromper  a  son 
profit."  Dial.,  42  ;  also  28. 

In  view  of  such  statements,  and  remembering  that,  accord- 
ing to  his  own  theory,  mleritorious  acts  alone  can  properly 
be  called  virtuous,  how  is  it  possible  to  affirm  that  virtue  con- 
sists in  obedience  to  Nature,  and  then  affirm  in  the  same  breath 
that  man  cannot  possibly  refuse  the  obedience?  Is  he  not, 
as  some  one  has  said  of  Hegel,  devising  a  logic  for  his  own  pri- 
vate use?  Is  he  not,  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  terms,  mak- 
ing a  virtue  of  necessity  ? 

It  is  true  that  Kenan  distinguishes  between  cheerful  and 
grudging  obedience,  graceful  and  ungraceful  service,  and  de- 
clares the  former  alone  to  be  moral,  as  in  the  following  passage 
(among  many  other's)  : 

"La  vertu,  c'est  de  contribuer  avec  joie  et  empressement  au 
bien  supreme.  Le  mal,  c'est  de  servir  sans  grace,  de  ressemjbler 
au  sold  at  mediocre  qui  murmure  contre  son  chef,  tout  en  allant 
au  feu  comme  les  autres."  N.  Hist.  Eel.,  XV. 

But  even  so,  what  more  does  morality  become  than  a  cheer- 
ful submission  to  the  inevitable?  And  what  else  do  we  mean 
by  miaking  a.  virtue  of  necessity  ?lla 

Man's  obedience  to  Nature,  again,  viewed  from  another  side, 
becomes  altruismt,  which  in  Kenan's  terminology  is  the  whole 
of  morality. 

"Chose  singuliere,"  he  writes  in  his  review  of  Sainte-Beuve's 
Port-Royal,  1860;  "  le  principe  qui  fait  les  bons  ecrivains  est 


268  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

le  meme  que  celui  qui  fait  les  saints.  L' amour-propre,  1'envie 
de  briller  sont  le  defaut  capital,  qu'il  s'agisse  de  morale  re- 
ligieuse  ou  qu'il  s'agisse  d'eloeution ;  1'oubli  de  soi,  le  mepris 
du  succes  sont  la  regie  du  bien  dans  tous  les  genres."  N.  Hist. 
Rel.;  492-3. 

There  is  no  contradiction,  of  course,  between  his  conception 
of  morality  as  obedience  to*  Mature,  and  his  conception  of  it 
as  altruism;  it  is  both,  only  from  different  points  of  view. 
Morality  is  obedience, — with  reference  to  the  source  of  the 
impulses  and  instincts  by  which  unselfish  action  is  prompted; 
it  is  altruism', — with,  reference  to  the  end  which  the  impulse 
seeks  to  attain.  The  element  of  altruism,  in  fact,  has  to  be 
made  very  prominent  in  order  to  guard  this  conception  of 
morality  against  obvious  misunderstandings.  For  if  virtue  is 
obedience  to  Nature,  what  then,  it  might  be  asked,  is  vice? 
Are  murder,  theft  and  adultery  less  "natural"  than  faith,  hope 
and  charity  ?  It  is  therefore  important  to  lay  stress  on  the 
motive,  and  not  on  the  motive  merely  as  such,  but  on  a  conscious 
and  deliberate  recognition  of  the  motive  as  altruistic. 

But  in  thus  attempting  to  guard  our  author's  coneerption 
against  absurd  misconstructions,  we  are  landed,  in  fact,  in  an- 
other contradiction.  For  how  can  deliberate  altruism  be  recon- 
ciled with  his  doctrine  that  Reason  is  always  and  inevitably 
self  -centered  ?  But  this  point  we  shall  Jiave  occasion  to  dis- 
cuss more  fully  as  we  proceed. 

A  threefold  distinction  seems  necessary  in  order  to  bring  out 
Kenan's  full  meaning.  Altruism  may  be  viewed  from  three 
sides,  according  as  we  contemplate  the  result  of  an  act,  or  its 
cause,  or  a  consciousness  of  the  cause  on  the  part  of  the  actor. 
It  is  this  last  phase  alone  which  Kenan  has  in  mind  when  he 
speaks  of  altruism]  as  virtue,  and  of  virtue  as  obedience  to  Na- 
ture. Throughout  his  moral  philosophy,  his  attention  seems 
directed,  not  to  the  goodness  or  badness  of  acts  as  determined 
by  their  consequences,  but  to  the  character  or  disposition  from 
which  they  proceed.  For  an  act  to  be  altruistic,  and  therefore 
virtuous,  in  Kenan's  sense  of  the  terms,  an  act  must  reveal  not 
only  de  facto  obedience  to  unselfish  impulses,  but  a  conscious- 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      269 

ness  of  the  impulse  as  being  unselfish.  A  man  is  not  yet  virtu- 
ous because  his  conduct  is  in  fact  unselfish,  whether  in  motive 
or  result,  but  only  when  the  unselfish  motive  is  knowingly  and 
deliberately  followed  as  such.  Through  the  instrumentality  of 
"other-profiting"  instincts, — to  adopt  a  bad  word, — man  is  ex- 
ploited, according  to  this  view,  whether  he  will  or  not,  in  the 
interests  of  universal  evolution,  or  the  good  of  the  universe. 
Even  when  individuals  imagine  themselves  pursuing  their  own 
interests  they  are  all  the  time  unconsciously  furthering  Nature's 
ulterior  aims.  But  this  is  not  yet  virtue,  or  merit.  It  is  only 
when  we  come  to  be  clearly  aware  of  this  dupery,  and  yet  co- 
operate, knowingly  and  deliberately,  with  Nature's  plans,  that 
our  obedience  is  entitled  to  the  lofty  appellation  of  virtue. 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  Kenan  made  no  effort  to  apply  this 
exacting  conception  of  virtue  to  work-a-day  life.  In  the  task 
of  allotting  the  prizes  for  virtue  known  as  the  Prix  Montyon, 
awarded  each  year  by  the  Academic  Franchise,  and  on  which 
Renan  was  himself  several  times  commissioned  to  report,  he 
appears  to  have  made  no  attempt  to  ascertain  as  a  preliminary 
qualification  to  compete  for  this  prize,  whether  the  candidates 
were  clearly  aware  of  their  being  exploited  in  behalf  of  deific 
evolution. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  his  conception  of  morality  as 
altruism  likewise,  Renan  is  making  a  virtue  of  necessity;  for 
he  holds  that  a  certain  amount  of  unselfishness  is  unavoidable 
in  every  human  life.  An  utterly  selfish  life  is  an  impossibi- 
lity. 

"Pretendre  enlever  de  ce  mjonde  le  sentiment  de  la  piete  et 
reduire  tout  au  pur  egoi'sme  est  aussi  impossible  qu'enlever  a  la 
femme  ses  organes  de  mere.  L'egoiste  lui-meme,  qui  pretend 
dresser  la  theorie  de  1'interet  bien  entendu,  est  dupe  de  la  na- 
ture. L'egoi'ste  donne  a  chaque  heure  mille  demjentis  a  son  sys- 
teme;  la  vie  d'un  egoiste  est  un  tissu  d'inconsequences,  d'ac- 
tions  qui,  a  son  point  de  yue,  sont  absurdes  et  folles."  Dial., 
37;  39-40. 

A  similar  paradox  appears  in  his  statements  regarding  the 
relation  of  morality  to  reason.  On  the  one  hand  he  insists,  as 


270  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

we  have  seen,  that  reason  is  hostile  to  altruism,  in  other  words 
to  morality  and  religion.  He  deplores  the  fact,  that  humanity, 
in  these  days  of  rationalism,  should  be  living  upon  its  moral 
capital,  the  laborious  savings  of  past  generations. 

"Les  vieilles  croyances  an  moyen  desquelles  on  aidait 
rhomme  a  pratiquer  la  vertu  sont  ebranlees,  et  elles*  n'ont  pas 
ete  remplacees.  Pour  nous  autres,  esprits  cultives,  les  equiva- 
lents de  ces  croyances  que  fournit  ridealisme  suffisent  tout  a 
fait;  car  nous  agissons  sous  Pempire  d'anciennes  habitudes; 
nous  soimmes  comme  ces  animaux  a  qui  les  physiologistes*  en- 
levent  le  cerveau,  et  qui  n'en  continuent  pas  moins  certaines 
f onctions  de  la  vie  par  1'effet  du  pli  contracte.  Mais  ces  mouve- 
ments  instinctifs  s'aiTaibliront  avec  le  temps.  .  .  .  Les 
personnes  religieuses  vivent  d'une  ombre.  ]STous  vivons  de 
Tombre  d?une  ombre.  De  quoi  vivra-t-on  apres  nous  ?"  Dial, 
XVIII-IX.  F.  Det,  XVIII. 

But  on  the  other  hand  he  just  as  frequently  declares  that 
morality  and  religion  are  beyond  the  reach  of  rational  argu- 
mentation. Compared  with  the  deep-rooted  non-rational  imh 
pulses  of  man's  moral  nature,  reason  is  but  a  superficial  ven- 
eering, powerless  to  suppress  the  altruistic  instincts  which  de- 
termine our  practice  in  spite  of  our  theories.  There  will 
always  be1  those,  he  declares,  who  practice  virtue  without  stop^ 
ping  to  make  sure  that  they  are  not  fools  for  their  pains. 

"Precher  a  rhomme  de  ne  pas  se  devouer  est  comme  precher 
a  Toiseau  de  ne  pas  f  aire  son  nid,  et  de  ne  pas  nourrir  ses  petits. 
Cela  est  tres-peu  dangereux;  rhomme  et  Toiseau  continueront 
toujours  leur  eternel  manege,  car  la  nature  en  a  besoin.  Une 
ingenieuse  providence  prend  ses  precautions  pour  assurer  la 
somme  de  vertu  necessaire  a  la  sustentation  de  1'univers." 
Dial.,  32-3. 

"Ce  que  vent  Tunivers,  il  rimposera  toujours;  car  il  a  pour 
appuyer  ses  volontes  des  ruses  monies.  Les  raisonnements  les 
plus  evidents  des  critiques  ne  feront  rien  pour  demolir  ces 
saintes  illustions."  ~F.  Det,  426-7. 

"Les  croyances  necessaires  sont  au-dessus  de  toute  atteinte. 
L'hum,anite  ne  nous  ecoutera  que  dans  la  mesure  ou  no® 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.  271 

temes  conviendront  a  ses  devoir  et  a  se&  instincts.  Disons  ce 
que  nous  pensons;  la  femme  n'en  continuera  pas  moins  sa 
joyeuse  cantilene,  1'enfant  n'en  deviendra  pas  plus  soucieux, 
ni  la  jeunesse  moins  enivree;  rhomme  vertueux  restera  ver- 
ttuex;  la  carmelite  continuera  a  macerer  sa  chair,  la  mere  a 
remplir  ses  devoirs,  1'oiseau  a  chanter,  1'abeille  a  faire  son 
miel."  EccL,  88;  repeated  in  P.  Isr.,  V:  159. 

There  is  no  real  contradiction,  however,  between  these  state- 
ments and  the  assertion  that  reason  is  hostile  to  virtue.  Ra- 
tionalism injures  altruism,,  vet  altruism!  survives  rationalism. 
Both  statements  would  seem  to  be  true.  A  society  which  for 
many  generations  has  been  accustomed,  like  modern  Europe, 
to  associate  virtuous  living  with  religious  beliefs,  is  certain  to 
have  its  morality  injuriously  affected  by  a  philosophy  which 
tends  to  subvert  those  beliefs,  It  is  a  matter  of  daily  observa- 
tion that  what  is  known  as  " Aufklarung"  has  no  tendency  to 
improve  morals.  But  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  also  true  that 
no  amount  of  rationalization  can  permanently  destroy  the  moral 
life  of  the  race.  Kenan's  meaning  appears  to  be  that  altruistic 
impulses,  being  matters  of  instinct,  will  always  exist;  but  that 
it  is  only  in  virtue  of  certain  illusions  that  these  impulses,  and 
the  conduct  they  prompt,  can  secure  the  sanction  of  reason. 

By  reason,  indeed,  Renan  simply  means  the  capacity  for  cool, 
dispassionate  judgment  of  values.  Rational  judgments,  ex  vi 
termini,  are  dispassionate  judgments.  But  dispassionate  delib- 
eration in  morals,  he  believed,  is  essentially  and  inevitably  self- 
centered;  self-interest  being  the  pivot,,  so  to  speak,  on  which 
the  deliberation  must  turn.  Hence  reason  becomes,  in  morals, 
a  capacity  for  the  calculation  of  self-interest,  and  therefore  a 
thorough-going  and  consistent  rationalism  must  of  course  be 
strictly  incompatible  with  an  unselfish  life.  From  this  position 
Renan  never  swerves.  A  conscious  and  deliberate  renunciation 
of  self-interest,  he  insists,  is  never  obtained  through  rational 
persuasion  ;  but  he  was  very  confident  that  humanity  will  never 
fail  to  supply  all  the  illusions  and  sophistries  necessary  for  the 
subsistence  of  moral  ideals  and  virtuous  habits. 

"Une  seule  chose  est  sure,  c'est  que  rhumanite  tirera  de  son 


272  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

sein  tout  c©  qui  est  necessaire  en  fait  d'illusions  pour  qu'elle 
remplisse  ses  devoir  et  accomplisse  sa  destinee."  Dial.,  XIX. 
We  must  remember,  however,  that  all  these  illusions  are  ef- 
fective only  because  they  are  taken,  or  rather  mistaken,  for 
truths.  However  important  they  may  be  in  sustaining  the 
moral  life,  the  time  must  come  when  they  are  seen  to  be  fic- 
tions, at  least  by  a  disillusioned  few.  What  then  shall  be  the 
attitude  of  these  philosophers  towards,  the  rest  of  mankind? 
In*  the  event  of  a  real  conflict  between  the  claims  of  truth  and 
the  requirements  of  morality,  which  shall  prevail  ?  Can  it  ever 
be  right  to  suppress  the  truth  in  the  interests  of  morality,  real 
or  supposed  ? 

As  an  example  we  may  take  once  more  the  belief  in  a  future 
judgment.  Suppose  it  to  be1  known  by  the  initiated  (among 
whom  we  must  reckon  Kenan),  beyond  the  possibility  of  a 
doubt,  that  belief  in  a  judgment  after  death  is  based  on  illu- 
sion. Shall  the  fact  be  openly  professed,  even  though  it  is 
certain  to  lead  to  a  lowering  of  the  standard  of  morals  ? 

Here  again  it  is  possible  to  quote  Kenan  on  both  sides 
of  the  question.  In  one  of  his  last  utterances  on  the  subject, 
his  preface  to  the  Avenir  de  la  science,  he  insists  that  even  truth 
itself  is  a  secondary  consideration  when  it  comes  into  conflict 
with  the  demands  of  m'orality. 

"Je  veux  certes  la  liberte  de  la  pensee;  car  le  vrai  a  ses  droits 
comme  le  Men,  et  on  ne  gagne  rien  a  ces  timides  mensonges 
qui  ne  trompent  personne  et  n'aboutissent  qu?a  Thypocrisie. 
Mais,  je  1'avoue,  la  science  mem©  et  la  cri- 
tique sont  a  me&  yeux  des  choses  secondaire®  aupres  de  la  neces- 
site  de  conserves  la  tradition  du  bien."  Mor.  Grit.,  Ill — IV ; 
also,  XVII. 

More  frequently,  however,  he  insists  that  truth  must  come 
first,  regardless  of  consequences  to  religion  and  morals;  for  the 
advancement  of  truth  is  an  end  to  which  morality  is  merely  a 
means.  F.  Det,  436-7. 

"L'ordre  social,  comme  1'ordre  theologique,  provoque  la 
question:  Qui  sait  si  la  verite  n'est  pas  triste?  L'edifice  de 
la  societe  humaine  porte  sur  un  grand  vide.  !Nous  avons  ose  lo 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      273 

dire.  Kien  do  plus  dangereux  quo  de  patiner  sur  une  couche 
de  glace  sans  songer  combien  cette  couche  est  mince.  Je  n'ai 
jamais  pii  croire  que,  dans  aucun  ordre  de  choses,  il  fut  mau- 
vais  d'y  voir  trop  clair.  Toute  verite  est  bonne  a  savoir.  Oar 
toute  verite  elaireinent  sue  rend  fort,  ou  prudent."  Avant- 
propos  to  the  Pretre  de  Nemi,  Dr.  Ph.,  263. 

In  his  Exaimen  de  conscience  philosopJiique  he  seems  to  up^ 
hold  the  extremie  position  that  man  exists  for  truth,  not  truth 
for  man.  A  planet  on  which  the  postulates  of  morality  are 
incompatible  with  the  facts  of  science  were  better  wiped  away : 

"Si  Perreur  etait  la,  condition  de  la,  moralite  humaine,  il  n'y 
aurait  aucune  raison  pour  s'interesser  a  un  globe,  voue  a  rigno- 
rance.  Nona  aimons  I'humanite,  parce  qu'elle  produit  la 
science ;  nous  tenons  a  la  moralite,  parce  que  des  races  honnetes 
peuvent  seules  etre  des  races  scientifiquea  Si  on  posait  Fig- 
norarice  co'mme  borne  necessaire  de  Thumanite,  nousi  ne  voyons 
plus  aucun  motif  de  tenir  a  son  existence.  .  .  .  Le  retour 
de  Thumanite  a  ses  vieilles  erreurs,  censees  indispensable^  a 
sa  moralite,  serait  pire  que  son  entiere  demoralisation."12  F. 
Det,  436-7.  Cf.  ibid.,  XXIV,  402;  A.  S.,  93. 

Of  all  the  contradictions  in  Kenan's  writings  the  most  as- 
tounding is  contained  in  the  following  passage,  when  con- 
trasted with  the  doctrine  which  prevails  in  his  later  years: 

"Que  les  personnes  qui  ne  croient  pas  a  la  realite  du  devoir, 
qui  regardent  la  morale  comme  une  illusion,  prechent  la  these 
desolante  de  rabrutissement  necessaire  d'une  partie  de  respece 
humaine,  rien  de  mieux;  mais  pour  nous  qui  crayons  que  la 
moralite  est  vraie  d'une  mianiere  absolue,  une  telle  doctrine  nous 
est  interdite.  A  tout  prix,  et  quoi  qu'il  arrive,  que  plus  de 
lumiere  se  fasse.  Voila  notre  devise ;  nous  ne  Fabandonnerons 
jamais."  Eef.  Int.,  308.  Cf.  Disc.,  232-3;  258-9;  39. 

"Nous  ne  I' abandonnerons  jamais/'  But  alas  for  human 
resolutions !  I/ho>mme  propose  mais  Dieu  dispose.  Only  a  few 
months  later,  the  very  doctrines  so  indignantly  repudiated  here: 
"la  miorale  comme  une  illusion,"  "la  these  desolante  de  rabru- 
tissement necessaire  d'une  partie  de  Tespec©  humaine,"  are  de- 
veloped in  extenso  by  Kenan  himself  in  the  Dialogues  pliiloso- 
5 


274  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

pliiques,  and  thenceforward  become  dominant  thoughts  in  all 
his  political  philosophy. 

The  above  passage  is  taken  from  a  public  address  on  the  place 
of  the  State  in  the  education  of  children,  delivered  in  April, 
1869,  shoTtly  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  and  during  his 
candidacy  for  the  electoral  district  of  Seine-et-Marne.  Can  it 
be  that  his  liberal  attitude  towards  popular  education  in.  this 
address  was  determined  by  his  candidacy  for  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  ? 

But  it  seems  more  likely,  in  view  of  his  independent  charac- 
ter, that  his  statement  truly  represented  his  dominant  belief  at 
the  time;  and.  that  his  espousal  of  the  opposite  view  immedi- 
ately after  the  war  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  change  of  political 
organization  which  followed  that  disastrous  event.  Idealist 
that  he  was,  he  seems  always  to  have  been  opposed  to  the  pre- 
vailing regime ;  a  democrat  under  the  empire,  an  aristocrat  un- 
der democracy. 

Not  that  his  earlier  beliefs  were  ever  abandoned,  however. 
The  old  and  the  new,  regardless  of  consistency,  are  affirmed  al- 
ternately, as  mood  or  necessity  prompt.  Audiatur  et  altera 
pars!  Even  in  his  latest  writings,  his  faith  in  rational  prog- 
ress, and  his  earlier  enthusiasm  for  popular  education,  are  fre- 
quently and  emphatically  affirmed,  though  the  latter  on  differ- 
ent grounds. 

"Mieux  vaut  un  peuple  immoral  qu'un  peuple  f  anatique ;  car 
les  masses  immorales  ne  sont  pas  genantes,  tandis  que  les 
masses  fanatiques  abetissent  le  monde,  et  un  monde  condamne 
a  la  betise  n'a  plus  de  raison  pour  que  je  m'y  interesse;  j'aime 
autant  le  voir  mourir.  Supposons  les  orangers  atteints  d'une 
maladie  dont  on  ne  puisse  les  guerir  qu'en  les  empechant  de 
produire  des  oranges.  Cela  ne  vaudrait  pas  la  peine,  puisque 
Toranger  qui  ne  produit  pas  d'oranges  n'est  plus  bon  a  rien." 
A.  S.,  X. 

An  intermediate  position  is  taken  in  the  Avenir  de  la  sci- 
ence, which  represents  the  climax  of  the  age  of  reason  in  his 
own  life.  In  the  long  run,  he  there  maintains,  truth  and  util- 
ity, the  interests  of  science  and  those  of  morality,  must  coin- 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.  275 

cide.  It  is  only  during  periods  of  transition,  like  that  from. 
Bupernaturalism  to  naturalism,  that  the  truth  ma,y  seem:  hostile 
to  morals.  The  only  morality  that  is  ever  injured  by  truth  is 
a  morality  based  on  error.  Reason,  however  inadequate  and 
disappointing  in  many  ways,  is  still  the  best  guide  we  have. 
(Souv.,  408:  letter  of  Sep.  11,  1846,  to  his  friend  M.  Cog- 
nat. )  Rationalism  has  never  yet  been  the  cause  of  social  degen- 
eration. In  fact,  he  insists,  the  experiment  has  never  been  tried, 
for  the  age  of  reason  is  even  now  only  in  its  dawn.  A.  S.,  74. 
Cf.  ibid.,  68;  93;  96;  101;  XIX.  N.  Hist  EeL,  505.  Mor. 
Grit,  III,  VII. 

Turning  now  to  the  question  of  moral  criteria:  it  is  very 
obvious  that  Kenan's  definition  of  morality  as  unselfishness  can- 
not furnish  a  standard  of  right  action,  for  the  simple  reason, 
that  "selfish"  and  "unselfish"  may  mean  as  miany  different 
things  as  there  are  different  characters  or  selves.  Selfish  con- 
duct is  presumably  that  which  secures,  or  is  expected  to  secure, 
the  agent's  own  welfare,  real  or  supposed,  regardless  of  the  wel- 
fare of  others.  But  obviously,  different  kinds  of  conduct  will 
bring  satisfaction  to  different  characters.  The  practice  of  vir- 
tue is  pleasurable  to  the  virtuous  as  vice  is  to  the  vicious. 
If  therefore,  an  act  becomes  selfish  whenever  it  aims  at  the 
satisfaction  or  pleasure  of  the  agent,  it  follows  that  the  practice 
of  virtue  by  the  virtuous  is  selfish ;  and  if  all  selfish'  action  is 
wrong,  it  must  be  wrong  for  the  virtuous  to  practice  virtue, 
which,  as  Euclid  would  say,  is  absurd. 

And  besides,  if  all  action  which' aims  at  the  agent's  own1  wel- 
fare is  wrong,  it  is  not  certain  that  any  opportunity  for  right 
action  remains.  It  would  be  easy  to  show,  indeed,  from  Renan's 
own  words,  that  morality  is  at  bottom  nothing  more  than  a;  ficv 
tion.  For  if  it  is  true  that  reason  is  utterly  and  unavoidably 
selfish,  as  he  insists,  and  that  hence  there  can  be  no  such  thing 
as  a  deliberately  unselfish  act ;  and  if,  as  he  further  maintains, 
deliberate  unselfishness  alone  can  be  called  meritorious,  then1 
does  it  not  follow  that  the  very  idea  of  merit,  or  of  morality, 
rests  on  illusion  ? 

But  this  is  as  far  as  possible  from  the  position  expressly  main- 


276  BULLETIN   OF   THE    UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

tained  by  him  elsewhere.  For  not  only  is  faith  in  morality 
declared  to  be  the  most  certain!  of  all  human  beliefs,  it  is  the 
only  absolute  certitude  in  the  entire  realm  of  philosophy. 
Speaking  of  the  articles  which  make  up  his  Essais  de  morale 
et  de  critique,  he  says: 

"Tous  se  resument  en  une  pensee  que  je  mets  fort  au-dessus 
des  opinions  et  des  hypotheses,  c'est  que  le  morale  est  la  chose 
serieuse  et  vraie  par  excellence,  et  qu'elle  suffit  pour  donner  a 
la  vie  un  sens  et  uiu  but"  Mar.  Grit,,  I.  Cf .  Frag.,  311 ;  also, 
Seailles,  E.  R.,  218. 

M.  Seailles  comments  on  these  passages : 

"A  regarder  les  choses  du  point  de  vue  de  Tespace  et  du 
temps,  il  y  a  quelque  chose  de  monstrueux  dans  la  primaute 
que  Renan  accorde  aux  sciences  morales,  c'est  revenir  a  Fan- 
thropomorphismje  sans  prendre  la  peine  de  le  justifies. "  E.  R., 
340. 

The  truth  is  that  we  are  confronted  again  with  the  capi- 
tal defect  of  Roman's  moral  philosophy,  as  of  all  his  philosoph- 
ical speculations,:  it  is  either  so  incurably  vague  as  to  afford 
no  definite  information,  or  so  hopelessly  self-contradictory  as 
to  baffle  all  .attempts  at  reconciliation,  and  even  at  clear  and 
consistent  exposition.  His  language  is  loose  and  elastic,  sup- 
ple and  evasive  to  the  last  degree.  Moreover,  he  seems  never 
to  have  examined  the  problems  of  moral  philosophy  from  a 
psychological  point  of  view.  There  is  nothing  in  his  writings 
to  indicate  that  he  ever  went  to  the  trouble  of  analyzing  men's 
moral  judgments  with  reference  to  the  ultimate  reasons  wky 
acts  are  currently  judged  to  be  good  or  bad,  or  motives  right 
or  wrong.  The  only  statement  in  his  books  which  might  sug- 
gest a  familiarity  with  the  subject  occurs  in  one  of  his  speeches 
before  the  Academie  Frangaise,  in  which  all  existing  theories 
concerning  the  origin  of  morality  and  the  ultimate  grounds 
of  obligation  are  declared  to  be  untenable.  Cf.  Disc.,  196-7. 

It  is  true  that  in  all  his  utterances;  on  the  subject  he  de- 
clares or  implies  that  morality  consists  in  unselfishness;  but 
it  is  too  absurd  to  suppose  that  so  clear-headed  a  man  as  Renan 
would  expressly  maintain  that  all  selfish  action  is  wrong,  and 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      277 

all  unselfish  action  right  The  truth  is  that  he  approaches  the 
problem  from  a  different  point  of  view.  Morality,  in  his  con- 
ception of  it,  is  not  so  much  a  question  of  right  and  wrong, 
or  of  reasons  for  right  and  wrong,  as  a  question  of  merit  or 
absence  of  merit  Unselfish  conduct,  he  would  say  with  Kant, 
to  whom  his  impressions  in  moral  philosophy  all  appear  to  go 
back,  is  meritorious  conduct;  and  that  is  his  reason  for  calling 
it  virtuous. 

But  even  so  he  gets  himself  hopelessly  involved  in  tauto- 
logy, or  entangled  in  contradictions,  the  moment  he  is  pressed 
to  define  his  terms.  What,  for  example,  does  he  miean  by  mer- 
itorious conduct? 

In  all  the  accepted  meanings  of  the  term,  merit  is  rested 
upon  virtue,  and  not  the  other  way  round.  An  action  is  meri- 
torious beca,use  it  is  virtuous,  or  virtuous  to  an  unusual  de- 
gree. Merit  is  simply  the  value  set  upon  virtue.  The  weaker 
the  flesh  the  greater  the  merit  if  we  do  right.  The  harder  it 
is  to  rise  early  in  the  mlorning,  the  greater  the  merit  in  doing 
so.  Cf .  Leslie  Stephen,  Sci.  Eth.,  Lond.,  1882,  p.  311 ;  Alex- 
ander, Mor.  Order  and  Prog.,  Lond.,  1891,  p.  194;  Kant,  Met 
d.  Sit,  1797,  p.  29. 

To  make  mierit  the  basis  of  virtue,  therefore,  involves  a 
logical  circle.  For  if  we  ask  for  the  ground  of  the  mierit,  the 
only  answer  can  be  that  it  is  virtue,  or  an  unusual  degree  of 
virtue.  The  tautology  is  obvious:  unselfish  conduct  is  vir- 
tuous because  it  is  meritorious,  and  it  is  meritorious  because 
it  is  unselfish  and  therefore  virtuous;  in  other  words,  it  is. 
good  because  it  is  good. 

And  this  really  seems  to  be  Kenan's  position.  He  expressly 
declares,  ove-r  and  over  again,  that  no  reason  can  be  given  why 
a  man  should  be  virtuous.  Whenever  an  individual  is  truly 
unselfish,  it!  is  in  consequence  of  some  mysterious,  transcenden- 
tal compulsion.  A  moral  hero  can  give  no  rational  grounds 
for  his  heroism. 

"La  signification  transcendante  de  Tacte  vertueux  est  pre- 
cisement  qu'en  le  faisant,  on  ne  poturra  pas  bien  dire  pour- 
quoi  on  le  fait  II  n'y  a  pas  d'acte  vertueux  qui  puisse  raison- 


278  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

nablemtent  se  deduire.  Le  heros,  quand  il  se  mot  a  reflechir, 
trouve  qu'il  a  agi  commie  un  etre  absurde,  et  c'est  justement 
pour  cela  qu'il  a  ete  un  heros.  II  a  obei  a  un  ordre  superieur, 
a  un  oracle  infaillible,  a  une  voix  qui  comniande  de  la  facon 
la  plus  claire,  sans  donner  ses  raisons."  Disc.,  196-7;  Cf. 
Mor.  Grit.,  II. 

But  again  we  must  ask:  Where  is  the  merit  of  unselfish- 
ness, if  it  springs,  not  from  the  (human  will,  but  from  some 
unknown,  irresistible  source?  What  merit  can  there  be  in 
doing  what  we  cannot  avoid  ? 

The  attempt  to  bring  logical  coherence  into  Kenan's  ethical 
teachings  leads,  in  fact,  as  already  suggested,  to  the  strange 
result  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  truly  meritorious  or 
moral  act,  in  his  own  sense  of  the  terms ;  for  the  only  con- 
duct to  which  merit  attaches  is  not  in  reality  the  work  of  man. 

This  seems  another  instance  of  the  persistence  in  him  of 
theological  influences.  If  in  the  place  of  his  transcendental 
compulsion  we  put  the  Christian  idea  of  divine  grace,  we  have 
the  theological  doctrine  that  whatever  is  good  or  meritorious 
in  human  conduct  proceeds  from  the  grace  of  God.  In  the 
•eyes  of  Reman  as  in  those  of  Saint  Augustine,  man  is  inca- 
pable of  even  resolving  a  truly  virtuous  act  of  his  own  free, 
unaided  choice. 

.  ''Quid  habes  quad  non  accepisti?  Le  dogme  de  la  grace  est 
le  plus  vrai  des  dogmes  chretiens.  L'effort  inconscient  vers  le 
bien  et  le  vrai  qui  est  dans  1'univers  joue  son  coup  de  de  par 
chacun  de  nous.  Tout  arrive,  les  quaternes  comme  le  reste. 
Nous  pouvons  deranger  le  dessein  providentiel  do<nt  notua 
aomines  Tobjet;  nous  ne  sommes  pour  presque  rien  dans  sa 
reussite."  Souv.,  373. 

Tihus  we  are  brought  around  at  last,  unawares,  to  the  ever- 
lastingly debatable  question  of  the  free  will,  and  perhaps  this 
is  the  most  convenient  place  to  state  Kenan's  position  in  regard 
to  this  time-honored  problemi 

He  has  nowhere  discussied  the  question  ex  cathedra,  for- 
tunately for  this  chapter,  and  even  his  passing  references  are 
few  and  brief. 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.  279 

The  term  free-will,  as  Hoffding  and  others  have  shown,  is 
played  fast  and  loose  with  in  philosophical  discussion,  being 
currently  used  in  half  a  dozen  or  more  quite  different  mean- 
ings. Of.  Holding's  Ethik,  Germ,  trans!.,  Leipz.,  1888. 
Kenan's  utterances  on  this  topic  are  altogether  too  vague  to  place 
him  on  either  the  determinist  or  the  indeterminist  side  in  this 
controversy. 

He  insists  that  man  is  a  free  moral  agent  (whatever  that 
may  moan).  Disc.,  III.  An  essential  condition  of  right  ac- 
tion, he  declares,  is  the  possibility  of  wrong  action.  Q.  C., 
65.  It  is  man's  mission  in  the  world  to  substitute  reason  for 
blind  physical  necessity.  A.  S.,  31. 

This  view  is  more  fully  and  more  clearly  set  forth  in  the 
following  anecdote,  which  incidentally  illustrates  Kenan's  habit 
of  reflecting  upon  his  own  actions,  and  perpetually  revising  his 
own  conclusions. 

aJe  vis  tin  jour  dans  un  bois  un  essaim  de  vilains  petite 
insectes,  qui  avaient  entoure  de  leurs  filets  un©  jeune  plante  et 
suQaient  ses  pousses  vertes  avec  un  si  laid  caractere  de  para- 
sitisme,  que  cela  faisait  repugnance.  J'eus  un  instant  1'idee 
de  les  detruire.  Puis  je  me  dis:  Ce  n'est  pas  leur  faute  s'il 
sont  laids;  c'est  une  facon  de  vivre.  II  est  d'un  petit  ©sprit, 
me  disais-je,  de  moraliser  la  nature  et  d©  lui  imposer  nos 
jugera/ents.  Mais  maintenant  je  vois  que  j'eus  tort;  j'aurais 
du  les  tuer;  car  la  mission  de  1'homme  dans  la  nature  c'est  de 
reformer  le  laid  et  1'immioraL"  A.  S.,  note  182. 

The  most  definite  of  his  utterances  on  the  question  of  the  free 
will  occurs  in  the  Averroes  et  I'Averro'isme,  where  the  views  of 
the  Arabian  philosopher  are  endorsed  in  the  following  words : 

"Ibn-Kioschd  a  ...  soutenu  ....  les  vraies 
theories  de  la  philosophi©  sur  la  liberte.  L'homme  n'est  ni  ab- 
solument  libre  ni  absolument  predestine.  La  liberte  envisagee 
dans  1'ame,  est  entiere  et  sans  restriction ;  mais  ©lie  est  limiit©© 
par  la  fatalite  des  circonstances  exterieures.  La  caus©  ©fii- 
cient©  de  nos  actes  est  en  nous ;  mais  la  caus©  occasionnell©  est 
hors  de  nous."  Averr.,  159-60. 

From  a  not©  to  the  Avenir  de  la  science  it  appears  that  the 


280  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

reality  of  roan's  freedom  was  so  unquestioningly  assumed  by 
Renan  as  an  indisputable  fact,  that  it  served  him  as  a  criterion 
of  philosophical  truth. 

"Qu'il  me  suffi.se  de  dire  que  je  crois  a  une  raison  vivante 
de  toute  chose,  et  que  j'admets  la  liberte  et  la  personnalite  hu- 
maine  comme  des  f  aits  evi  dents ;  que  par  consequent  toute  doe- 
trine  qui  serait  amenee  logiquement  a  les  nier  serait  f  ausse  a 
mies  yeux."  A.  S.,  note  14. 

It  should  be  noticed,  however,  that  all  these  passages  belong 
to  his  earliest  period,  immediately  following  his  separation 
from  the  church.  In  his  later  works  there  does  not  appear  to 
be  even  a  passing  reference  to  this  classical  product  of  schola-s- 
tical  lore. 

Returning  to  our  question  of  moral  criteria: 

The  only  standard  of  ethical  judgments  to  which  Renan  has 
anywhere  expressly  declared  his  personal  allegiance  is  the  es- 
thetic standard,  which  in  his  earlier  days  he  believed  to  be  des- 
tined to  supplant  all  other  standards  of  right,  in  proportion  as 
humanity  progresses  in  culture. 

"Je  reconnais  que  le  sens  moral  ou  ses  equivalents  sont  de 
Fessence  de  Fhumanite;  .  .  .  II  y  a  dans  Fhumanite 
une  faculte  ou  un  besoin,  une  capacite,  en  un  mot,  qui  est 
combiee  de  nos  jours  par  la  morale,  Je  concois 

de  mem|e  pour  Favenir  que  le  mot  morale  devienne  impropre 
et  soit  remplace  par  un  autre.  Pour  mon  usage  particulier, 
j'y  sub&titue  de  preference  le  nom  esthetique.  En  face  d'une 
action,  je  me  demJande  plutot  si  elle  est  belle  ou  laide,  que 
bonne  ou  mauvaise,  et  je  crois  avoir  la  un  bon  criterium;  car 
avec  la  simple  morale  qui  fait  Fhonnete  homnie,  on  peut  encore 
mener  une  assez  mesquine  vie."  A.  S.,  177. 

aSois  beau,  et  alors  fais  a  chaque  instant  ce  que  t'inspirera 
ton  coeur,'7  voila  toute  la  morale.  T'outes  les  autres  regies 
sont  fautives  et  mensongeres  dans  leur  forme  absolue.  Les 
regies  generales  ne  sont  que  des  expedients  mesquins  pour  sup- 
pleer  a  Fabsence  du  grand  sens  moral,  qui  suffit  a  lui  seul  pour 
reveler  en  toute  occasion  a  Fhommie  ce  qui  est  le  plus  beau/' 
A.  S.,  179-80 ;  475 ;  F.  Det.,  333. 


BEAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      281 

"Moi  qui  suis  cultive,  je  ne  trouve  pas  de  mlal  en  moi,  et 
spontanement  en  toute  chose  je  me  port©  a  ce  qui  me  semble 
le  plus  beau.  Si  tous  etaient  aussi  cultives  qu©  moi,  tous  s©rai- 
eiit  comime  moi  dans  Theureuse  impossibility  de  mial  faire. 
La  morale  a  ete  congu©  jusqu'ici  d'une  maniere 
fort  etroite,  comm©  un©  obei'ssance  a  une  loi,  comme  une  lutte 
interieur©  entr©  des  lois  opposees.  Pour  moi,  je  declare  que 
quand  je  fais  bien,  je  n'obeis  a  personne,  je  ne  livre  aucune 
bataille  et  n©  remporte  aucune  victoire.  .  .  .  L^homnie 
eleve  n'a  qu'a  suivre  la  delicieuse  pent©  de  son  impulsion  in- 
tin^e;  il  pourrait  adopter  la  devise  de  St.  Augustin. 
'Fais  c©  que  tu  voudras" ;  car  il  ne  peut  vouloir  que  de  belles 
choses.  L'homme  vertueux  est  un  artiste  qui  realise  1©  beau 
dans  une  vie  humaine  comme  le  statuaire  1©  realise  sur  1© 
marbre,  comme  le  musicien  par  des  sons.  Y  a-t>il  obei'ssance 
et  lutte  dans  Fact©  du  statuaire  et  du  musicien  ?"  A.  S.,  354— 
5.  Of.  James,  Var.  Eel.  Exp.,  80. 

The  religion  of  the  future,  he  prophesies,  will  be  a  pure 
humanism,  "c'est  a  dire  le  cult©  de  tout  ce  qui  est  de  rhomme, 
la  vie  entiere  sanctifiee  et  elevee  a  un©  valeur  miorale.  Soigner 
sa  belle  humamte  (Schiller)  s©ra  alors  la  Loi  ©t  l©s  Prophetes." 
A.  S.,  101. 

"Tout  c©  qui  s'atta-ch©  a  la  vie  superieure  de  Thomme,  a 
cet,t©  vie  par  laquelle  il  se  distingue  d©  Tanimal,  tout  c©la  ©st 
sacre,  tout  cela  est  digne  de  la  passion  des  belles  ames. 
L'homme  parfait  serait  celui  qui  s©rait  a  la  fois  poete,  philo- 
sophe,  savant,  homm©  vertueux."  A.  S.,  11.  Cf.  ibid.,  355 ; 
M.-Aur.,  554;  Mor.  Grit,  36T. 

In  the  following  passage  we  have  an  interesting  example  of 
Kenan's  application  of  this  criterion  of  right  to  a  concrete  in- 
stance: the  institution  of  suttee  among  the  natives  of  India. 
The  English  are  severely  condemned  for  attempting  to  repress 
this  beautiful  effusion  of  idealism,  that  is  to  say  the  burning 
of  womjen  alive. 

"Les  Anglais  ont  cru  faire  pour  la  saine  moral©  en  inter- 
disant  dans  Tlnde  les  processions  ensanglante©s  par  des  sacri- 
fices volontaires,  1©  suicid©  de  la  femme  sur  le  tombeau 


282  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

dii  mari.  Etrange  meprise!  Croyez-vous  que  ce  fanatique 
qui  va  poser  avec  joie  sa  tete  sous  les  roues  du  char  de  Jagat/- 
nata  n'est  pas  plus  heureux  et  plus  beau  que  vous,  insipides 
marchands?  Croyez-vous  qu'il  ne  fait  pas  plus  d'honneur  a 
la  nature  humaine  en  temioignant,  d'une  facon  irrationnelle 
sans  doute  mais  puissante,  qu'il  y  a  dans  rhomme  des  instincts 
superieurs  a  tous  les  desirs  du  fini  et  a  1' amour  de  soi-memo? 
II  faut  voir  dans  ces  actes  la  fascination  que  Tinfini  exerce  sur 
rhomme,  Penthousiasme  impersonnel,  le  culte  du  suprasensible. 
Et  c'est  a  ces  superbes  debordements  des  grands  instincts  de 
la  nature  humaine  que  vous  venez  de  tracer  des  limites,  avec 
votre  petite  morale  et  votre  etroit  bon  sens."  A.  S.,  87. 

Is  any  further  proof  needed  of  the  insufficiency  and  unre- 
liableness  of  the  beauty  standard  as  a  criterion  of  right  and 
wrong  ? 

In  another  passage  from  the  same  book,  monasticismi  is  pro- 
nounced more  beautiful  than  industrialism};  are  we  to  con- 
clude that  it  is  therefore  morally  more  right  ?  Cf .  Mor.  Grit., 
356;  ]XToaiv.  fit  Eel.,  337-8. 

I  cannot  resist  quoting  two  more  passages  on  this  topic, 
showing  what  opposite  judgments  he  himself  passed  on  the 
same  characters  in  the  samje  book. 

"Pairqe  mieux  un  iogui,  j'aime  mieux  un  mouni  de  Tlnde, 
j'aime  mieux  Simeon  Stylite  mange  des  vers  sur  son  etrange 
piedestal  qu'un  prosaique  industriel,  capable  de  suivre  pen- 
dant vingt  ans  une  meme  pensee  de  fortune.  Heros  de  la  vie 
desinteressee,  saints,  apotres,  mounis,  solitaires,  cenobites,  as- 
cetes  de  tous  les  siecles  ...  que  vous  avez  mieux  comh 
pris  la  vie  que  ceux  qui  la  prennent  coimne  un  etroit  calcul 
d'interet,  comme  une  lutte  insignifiante  d'ambition  ou  de 
vanite."13  A.  S.,  84-5. 

With  this  passage  in  mind,  turn  to  the  following,  written 
the  samje  year: 

"L'abstinence  et  la  mortification  sont  des  vertus  de  barbares 
et  d'hommes  materiels,  qui,  sujets  a  de  grossiers  appetits,  ne 
congoivent  rien  de  plus  heroique  que  d'y  resister.  .  .  Aux 
yeux  d'homone'S  grossiers,  un  hommie  qui  jeune,  qui  se  flagelle, 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPFIY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.  283 

qui  est  chaste,  qui  passe  sa  vie  sur  une  colonne,  est  1'ideal  de  la 
vertu.  .  .  L' abstinence  affectee  prouve  qu'on  fait  beau- 
coup  de  cas  de®  choses  dont  on  se  prive."  A.  S.,  403-4. 

Taking  the  two  statements  together,  it  would  be  easy  to  show 
from  his  own  words  that  Renan  was  ffun  homme  materiel," 
"un  homme  grassier"  when  he  penned  his  rhapsodic  admiration 
of  the  vermin-eaten  hermit  on  his  column.  That  would  be  un- 
true, however,  as  well  as  unkind.  It  is  simiply  another  in- 
stance of  the  countless  conflicting  opinions  expressed  in  his 
books,  according  as  he  gives  expression  to  the  idealistic  values 
of  his  poetic  temperament  or  to  the  subtle  speculations  of  an 
analytic  mind. 

His  preference  for  the  esthetic  standard  in  morals,  it  may  be 
noted  in  passing,  is  entirely  in  keeping  with  his  pronounced 
aversion  for  logic.  Esthetic  impressionism  in  ethics  fits  ad- 
mirably with  the  perpetual  tergiversation  and  mercurial  fickle- 
ness of  his  general  philosophy;  both  alike  affording  release 
from  the  odious  fetters  of  logical  consistency.  It  is  another 
evidence  of  the  wonderful  versatility  of  his  mind,  perpetually 
oscillating  between;  different  points  of  view,  and  delighting  in 
the  sense  of  its  own  ubiquity.  Renan  could  not  make  up  his 
mind  to  exclude  from  his  appreciation  anything  that  miight 
possibly  enrich  his  collection  of  intellectual  and  spiritual  curi- 
osities. Logical  consistency  seemed  to  him]  too  great  a  price 
to  pay  for  this  self-impoverishment.  The  good,  the  beautiful 
and  the  true,  in  all  their  various  manifestations,  found  eager 
and  ardent  recognition  from  his  pen,  quite  regardless  whether 
or  not  his  esthetic  appreciations  were  consistent  with  his  intel- 
lectual ones.  An  institution  might  be  good  but  not  beautiful, 
or  beautiful  but  not  good ;  a  doctrine  might  be  true  but  injuri- 
ous, or  useful  but  false,  oar  beautiful  without  being  either  true 
or  good;  but  this  he  considered  no  ground  for  withholding  his 
recognition  of  their  own  peculiar  merits.  His  exclusive  aim 
at  all  times  was  sincerity,  and  the  reconciliation  of  his  sepa- 
rate sincerities  he  has  left  to  his  readers,  or  rather  expositors. 

Renan's  emphasis  on  the  esthetic  side  of  life  in  the  period 
imimediately  following  his  separation  from  the  church  appears 


284  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

to  have  been  a  reaction  against  Christian  asceticism.  He  re- 
proaches the  church  for  its  one-sided  emphasis  upon  goodness, 
to  the  neglect  or  even  exclusion  of  truth  and  beauty.  Human 
perfection,  he  insists,  implies  intellectual  and  esthetic  culture 
as  well  as  moral;  and  this  remained  a  favorite  topic  with  him 
to  the  end  of  his  life. 

"On  s'imagine  trop  sou  vent/'  he  writes  "que  la  mora- 
lite  seule  fait  la  perfection,  que  la  poursuite  du  vrai  et  du  beau 
ne  constitue  qu'une  jouissance,  que  rhomtme  parfait,  c'est 
1'honnete  homime,  le  f rere  morave  par  example.  Le  modele  de 
la  perfection  nous  est  donne  par  Phumanite  elle-meme;  la  vie 
la  plus  parf  aite  est  celle  qui  represente  le  mieux  toute  Phu- 
manite.  Or  Phumanite  cultivee  n'est  pas  seulement  morale; 
elle  est  encore  savante,  curieuse,  poetique,  passionnee."  A.  S., 
12.  Of.  ibid.,  355;  Mor.  Crit.,  367. 

In  his  juvenile  enthusiasm  he  even  goes  so  far  as  to  hope 
that  somje  day  a  more  completely  human  moral  ideal  may  be 
evolved,  " —  un  Christ  qui  ne  representerait  plus  seulement  le 
cote  moral  a  sa  plus  haute  puissance,  mais  encore  le  cote  es- 
thetique  et  scientifique  de  Phumanite."  A.  S.,  13. 

This  alleged  one-sidedness  of  the  Christian  ideal  of  human 
perfection  is  reaffirmed,  more  than  thirty  years  later,  in  his 
Marc-Aurele,  and  indeed  to  the  end  of  his  days: 

"Le  defaut  du  christianisme  appiarait  bien  ici.  II  est  trop 
uniquement  moral ;  la  beaute,  chez  lui,  est  tout  a  fait  sacrifice. 
Or,  aux  yeux  d'une  philosophie  complete,  la  beaute,  loin 
d'etre  un  avantage  superficiel,  un  danger,  un  inconvenient,  est 
un  don  de  Dieu,  commje  la  vertu.  Elle  vaut  la  vertu;  la 
femme  bello  exprime  aussi  bien  une  face  du  but  divin,  une  des 
fins  de  Dieu,  que  Fhomme  de  genie,  ou  la  femmie  vertueuse. 
Elle  le  sent,  et  de  la  sa  fierte.  .  .  .  Elle  sait  bien  qu'elle 
compte  entre  les  premieres  manifestations  de  Dieu. 
La  fem^ne,  en  se  parant,  accomplit  un  devoir;  .  .  la  plus 
belle  oeuvre  de  Dieu,  c'est  la  beaute  de  la  femme.  M.-Aur., 
554-5.  Cf.  Souv.,  YIII-IX,  14-15,  33-4,  114. 

But  in  later  years  he  applied  this  principle  of  all-sided  de- 
velopment, more  broadly,  to  humanity  as  a  whole,  rather  than 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.  285 

to  separate  institutions,  or  to  individual  men.  He  seems  to 
Lave  held  in  his  latest  phase  that  the  ideal  life  for  a  given  in- 
dividual at  any  time  depends  on  a  great  many  things:  his  age, 
history,  rank,  social  function,  his  talents,  opportunities, and  so 

forth: 

"Ghaque  classe  de  la  societe  est  un  rouage,  un  bras  de  le- 
vier  dans  cette  immense  machine.  Voila  pourquoi  chacune  a 
.-ses  vertus.  Nous  sommes  tons  des  fonctions  de  Tunivers;  le 
devoir  consiste  a  ce  que  chacun  remiplisse  bien  sa  fonetion." 
Dial.,  132-3. 

"II  importe  pen  que  St  Vincent  de  Paul  n'ait  pas  ete  un 
grand  esprit.  Raphael  n'aurait  rien  gagne  a  etre  bien  regie 
dans  ses  moeurs.  L'effort  divin  qui  est  en  tout  se  produit  par 
les  justes,  les  savants,  les  artistes.  Chacun  a  sa  part.  Le  de- 
voir de  Goethe  fut  d'etre  egoi'ste  pour  son  oeuvre.  L'immo- 
ralite  transcendante  de  Fartiste  est  a  sa  facon  moralite  su- 
premo, si  elle  sert  a  I'accomplissement  de  la  particuliere  mis- 
sion divine  dont  chacun  est  charge  ici-bas."  Dial.,  133.  Cf. 
F.  Det.,  382-3.  Ref.  Int.,  2;  A.  S.,  VIII-X;  Of.  F.  Det., 
110 ;  also  Mackenzie,  Manual  of  Ethics,  3rd  ed.,  p.  339. 

"La  fete  de  1'univers  manquerait  de  quelque  chose,  si 
]e  monde  n'etait  peuple  que  de  fanatiques  iconoclastes  et  de 
lourdauds  vertueux."13a 

But  do  not  these  later  statements  furnish  a  complete  an- 
swer to  his  earlier  criticisms  on  the  one-sidedness  of  the  Chris- 
tian ideal  of  goodness  ?  The  special  emphasis  laid  by  the 
Christian  religion  on  moral  excellence  is  simply,  "from  a  cos- 
mical  standpoint,"  a  case  of  what  the  economists  call  division 
of  labor.  And  is  it  so  certain  that  the  interests  of  the  race, 
even  on  secular  grounds,  may  not  require  a  special  emphasis 
on  some  one  side  of  human  capabilities,  either  as  being  of 
miore  fundamental  importance  in  character,  or  less  likely  to 
receive  sufficient  attention  from  individuals  in  the  absence  of 
a  constant  social  or  institutional  pressure? 

It  was  said  somb  pages  back  that  the  only  moral  criterion 
explicitly  acknowledged  by  Henan  as  guiding  his  personal  val- 
uations of  right  and  wrong,  in  judgment  and  action,  was  the 


286  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN". 

standard  of  beauty.  It  would  be  misrepresenting  his  mean- 
ing, however,  to  suppose  that  he  intended  this  criterion  to  serve 
universally,  regardless  of  the  characters  and  the  ideals  of  the 
persons  judging.  For  refined,  impeccable  natures  of  high 
moral  culture,  like  himself,  he  indeed  believed  that  the  right 
would  always  coincide  with  the  beautiful;  but  it  is  only  when, 
all  have  attained,  as  he  believed  all  could  attain,  this  same  de- 
gree of  moral  perfection,  that  the  beauty  of  an  act  can  be  a 
reliable  criterion  of  its.  rightness.  We  saw  into  what  opposite 
judgments  he  himself  was  led,  notwithstanding  his  impeccabil- 
ity, by  this  standard.  The  truth  is  that  the  criterion  of 
beauty  is  not  one,  but  many;  varying  with  the  character,  the 
ideals,  the  knowledge,  the  propensities  and  even  the  moods  of 
the  persons  judging.  Different  acts  seemi  beautiful  to  differ- 
ent persons,  and  to  the  sam)e  person  at  different  times. 

Nor  did  Renan  see  that  the  esthetic  standard  is  at  bottom 
only  a  sublimation  of  the  hedonistic  standard,  just  as  truly  as 
appreciation  of  beauty  affords  pleasure.  If  by  pleasure  is 
meant  an  agreeable  state  of  consciousness, — and  what  else  can 
it  mean? — •,  then  beauty  is  a  species  of  pleasure,  and  ugliness 
a  species  of  pain,  in  however  refined  a  form.  But  this 
fact  seems  never  to  have  occurred  to  Renan;  for  ethical 
hedonism  is  as  violently  antagonized  in  his  earlier  period  as 
moral  estheticism  is  enthusiastically  chamtpioned.  He  ex- 
pressly repudiates  the  idea  that  pleasure  is  the  ultimate  item 
of  worth  in  life.  If  happiness  were  the  highest  aim,!  of  life, 
or  even  the  only  rational  aim,  there  would  be  no  difference,  lie 
argues,  in  respect  of  their  destinies,  between  man  and  beast. 
Mor.  Grit,  IV;  A.  S.,  324-5. 

He  frequently  insists  on  what  Jias  been  called  the  paradox 
of  hedonism,  the  fact  that  a  conscious  and  exclusive  pursuit 
of  pleasure  defeats  its  own  aim.  Pleasure-seeking,  he  assures 
the  unsophisticated  populace  of  Treguier,  is  impolitic  as  well 
as  immoral.  The  surest  way  of  finding  happiness  is  to  stop 
looking  for  it.  Disc.,  219.  Cf.  C.  D'Angl.,  222;  Souv.y 
127-8. 

In  later  years  his  attitude  towards  hedonistic  conceptions 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.  287 

of  life  were  very  radically  changed,  however,  and  much  for 
the  worse.  But  this  decadent  phase  will  call  for  further  dis- 
cussion in  the  next  chapter. 

It  remains  to  observe  in  this  place  that  another  criterion  of 
moral  judgments,  besides  that  of  beauty,  was  in  fact  presup- 
posed and  implied  in  all  his  utterances  on  the  subject:  the 
standard  of  social  utility,  or  social  efficiency.  In  the  Abbesse 
de  Jouarre,  for  example,  the  most  objectionable  of  his  Dromes 
philosophiques,  he  implies  all  along  that  acts  are  good  or  bad 
according  as  their  consequences  are  socially  advantageous  or 
the  reverse.  The  only  reason  why  "free  love"  is  judged  to  be 
wrong  is  because  it  is  incompatible  with  the  requirements  of 
civilized  life.  This  doctrine  is  clearly  formulated  in  his 
Avant-propos  to  the  play: 

"Je  m/ imagine  souvent  que,  si  Phumianite  acquerait  la  certi- 
tude que  le  monde  dut  finir  dans  deux  ou  trois  jours,  P  amour 
eclaterait  de  toutes  parts  avec  une  sorte  de  frenesie;  car  ce 
qui  retient  P amour,  ce  sont  les  conditions  absolument  neces- 
saires  que  la  conservation  morale  de  la  societe  humaine  a  im- 
posees.  Quand  on  se  verrait  en  face  d'une  mprt  subite  et  cer- 
taine,  la  nature  seule  parlerait;  le  plus  puissant  de  ses 
instincts,  sans  cesse  bride  et  contrarie,  reprendrait  ses  droits; 
un  cri  s'echapperait  de  toutes  les  poitrines,  quand  on  saurait 
qu'on  peut  approcher  avec  une  entiere  legitimite  de  Tarbre  em- 

toure  de  taut  d'anathemes."  Dr.  Ph.  411 Le 

monde  boirait  a  pleine  coupe  et  sans  arriere-pensee  un  aphro- 

disiaque  puissant  qui  le  ferait  mourir  de  plaisir 

On  mouiTait  dans  le  sentiment  de  la  plus  haute  adoration  et 
dans  Pacte  de  priere  le  plus  parfait."  Dr.  Ph.,  411-12.  Cf. 
Dial.,  133 ;  F.  Det.,  382-3. 

For  once,  then,  morality  is  dissociated  completely  from  all 
metaphysical  speculations  or  transcendental  moral  impera- 
tives. 

"J'espere  que  m'on  Abbesse  plaira  aux  idealistes,"  he  says 
of  this  play  "qui  n'ont  pas  besoin  de  crodre  a  Texistence  d'es- 
prits  purs  pour  croire  au  devoir,  et  qui  savent  bien  que  la 


288  BULLETIN   OF   THE  UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

noblesse  morale  ne  depend  pas  des  opinions  metaphysiques." 
Dr.  Ph.,  413. 
And  again: 

"Le  vrai,  le  beau,  le  bien  ont  par  eux-memes  assez  d'attrait 
pour  n'avoir  pas  besoin  d'une  autorite  qui  les  coonniande,  ni 
d'une  recompense  qui  y  soit  attachee."  Dr.  Ph.,  413. 

Yet  in  the  Avenir  de  la  science,  in  his  impassioned  plea  for 
the  extension  of  science  and  its  application  to  all  departments 
of  human  life,  he  expressly  repudiates  a  merely  utilitarian  ba- 
sis for  his  plea,  and  incidentally  declares  that  morality  has  a 
value  in  itself,  independently  of  any  advantage  to  society: 

"(Test  comnie  si,  pour  etablir  la  morale,  on  se  bornait  a 
presenter  les  avantages  qu'elle  procure  a  la  societe.  La  science, 
aussi  bien  que  la  morale,  a  sa  valeur  en  elle-mieme  et  indepen- 
detriment  de  tout  resultat  avantageux."  A.  S.,  22. 

All  the  reasons  for  morality  dispersed  throughout  his  writ- 
ings, or  nearly  all,  are  run  in  together  in  the  following  prayer, 
with  which  he  concludes  his  article  la,  Melaphysique  el  son 
avendr. 

"O  Pere  celeste,  j 'ignore  ce  que  Tu  nous  reserves.  Cette  foi, 
que  Tu  ne  nous  permets  pas  d'effacer  de  nos  coeurb,  est-elle  une 
consolation  que  Tu  as  menagee  pour  nous  rendre  supportable 
notre  destine©  fragile  ?  Est-ce  la  une  bienf aisante  illusion  que 
ta  pitie  a  savamment  combinee,  ou  bien  un  instinct  profond, 
une  revelation  qui  suffit  a  ceux  qui  en  sont  dignes  ?  Est-ce 
le  desespoir  qui  a  raison,  et  la  verite  serait-elle  triste?  Tu 
n'as  pas  voulu  que  ces  doutes  re^ussent  une  claire  reponse, 
aim  que  la  foi  au  bien  ne  restat  pas  sans  mlerite,  et  que  la 
vertu  ne  fut  pas  un  calcul.  Une  claire  revelation  eut  assimile 
Tame  noble  a  Tame  vulgaire;  Fevidence  en  pareille  matiere 
eut  ete  une  atteinte  a  notre  liberte.  C'est  de  nos  dispositions 
interieures  que  Tu  as  voulu  faire  dependre  notre  foi.  Dans 
tout  ce  qui  est  objet  de  science  et  de  discussion  rationnelle, 
Tu  as  livre  la  verite  aux  plus  ingenieux;  dans  Tordre  moral 
et  religieux,  Tu  as  juge  qu'elle  devait  appartenir  aux  meilleurs. 
II  edit  ete  inique  que  le  genie  et  1'esprit  constituassent  ici  un 
privilege1,  et  que  les  croyances  qui  doivent  etre  le  bien  commun 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  KENAN.      289 

de  tons  fussent  le  fruit  d'un  raisonnement  plus  ou  moins  bieii 
conduit,  de  recherches  plus  ou  moins  favorisees."  Frag., 
333-4.  ' 

Before  concluding  this  chapter,  a  word  must  be  said  about 
Roman's  position  on  the  much-mooted  question  of  optimism 
versus  pessimism: 

It  would  seem  that  there  is  no>  place  in  his  philosophy 
for  a  theodicy,  inasmuch  as  in  his  speculations  about  thje  cos- 
mos the  relations  of  creator  and  creation  are  inverted.  In- 
stead of  God  in  the  beginning  creating  heaven  and  earth,  the 
heavens  and  the  earth  are  engaged  through  all  time  in,  the  task 
of  evolving  a  God.  Nevertheless,  Renan  has  attempted  some- 
thing like  a  justification  of  the  ways  of  God  to  man. 

In  the  semi-conscious  groping  of  the  deific  process,  he  as- 
sures us,  a  certain  amount  of  evil  is  the  necessary  price  of 
a  greater  good.  F.  Det,  377-8.  Of.,  Mor.  Grit.,  179. 

Renan  took  every  opportunity  to  testify  that  life  is  good, 
and  decidedly  worth  living.  Replying  to  the  Discours  de  re- 
ception of  M.  Pasteur,  before  the  Academie  Frangaise.  1882,  he 
declares : 

"Le  coin  imperceptible  de  la  realite  que  nous  entrevoyons 
est  plein  de  ravissantes  harmonies^  et  la  vie,  telle  qu'elle  nous 
a  ete  octroyee,  est  un  don  excellent  et  pour  chacun  de  nous 
la  revelation  d'une  bonte  infinie.  Disc.,  81.  Of.  ibid.,  207- 
8;  219. 

"Grace  a  la  vertu,  la  Providence  se  justifie;  le  pessimisme 
lie  peut  citer  que  quelciues  cas  bien  rares  d'etres  pour  lesquels 
Texistence  n'ait  pas  ete  un  bien.  Un  dessein  d7 amour  edate 
dans  1'univers;  malgre  ses  immenses  defauts,  ce  monde  rest© 
apres  tout  une  oeuvre  de  bonte  infinie."  Disc.,  199-200. 

In  his  own  experience  of  life,  he  often  declares,  the  good 
was  unquestionably  far  in  excess  of  the  evil ;  and  he  confidently 
assumes  that  the  same  must  be  true  of  the  lives  of  the  vast 
mlajority  of  men. 

"Je  n'ai  jamais  beaucoup  sounert,"  he  writes  in  concluding 

his  Souvenirs,  " A  mioins  que  mies  dernierea 

annees  ne  rne^  reservent  des  peines  bien  cruelles,  je  nyaurai? 
6 


290  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

en  disant  adieu  a  la  vie,  qu'a  remercier  la  cause  de  tout  bien 
de  la  ehannante  promenade  qu'il  m'a  ete  donne  d'accomplir  a 
travers  la  realite."  Souv.,  373-8. 

Ten  more  years  were  reserved  for  Renan  after  writing  these 
words,  years  full  of  toil  and  much  physical  pain;  yet  we  find 
him  reaffirming  this  same  faith  in  the  fundamental  goodness 
of  life,  to  the  end  of  his  days.  His  charming  little  speech 
before  the  Felibres,  in  June,  1891,  the  year  before  his  death, 
and  again  at  the  Fete  de  Brehat,  in  September  of  the  same 
year,  are  among  his  latest  direct  confessions  on  the  subject: 

"Je  garderai  jusqu'a  la  fin  la  foi,  la  certitude,  1'illusion, 
si  Ton  veut,  que  la  vie  est  un  fruit  savoureux."  F.  Det.,  124 ; 
ibid.,  109,  168. 

The  complete  sincerity  of  these  public  professions  is  attested 
by  the  general  tone  and  spirit  of  all  his  writings. 

Slide  by  side,  with  his  belief  in  the  essential  goodness  of  life, 
and  proceeding  from  the  same  spirit,  went  his  faith  in  the 
essential  goodness  of  man.  In  his  daily  intercourse  with  people, 
ihe  habitually  assumed  that  he  was  dealing  with  honest  men 
until  he  had  proof  of  the  contrary.  It  was  impossible  for  him, 
he  declares,  to  be  unkind  to  anybody  a  priori. 

"Un  des  principes  fondamentaux  de  ma  vie,  principe  auquel 
je  m*  attache  obstinement,  bien  que  plusieurs  de  mes  amis  me 
disent  que  c'est  une  enorme  duperie,  est  de  considerer  comme 
un  honnete  homme  toute  creature  humaine  pour  laquelle  le 

contraire  ne  infest  pas  demontre Je  persiste 

a  pemser  que  si  Ton  tient  compte  de®  difficultes  sans  nombre 
de  la  condition  humaine,  la  bienveillance  generale  est  la  vraie 
justice."  F.  Det.,  194-5.  Of.  Souv.,  374. 

Bcimeanbering  Kenan's  habit  of  espousing  alternately  both 
sides  of  any  debatable  question,  in  order  to  be  sure  not  to  exclude 
any  part  of  the  truth,  it  seems  surprising  that  he  should  nob 
occasionally  have  defended  the  pessimistic  attitude  also.  But 
the  fact  seems  to  be  that  he  never  did.  Is  this  because,  he  was 
incapable  by  temperament  of  being  impressed  with  the  evil 
in  life,  the  Weltschmerz,  or  is  it  because  he  deliberately  re- 
solved to  ignore  it?  There  is  such  a  thing  as  temperamental 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.      291 

optimism,    rendering   its   happy   possessor   impervious  to   the 
manifestations  of  cosmic  evil.14 

There  are  several  passages  in  Kenan's  books,  it  is  truei,  in 
which  he  seems  at  first  glance  to  make  open  avowal  of  pessi- 
mism ;  and.  it  would  seemi  that  on  the  strength  of  these  state- 
ments some  eminent  critics,  M.  Faguet  among  themi,  have  given 
him  credit  for  a  first-hand  acquaintance  with  pessimism  in 
his  own  person:.  < 

"Bien  que  parfois  je  sois  tente  d'envier  le  don  de  ces  natures 
heureuses,  tou jours  et  facilement  satisfaites,  j'avoue  qu'a  la 
reflexion,  je  me  trouve  fier  de  mon  pessimisme,  ©t  que,  si  je 
le  sentais  s'amollir,  le  siecle  restant  le  meme,  je  rechercherais 
avidement  quelle  fibre  s'est  relach.ee  en  mon  coeur."  Mor. 
Grit,  XII. 

And  again  in  his  article  on  M.  de  Sacy: 

"M.  de  Sacy  est  pessimiste,  et  il  a  bien  raison.  II  est  dee 
temps  ou  Poptimisme  fait  involontairement  soupconner  ehez 
celui  qui  le  professe  quelque  petitesse  d'esprit  ou  quelque 
bassesse  de  coeur."  Mor.  Grit,  20.  Of.  ibid.,  21,  23;  also 
Seailles,  El  K,.,  51. 

But  in  thesei  and  similar  passages,  as  a  glance  at  the  context 
will  show,  he  is  really  using  the  word  pessimism;  in  a  sense 
very  different  from,  that  in  which  it  would  contradict  his  habit- 
ual professions  of  optimism.  Adverse  criticisms  of  a  distaste- 
ful political  and  social  regime,  or  gloomy  forecasts  of  their 
probable  future,  if  we  call  this  pessimismj  atl  all,  is  yet  a  very 
different  thing  from  the  assertion  that  creation  is  a  failure^ 
or  that  life  is  essentially  and  inherently  not  worth  living. 

How  profound  and  unshakable  was  Kenan's  faith  in  the 
fundamental  goodness  of  life  and  of  men,  is  unmistakably  ex- 
pressed even  in  his  first  book,  and  from  the  faith  there  pro- 
claimed he  never  appreciably  swerved: 

"Peut-etre  nos  affirmations  a  cet  egard  oiHrelles  un  peu  du 
m-erite  de  la  foi,  qui  croit  sans  avoir1  vu,  et  a  vrai  dire,  quand 
on  envisage  les  faits  isoles,  roptimisme  semble  une  generositc 
faite  a  Dieu  en  toute  gratuite.  Pour  moi,  je  verrais  1'hu- 
manite  crouler  sur  ses  fondements,  je  verrais  les  homlmes  s'egor- 


292  BULLETIN   OF  THE   UNIVERSITY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

ger  dans  une  nuit  fatale,  que  je  proclamerais  encore  quo  la 
nature  humaine  est  droite  et  faite  pour  le  parfait,  que  les  mal- 
entendus  se  leveront,  et  qu'un  jour  viendra  le  regne  de  la  raison 
et  du  parfait."  A.  S.,  69. 

In  his  article  on  Amiel,  however,  in  1884,  he  reluctantly 
admits  the  deplorable  fact  that  for  some  few  unfortunates,  not 
to  be  were  better  than  to  be.  But  he  holds  that  these  unfortu- 
nate exceptions  are  very  few,  and  arise  not  so  much  from!  the 
nature  of  things  as  from  certain  "coincidences  funestes/' 
which  he  hopes  may  some  day  be  eliminated  entirely.  F.  Det., 
388. 

Onei  way  of  eliminating  these  few  outstanding  exceptions,  he 
•suggests, — and  there  seemis  no  reason  to  suppose  that  he  is  not 
in  earnest — is  to  provide  for  all  men  the  means  of  a  painless, 
•decent  and  voluntary  exit  from  life,  in  the  form  of  public 
euthanasial  parlors,  maintained  by  the  State,  and  apparently 
placed  at  the  disposal  of  all  comers. 

"J'ai  toujours  eu  pour  principe,"  says  Prospero'-RBnani,  who 
himself  dies  in  this  way,  "qu'une  vie  disposee  selon  les  regies 
d'une  belle  eurythmie  ne  doit  pas  laisser  au  hasard  une  piece 
aussi  importante  que  le  denouement.  Tout  est  bonheur  dans 
la  vie,  quand  on  peut  a  son  gre  disposer  de  la  mort. 
La  vie  n'est  chose  digne  que  quand  on  peut  la  finir  a  volonte." 
Dr.  PK,  228-9,  231. 

"Que  dites-vous!"  exclaims  his  attendant,  Jiorrified.  "Le 
suicide  implique  des  idees  repoussantes,  une  mare  de  sang,  des 
souillures.  La  proprete  rinterdit." 

"IsTon,  soyez  tranquille,  chere  Brunissende,"  replies.  Pros- 
pero.  "Je  n^aurai  que  des  sensations  douces,  et  mes  traits  con,- 
servoTont  leur  beaute.  Mourir  n'est  rien.  L'essentiel  est  de 
mourir  avant  le  premier  affaiblissement  et  d'eviter  Fennui 
d'etre  plaint,"  Ibid.,  229. 

"Viens  done,  mon  eau  de  mort,  c'est  ton  heure !  Oher  tissu 
impregne  d'ether,  qui  possedes  dans  tes  plis  le  tresor  de  Fanes- 
thesie,  donne-moi  le  repos.  Ah !  je  crois  que  tu  seras  en  defini- 
tive mon  invention  la  plus  bienfaisante,"  Ibid.,  234. 

Then,  gradually  expiring  under  his  euthanasial  veil: 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.      293 

"Grace  a  ce  linceul,  je  meurs  entier,  et  sans  perdre  aucune 
des  sensations  delicieuses  qui  sont  d'ordinaire  obliterees  chez 
le  mourant  par  la  douleur  et  raffaiblissemient.  La  coupe  de 
la  vie  est  delicieuse.  Quelle  sottise  de  s'indigner  parce  qu'on. 
en  voit  le  fond !  C'est  Pessence  d'une  coupe  d'etre  epuisabla" 

And  taking  leave  of  his  attendants : 

"Dites  qu'on  joue  les  airs  d'Amalfi  et  du  golfe  de  Naples. 
Ayez  soin  que  je  ne  voie  pas  un  visage  triste  et  que  je  n'entende 
pas  un  soupir. 

"fitre  eternel  et  bon,  merci  pour  Fexistenca  J'ai  collabore 
a  toutes  tes  oeuvres,  j'ai  servi  a  toutes  tes  fins,  Je  te  benis! 
(II  s'endort  en  souriant.  On  lit  sur  sa  figure  les  signes  de 
jouissances  infinies.)"  Dr.  Ph.,  246-7.  Of.  James,  Var.  Kel. 

Does  Kenan  refuse  to  be  held  responsible  for  this  revolting 
doctrine?  Tihen  here  are  the  same  ideas  direct,  from  his  own 
pen: 

"C'est  coinome  si  Ton  repoussait  une  coupe  de  vin  exquia 
parce  qu'elle  sera  vite  epuisee,  un  plaisir  parce  qu'il  ne  dure 
pas  longtemps.  .  .  .  Keste  la  douleur,  qui  surement  est 
chose  odieuse,  humiliante,  nuisible  aux  fonctions  nobles  de  la 
vie.  L'homme  peut  la  combattre,  presque  la  supprimer,  tou- 
jours  s?y  soustraire.  Les  cas  ou  l?hompne  est  rive  a  la  vie  sont 
tres  rares.  La  seulo  destinee  absolum^ent  condamnee  est  celle 
de  Panimfcl  esclave,  du  cheval  par  example,  qui  ne  peut  se 
suicider,  ou  bien  celle  des  condamnes  a  mort,  gardes  a  vue, 
ou  de  Taliene:  mais  ce  sont  la  des  situations  bien  exception- 
nelles.  L'imnaense  majorite  des  individus  n'a  pas  a  se  plaindre 
de  son  passage  par  1'etre,  puisque  la  balance  de  la  vie  se  solde 
en  joie  et  que  la  mort  pourra  sans  doute  un  jour  etre  rendue 
sans  douleur."15  F.  Det,  384-5. 

If  life  is  a  good,  Kenan  argues,  the  world  as  a  whole  must 
be  good;  for  the  continuance  of  life  alone  is  evidence  that, 
for  each  species  of  creatures  taken  as  a  whole,  the  good  must  be 
in  excess  of  the  evil,  else  this  species  would  cease  to  exist. 
And  if  there  is  a  balance  of  good  for  each,  there  must  be  a 
balance  of  good  for  all. 


294-  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

"L'etre,  ou  du  moms  la  conscience,  n'a  commence  et  ne  con- 
tinue dans  le  monde  que  parce  qu'il  y  a  dans  1'etre  une  plua- 
value  de  bien  pour  1'ensemble  des  individus  conscieoits. 

Un  monde  ou  le  mal  Pemporterait  sur  le  bien  serait  un  monde 
qui  n'existerait  pas,  ou  qui  disparaitrait."  F.  Dek,  387. 

And  again,  in  his  Exam  en  de  conscience  phUosophique: 

"De  cette  resultants  supreme  de  Punivers  total,  nous  ne  pou- 
yons  dire  qu'une  seule  chose,  c'est  qu'elle  est  bonne.  Car  si 
elle  n'etait  pas  bonne,  Punivers  total,  qui  existe  depuis  Peter- 
nite;  se  serait  detruit.  Supposons  une  miaison  de  banque 
existant  depuis  Peternite.  Si  cette1  maison  avait  le  moindre 
defaut  dans  ses  bases,  elle  eut  mille  fois  fait  faillite."16 
F.  Det.  427. 

Renan  had  no  patience  with  pessimists.  The  fundamental 
error  of  pessimism,  he  declares,  consists  in  applying  to  the 
world  as  a  whole  an  anthropocentric  measure  of  worth,  as  if 
the  totality  of  things  had  been  planned  for  the  exclusive  con- 
venience of  m'an.  F.  Det.,  388-389. 

But  surely  this  again  is  a  slip  of  the  pen.  It  is  impossible 
to  suppose  that  Renan  would  seriously  maintain  that  pessimists 
are  specially  prone  to  exaggerate  the  importance  of  man  in  the 
universe ! 

And  besides,  does  not  his  reasoning  hit  the  optimists  quite 
as  hard  as  the  pessimists  ?  If  it  is  a  mistake  to  call  the  world 
bad  because  it  is  not  the  best  possible  for  man,  by  what  right 
do  we  call  it  good  in  the  opposite  case  ?  Yet  this  is  precisely 
what  he  is  himself  continually  doing. 

The  truth  seems  to  lie  somewhere  betweien  the  two  positions, 
or  rather  alternately  with  each  of  the  disputants.  Optimists 
and  pessimists  are  both  partly  right  and  partly  wrong.  Asser- 
tions about  the  goodness  or  badness  of  the  world,  or  of  life  in 
the  world,  are  without  meaning  until  the  statements  are  reduced 
to  concrete  terms.  The  question  must  be  whether  life  is  good  or 
bad  for  some  particular  individual,  or  group  of  individuals.  For 
the  world  is  both  good  and  bad ;  good  for  some  creatures  and 
bad  for  others,  good  in  some  respects  and  bad  in*  others.  When- 
ever a  given  species  of  beings  is  in  a  prosperous  and  progressive 


BEATJER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.  295 

condition,,  we  infer  that,  for  this  particular  group,  the  good 
must  predominate  over  the  evil  ("good"  being  taken  in  the 
se<nse  of  life-sustaining)  ;  and  the  reverse  is  true  whenever  a 
given  species  is  on  the  way  to  extinction.  The  same  reason- 
ing applies  to  individuals.  For  them  also,  the  world,  in  other 
words  life  in  the  world,  is  at  once  good  and  bad,  to  different 
individuals,  at  different  times,  and  in  different  respects. 

If  this  is  true,  it  seems  clear  that  anthropocentricism,  or 
somje  otheir  "centricism,"  is  unavoidable  in  our  judgments  of 
good  and  bad,  if  o>ur  language  is  to  be  more  than  empty  sound. 
Plain  statements  of  fact,  however  encouraging  or  discouraging 
these  mjay  be,  should  never  be  termed  either  optimism  or  pes- 
simism. These  terms  should  be  reserved,  in  the  interests  of 
clear  thinking,  for  exaggerations  of  existing  good  and  evil  re- 
spectively. 

Renan  maintains,  in  conclusion,  that  the  world,  good  as  it 
is  already,  is  growing  better  every  day,  thanks  to  the  labors 
of  man.  On  this  point  he  never  changed  from)  the  position  af- 
firniied  in  his  youth : 

"I/optimisme  serait  une  erreur,  si  Phomime  n'etait  point  per- 
fectible, s'il  ne  lui  etait  donne  d'ameliorer  par  la  science  1'ordre 
etabli.  La  formule:  'Tout  est  pour  le  mieux/  ne  serait  sans 
cela  qu'une  amere  derision.  Oui,  tout  est  pour  le  mieux,  grace 
a  la  raisonj  humaine,  capable  de  reformer  les>  imlperfections 
necessaires  du  premier  etablissement  des  choses.  Disons  plu- 
tot:  tout  sera  pour  le  mieux,  quand  rhommei,  ay  ant  accomtpli 
son  oeuvre  legitime,  aura  retabli  rharmlonie  dans  le  monde 
moral  et  se  sera  assujetti  le  monde  physique."  A.  S.,  31.  Cf. 
ibid.,  69. 


296  BULLETIN   OF   THE    UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

POLITICAL  AND  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  political  and  social  philosophy  of  Renan  is  thoroughly 
permeated  by  his  metaphysics,  and  suffers  from  the  same  capri- 
ciousness  and  unseizable  vagueness.  From  transcendentalism 
in  ethics,  we  paiss  to  idealism  in  politics,  not  to  say  utopianism, 
as  in  the  Avenir  de  la  science. 

He  has  somewhere  declared  himself  unable  to  take  seriously 
the  philosopher  who  has  never  worked,  as  a  specialist  over  some 
problem  in  science.  The  philosopher  might  retort  that  Renan 
himself  would  have  profited  no  less  by  a  little  of  the  disci- 
pline which  philosophical  system-building  affords.  The  jux- 
taposition of  his  own  divergent  ideas  on  related  subjects,  had 
he  himself  undertaken  the  task,  would  probably  have  eliminated 
from  his  beautiful  pages  many  a  sophism  which  now,  concealed 
by  the  charm  of  his  magical  phrase,  glides  by  unnotit?ed ;  and 
perhaps  nothing  short  of  such  a  labor  could  have  brought  this 
poetic  writer  of  classical  prose  to  a  proper  regard  for  that  sacred 
jewel  of  philosophical  tradition,  consistency.  Cf.  Seailles, 
Ei.  R>,  213-14. 

In  his  latest  phase,  thoroughly  disillusioned  in  respect  of 
all  things  human  and  divine,  an  all-indulging  scepticism!  so 
far  predominates  in  his  writings  as  to  be  almost  his  normal  point 
of  view. 

A  few  items,  however,  are  constant  in  his  ever-changing 
creed,  and  among  these  must  be  mentioned  his  unlimited  faith 
in  the  possibilities  of  humlan  reason  in  the  field  of  positive  sci- 
ence. \  The  day  will  come,  he  insists,  when  reason,  in  spite 
of  all  that  can  be  done  to  impede  its  progress,  will  truly  govern 
the  world,  even  the  political  world. 


BRATJER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.  297 

At  the  present  day,  to  be  sure,  science  and  politics  have  little 
in  common.  Corr.,  p.  29.  ;  But  an  age  of  reason  is  coming, 
he  prophesies  in  the  Avenir  de  Id  science,,  evem  for  politics. 
The  last  word  of  science1,  he  insists,  must  be  the  scientific  organ- 
ization of  humanity. 

"Pour  la  politique,  dit  Herder,  I'hommle  est  un  moyen;  pour 
la  morale,  il  est  une  fin.  La  revolution  de  I'avenir  sera  le  tri- 
omphe  de  la  morale  sur  la  politique.  Organiser  scientifique- 
ment  rhumanite,  tel  est  1©  lernier  mot  de  la  science  moderne, 
telle  est  son  audacieuse,  m'ais  legitime  pretention."  A.  S.,  37 ; 
repeated  in  Q.  C.,  334.  Cf.  preface  to  L'Eau  de  jouvence, 
Dr.  Pk,  111. 

In  respect  of  his  method]  in  social  philo'sophy,  Ren  an  belongs 
to  the  synthetic  or  historical  school.  He  contends  that  the  so- 
cial sciences  must  be  based  on  a.  study  of  the  laws  which  have 
guided  the  development  of  society  thus  far.  Q.  C.,  76. 

In  a  lecture  first  delivered  at  the  Sorbonne  in  1882,  and 
which  has  since  become  famous,  Renan  has  given  an  elaborate 
definition  of  his  idea  of  a  nation.  He  begins  by  recalling  the 
manifold  forms  which  human  association  has  taken  in  the  past. 
There  are  those  vague  agglomerations  of  men  after  the  manner 
of  ancient  Babylonia,  China  and  Egypt;  tribes  like  those  of 
the  Hebrews  and  Arabs ;  city  states,  like  Athens  and  Sparta ; 
unions  of  different  countries,  as  in  the  Romjan  and  Carlo- 
vingian  empires ;  communities  without  a  country,  held  together 
by  religious  ties,  like  the  Israelites  and  the  Parsees.  Then 
we  have  the  different  types  of  nations  and  confederations  of  the 
modern  world :  France,  England.  Germany,  Switzerland  and 
the  United  States ;  and  finally  there  is  that  feeling  of  brother- 
hood and  kinship  established  by  community  of  race  or  lan- 
guage, uniting  men  into  still  larger  groups,  as  when  we  speak 
of  the  Slavic  or  Grermanic  peoples.  All  these  diverse  forms  of 
human  association  have  actually  existed,  or  still  exist ;  are  they 
all  nations? 

In  regard  to  the  ancient  world,  his  answer  is:  obviously  not. 
A  nation,  in  the  modern  sense  of  the  term,  was  unknown  to  an- 
tiquity. Egypt,  China  and  ancient  Chaldea  were  not  nations ; 


298  BULLETIN   OF    THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

they  were  mjasses  or  hordes,  led  by  a  supposed  descendant  of 
the  sky.  Egypt  had  no  citizens,  any  more  than  has  China 
today. 

What,  then,,  is  it  that  constitutes  a  nation  ?  Is  it  comjmu- 
irity  of  race?  But  in  which  of  our  modern  nations  is  this  to 
be  found  ?  The  truth  is  that  ethnographic  considerations  have 
had  little  or  nothing  to  do  with  the  formation  of  modern  na- 
tions. France1,  for  exam-pie,  is  Celtic,  Iberian  and  Germanic; 
Germany  is  Germanic,  Celtic  and  Slavic.  In  other  nations, 
as  in  Italy,  the  ethnographic  elements  are  still  more  compli- 
cated. It  is  impossible,  in  fact,  to  determine  the  race-element 
of  a  modern  nation  in  the  physiological  sense  of  the  termi,  for 
the  zoological  beginnings  of  humianity  long  antedate  the  ori- 
gin of  civilization  and  language. 

And  what  is  true  of  community  of  race  applies  equally, 
mutatis  mutandis,  to  community  of  language  and  religion; 
neither  of  these  is  sufficient  for  the  founding  of  a  nation. 

Is  it  community  of  comjrnercial  and  industrial  interests,  then, 
that  constitutes1  a  nation'?  This  also  Kenan  denies;  a  Zoll- 
verein  is  not  a  patrie. 

~Nor  is  it  the  "natural  frontiers,"  such  as  mountains  or  riv- 
ers, that  determine  the  limits  of  a.  nation.  In  a  word,  neither 
race,  nor  language,  nor  community  of  interests,  noi*  religious 
affinity,  nor  geographical  conditions, — none  of  these  is  suffi- 
cient to  found  a  nation. 

A  nation  is  a  soul  or  spiritual  principle,  resulting  from 
efforts  and  sacrifices  made  in  the  past.  A  heroic  past: 
great  men,  great  achievements, — this  is  the  social  capital  upon 
which  a  national  idea  may  be  established.  To  have  done 
great  things  together  and  be  willing  to  do  more ;  comjmon  souve- 
nirs of  a  glorious  past  and  a  united  will  in  the  present;  com- 
mon sufferings,  common  joys,  a  common  hopei:  these  are  bonds 
of  union  stronger  than  race,  language  or  religion;  these  are 
the  foundations  of  national  existence.  Cf.  Disc.,  2Y7ff. 

"Lai  patrie  est  un  compose  de  corps  et  d'amies.  L^ame,  ce 
sont  les  souvenirs,  les  usages,  les  legendes,  les  malheiirs,  les 
esperances,  le®  regrets  communs ;  le  corps,  c'est  le  sol,  la  race, 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.  299 

la  langue,  les  montagnes,  les  fleuves,  les  productions  caracte- 
ristiques."  0.  d'Angl.,  34. 

"Dante,  Petrarque,  les  grands  artistes  de  la  renaissance  ont 
ete  les  vrais  fondateurs  de  I'unite  italienne.  Goethe,  Schiller, 
Kant,  Herder,  ont  cree  la  patrie  allemande."  Ref.  Int.,  138. 

The  idea  that  a  nation  is  something  more  than  the  sum  of 
its  members  appears  already  in  the  Avenir  de  la  science,  and 
is  repeated  in  all  his  later  works. 

"La  societe  n'est  pas  la  reunion  atomiistique  de®  individus, 
formee  par  la  repetition  de  1'unite;  elle  est  une  unite  consti- 
tuee;  elle  est  primitive."  A.  S.,  252. 

"Aux  yeux  d'une  philosophic  eclairee,  la  societe  est  un  grand 
fait  providentiel ;  elle  est  etablie,  non  par  Phommie,  mais  par 
la  nature  elle-meme,  afin  qu'a  la  surface  de  notre  planete  se 
pro-dulse  la  vie  intellectuelle  et  morale.  L'homme  isole  n'a 
jamais  existe.  La  societe  humaine,  miere  de  tO'Ut  ideal,  est 
le  produit  direct  de  la  volonte  supreme  qui  veut  que  le  bien, 
le  vrai,  le  beau,  aient  dans  1'univers  des  contemplateurs,"  Ref. 
Int.,  241-2.  Of.  ibid.,  302-3. 

There  is  naturally  not  mtuch  in  the  writings  of  Renan  with, 
reference  to  the  earlier  forms  of  human  association,  or  the  mian- 
ner  in  which  the  clan,  the  tribe  or  the  nation  develops.  His 
only  utterance  on  this  point  is1  that  the  family,  and  more  par- 
ticularly the  monogamic  family,  is  necessary  to  the  formation 
of  great  races.  Dial.,  35.  This  statement  he  often  repeats. 
The  conjugal  fidelity  of  women  which  monogamy  implies  is  the 
result,  he  declares,  of  long-continued  cruelty  to  her  sax  in  the 
remote  past.  Like  all  great  things1  the  family  was  founded  by 
the  most  atrocious  means;  millions  of  women  stoned  to  death 
paved  the  way  to  conjugal  fidelity.  P.  Isr.,  1:5. 

From  the  fact  that  society  is  an  evolutionary  and  therefore 
non-rational  product,  and  not  the  creation  of  some  contmt 
social,  combined  with  the  fact  that  reason  is  acquiring  an  ever 
growing  influence  in  political  and  social  affairs,  he  appears 
to  conclude  that  political  progress  is  destined  to  do  away  with 
patriotism,.  Social  progress,  from  his  point  of  view,  may  be 
defined  as  a  substitution  of  reason  for  tradition.  With  the 


300  BULLETIN   OF   THE   rXIVEESITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

progress  of  reason,  considerations  of  humanity  will  more  and 
more  prevail  over  those  of  country.  Patriotism,  therefore, 
being  essentially  a  non-rational  form  of  social  cohesion,  u 
tain  to  grow  weaker  as  men  grow  more  rational,  and  will  ulti- 
mately disappear  altogether; — a  catastrophe,  it  may  be  added, 
which  Renan  would  be  the  last  to  regret. 

Renan  has  said  many  hard  things  against  patriotism : 

The  fact  is,  he  writes,  that  nation  and  philosophy  have  little  to 
do  with  each  other.  Patriotism,  among  other  meannesses,  has  the 
p-retention  of  having  a  God  of  its  own.  Jahreh  elohetm,  said 
the  Israelite:  unser  Gott,  says  the  German.  A  nation  is  al- 
ways egotistical  It  desires  that  the  God  of  heaven  and  earth 
should  think  of  no  other  interests  than  its  own.  Under  one 
name  or  another  it  creates  for  itself  tutelary  divinities.  P. 
Isr..  I:'2'20. 

Again  in  the  Hibbert  Lecture  for  1880: 

"Grande  est  la  patrie,  et  saints  sont  les  heros  de  Marathon 
et  des  Thermopyles.  La  patrie,  cependant,  n'est  pas  tout 
iei-bas.  On  est  homme  et  fils  de  Dieu,  avant  d'etre  frangais 
ou  allemand.  Le  royaume  de  Dieu,  reve  eternel  qu'on  n'arra- 
chera  pas  du  eoeur  de  Fhomme,  est  la  protestation  contre  ce  que 
le  patriotisme  a  de  trop  exclusif."  C.  d'Angl.,  3T-S;  also 
V.  J..  123. 

"Ma  philosophic  est  I'ldealisme;  ou  je  vois  le  bien,  le  beau, 
le  vrai,  la  est  ma  patrie,"  Ref.  Int.,  177--.  Cf.  Coir.,  Je. 
14,  1853. 

Similar  declarations  abound  in  his  letters,  especially  those 
of  the  earlier  period.  Writing  in  1849  to  his  friend  Berthelot, 
he  refers  to  an  observation  he  has  made  among  the  French 
peasants:  after  only  a  single  century  of  civilization,  they  are 
showing  signs  of  decadence;  and  he  consoles  himself  with  the 
hope  that  the  Slavic  peoples,  invading  western  Europe,  may 
perhaps  adopt  its  ideas  and  carry  them  forward  with  a  new 
energy.  Cf.  Ref.  Int,  192.  It  is  only  when  the  vanquished 
are  superior  in  capacity  and  culture  to  their  conquerc: 
adds,  that  an  appeal  to  nationality  is  justifiabla  Corr.,  37-9. 
. -fimporte  par  qui  le  bien  se  fait?  Xous  sornnies  main- 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.  301 

tenant  pour  les  barbares  contre  les  Romiains.  II  n'y  a  pas  de 
decadence  au  point  de  vue  de  1'humanite."17  Corr.,  39. 

But  though  it  is  true  that  Renan  made  little  of  patriotism, 
especially  in  the  ultra-rationalistic  period  of  his  earlier  years ; 
and  though  he  treats  it  as  a  logical  fallacy  kept  alive  by  preju- 
dice, yet  he  felt  it  to  be  of  the  utmost  importance,  in  the  in- 
terests of  national  strength,  that  the  fallacy  should  continue 
widely  to  prevail.  For  a  long  time  to  comje,  he  declares,  the 
existence  of  separate*  nationalities  is  necessary  to  the  preserva- 
tion of  liberty,  which  would  be  lost  if  the  world  had  but  one 
law  and  one  master.  A  confederation  of  the  world  involving 
the  abolition  of  independent  nationalities,  even  if  possible, 
would  not  be  desirable. 

"La  division  est  la  condition  de  la  liberte.  II  dependrait 
de  quelqu'un  de  fond  re  les  nations  en  une  seule  nation,  les 
figlises  en  une  seule  figlise,  les  sectes,  les  ecoles,  en  une  seule 
secte,  en  une  seule  ecole,  qu'il  faudrait  s'y  opposer.  Le  vieux 
monde  romain  a  peri  par  1'unite,  le  salut  du  monde  moderne 
sera  sa  diversite."  Q.  C.,  352. 

The  same  is  affirmed  of  religions: 

"Des  trois  grandes  formes  que  le  christianisme  a  prises  dans 
nos  societes,  catholicisme,  protestantisme,  orthodoxie,  en  est-il 
une  qui  doive  supprimer  les  deux  autres  ?  La  puissance  de  la 
Russie  fait  Favenir  de  1'orthodoxie,  la  race  anglo-saxonne  porte 
avec  elle  Tesprit  du  protestantisme  sur  tous  les  points  du  globe, 
le  Catholicism e  a  pour  resister  sa  centralisation  puissante  et  sa 
forte  discipline.  Rejouissons-nous  de  ces  divisions  irreduo 
tibles  qui  sont  la  garantie  de  la  liberte."  Nouv.  Hist,  ReL, 
463. 

Renan  has  been  much  criticised  for  his  attitude  towards  dem- 
ocratic institutions. 

JM.  Berthelot,  who  had  a  closer  acquaintance  with  him  than 
probably  any  one  else,  describes  Kenan's  attitude  towards  de> 
mocracy  by  comparing  it  with  his  own: 

"Nos  conceptions  fondamentales  etaient  assez  differentes. 
Si  nous  etions  tous  deux  egalement  devoues  a  la  science  et  a  la 
libre  pensee,  Renan,  en  raison  de  ses  origines  bretonnes  et  de 


302  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

son  education  ecclesiastique  et  contemplative,  tournee  vers  le 
passe,  avait  moins  de  gout  pour  la  democratie,  pour  la  Revo- 
lution franchise,  et  surtout  pour  cette  transformation  a  la  fois 
rationnelle,  industrielle  et  socialiste,  dans  laquelle  est  engagee 
la  civilisation  mjoderne.  Les  anciennes  manieres  d'envisager 
la  protection  des  sciences,  des  lettres  et  des  arts,  par  un  pou- 
voir  super ieur  et  autocratique,  I'attiraient  davantage:  il  n'en 
a  jainais  fait  mystere."  Corr.,  2.  Cf.  Souv.,  XI,  335. 

It  would  be  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  Renan  was  anti-demo- 
cratic from  the  beginning,  however.  The  contrary  is  the  fact. 
The  political  and  social  ideas  of  his  first  book  are  democratic 
to  the  last  degree.  The  revolution  of  1848,  coming  soon  after 
his  withdrawal  from  the  church,  found  him!  a  young  man  of 
extremely  radical  tendencies,  fired  with  a  zeal  for  social 
as  well  as  religious  reform.18  Corr.,  26-7;  35-6;  Ref.  Int., 
14-15. 

In  his  later  writings,  his  attitude  towards  democracy  is  an- 
tagonistic enough,  it  is  true.  His  Reforme  intellectuelle  et 
morale,  written  in  1870,  is  one  long  tirade  against  democratic 
institutions.  The  very  source  of  democracy  is  condemned. 
Popular  government,  he  declares,  springs  from1  a  false  and  ig- 
noble view  of  life,  being  based  on  envy  and  selfishness. 

Another  charge  is  that  democracy  is  a  cause  of  national 
weakness;  a  transgression,  that  is,  of  the  first  and  greatest  of 
Nature's  commandments:  be  strong!  Ref.  Int.,  49;  18;  29- 
30. 

"La  democratie  est  le  plus  fort  dissolvant  de  rorganisation 
militaire.  L'organisation  militaire  est  fondee  sur  la  disci- 
pline; la  democratie  est  la  negation  de  la  discipline."  Ref. 
Int.2  54. 

Moreover,  democracy  rests  on  a  fallacious  assumption  of  hu- 
mjan  equality.  It  is  not  true  that  all  men  are  by  nature  free 
and  equal;  rather  the  proposition  is  absurd.  Everyone 
knows  that  men  are  eminently  unequal,  in,  body,  mind 
and  f  character,  and  no  human  institution,  can  change  this 
fundamental  fact.  Nor  is  it  possible  for  men  to  treat  each 
other  as  though  they  were  equal,  to  -say  nothing  of  the  viola 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.  303 

tion  of  justice  in  doing  so.  Personal  beauty,  intellectual  and 
physical  vigor,  a  noble  character,  are  intrinsically  respectable, 
ns  their  opposites  are  inherently  despicable.  No  amount  of 
revolutionary  legislation  can  sweep  away  the  distinctions  be- 
tween vice  and  virtue,  beauty  and  ugliness,  strength  and  weak- 
ness, honesty  and  dishonesty .  Title©  and  privileges  may  be 
abolished,  but  those  who  really  deserved  them  will  be  looked  up 
to  and  bowed  down  to  as  much  as  before.  A  gentleman  does  not 
become  the  equal  of  gavroche  by  calling  them;  both  citoyen. 

He  calls  attention  to  the  superiority  of  Germany  to  France 
in  this  respect. 

"Tandis  que  parmi  nous  un  meme  type  d'honneur  est  Fide-al 
de  tons,  en  Allemagne,  le  noble,  le  bourgeois,  lei  professeur,  le 
paysan,  Fouvrier,  ont  leur  form'ule  particuliere  du  devoir;  les 
devoirs  de  Fhomtme,  les  droits  de  rhomme  sont  peu  compris; 
et  c'est  la  une  grande  force,  car  1'egalite  est  la  plus  grande 
cause  d'affaiblissenient  politique  et  militaire  qu'il  y  ait."  Ref. 
Intv  52-3 ;  also  p.  176. 

"On  supprime  Phumanite,  si  Ton  n'admet  pas  que  dee 
classes  entieres  doivent  vivre  de  la  gloire  et  de  la  jouissance 
des  autres."  Ref.  Int.,  246;  296. 

But  of  all  the  absurdities  of  democracy,  he  declares,  the  most 
idiotic  is  the  institution  of  universal  suffrage.  He  could 
never  forgive  what  he  calls  the  us/parallelled  recklessness  of  the 
French  statesmen  of  1848  for  conferring  universal  suffrage 
upon  the  country  when  it  was  not  even  called  for.  Ref.  Int., 
14-15. 

His  objections  to  the  ballot-box  have  become  platitudes.  It 
affords  no  criterion  of  right  policy,  of  true  theory,  or  of  wise 
and  efficient  administration.  On  the  contrary,  the  appeal  to 
the  ballot-box  is  an  appeal  from  knowledge  to  ignorance,  and 
from  civilization  to  barbarism.  Furthermore,  the  masses  are 
always  exposed,  by  their  love  of  flattery,  to  the  evil  designs  and 
malpractices  of  the  "peripatetic  political  practitioner."  Dr. 
Ph.,  383.  F.  Det,  171. 

"La  masse  n'a  droit  de  gouverner  que  si  Ton  suppose  qu'elle 
sait  mieux  que  personne  ce  qui  est  le  meilleur.  Le  gouveme- 


304  BULLETIN"   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

ment  represente  la  raison,  Diem,  si  1'on  veut,  I'humanite  dans 
le  sens  eleve  (c'est  a  dire  les  hautes  tendances  de  la  nature  hu- 
maine)  mais  non>  un  chiffre.  .  .  Le  suffrage  universe!  n'est 
legitime  que  s'il  pent  hater  1' amelioration  sociale.  Un  despote 
qui  realiserait  cette  amelioration  contre  la  volonte  du  plus 
grand  nombre  serait  parfaitement  dans  son  droit."  A.  S., 
349-50 ;  Ref.  Int.,  47,  67-8 ;  O.  C.,  302. 

Nor  is  the  ballot-box  a  test  of  strength  even: 

aEb  se  proclamant  ultima  ratio,  le  suffrage  universe!  part 
de  cette  idee  que  le  plus  grand  nombre  est  un  indice  de  force; 
il  suppose  que,  si  la  minorite  ne  pliait  pas  devant  l'o>pinion  de 
la  majorite,  elle  aurait  toute  chance  d'etre  vaincue.  Mais  ce 
raisonnement  n'est  pas  exact,  car  la  minorite  peut  etre  plus 
energique  et  plus  versee  dans  le  maniement  des  armes  que  la 
majorite."  Kef.  Int.,  303. 

Already  in  the  Avenir  de  la  science  he  suggests  that  the 
m)ore  direct  method  of  actual  battle  is  preferable  to  the  count- 
ing of  heads,  since  the  truth  is  likely  to  be  with  those  who>  art) 
impelled  by  conviction  to  risk  their  own  heads  in  defense  of 
their  claims.  A.  S.,  344-5. 

Besides,  he  asks,  by  what  right  can  a  majority,  merely  as 
such,  claim  the  privilege  of  deciding  a  nation's  destiny?  The 
only  justification  of  government  is  the  good  of  humanity;  but 
to  realize  this  good  is  not  necessarily  the  same  thing  as  to  obey 
the  will  of  the  greatest  number.  If  therefore  in  a  given  in- 
stance the  majority,  whether  from  ignorance,  prejudice  or  any 
other  cause,  are  found  to  oppose  the  best  interests  of  humanity, 
including  their  own,  is  it  not  right  that  they  should  be  carried 
along  by  a  wiser  minority,  even  against  their  will?  A.  S., 
429-30;  of.  340. 

"Le  bien  de  1'hunianite  etant  la,  fin  supreme,  la  mdnorite 
ne  doit  nullemlent  se  faire  scrupule  de  mener  contre  son  gre, 
s'il  le  faut,  la  majorite  sotte  ou  egoiste.  Mais  pour  cela  il 
faut  qu'elle  ait  raison.  Sans  cela,  c'est  une  abominable  tyran- 
nie."  A.  S,,  429. 

A  further  charge  against  democracy  is  its  unfitness  to  attain 
what  he  considers  the  principal  raison  d'etre  of  national  exist- 


BRATJER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.  305 

ence, — the  production  of  great  men.  Nothing  without  great 
men,  he  exclaims ;  it  is  through  great  men  that  humanity  will 
work  out  its  salvation.  Dial.,  103.  But  democracy,  he  insists, 
Is  doomed  to  mediocrity  in  all  things.  Mor.  Crit.,  371-3. 

With  reference  to  methods  of  selecting  national  executives, 
he  writes : 

"II  est  incontestable  que,  s'il  fallait  s'en  tenir  a  un  moyen  de 
selection  unique,  la  naissance  vaudrait  mdeux  gue  Felection.  Le 
hasard  de  la  naissance  est  moindre  que  le  hasard  du  scrutin." 
Kef.  Int.,  45. 

Last  not  least,  democracy  stands  condemned  by  its  own  inher- 
ent instability.  France  committed  suicide  the  day  it  beheaded 
its  king.  Eef.  Int.,  8,  250-2. 

It  would  be  mistaking  Kenan's  meaning,  however,  to  conclude 
that  he  intends  by  these  charges  to  condemn  constitutional  gov- 
ernment. Indeed,  a  truly  constitutional  government  is  just 
what  democracy  is  incapable  of  producing,  according  to  himi. 
Considered  historically,  he  says,  constitutional  government  is 
not  a  creation  of  democracy.  England,  which  instead  of  the 
absolute  doctrine  of  popular  sovereignty  admits  only  the  more 
moderate  principle  that  there  must  be  no  government  without 
the  people,  nor  against  the  people,  has  been  far  better  governed 
than  France. 

"L'Angleterre  .  .  .  s'est  trouvee  malle  fois  plus  libre  que 
la  France,  qui  avait  si  fierement  plante  le  drapeau  philosophique 
des  droits  de  1'homme.  (Test  que  la  souverainete  du  peuple  ne 
fonde  pas  le  gouvernement  constitutionnel."  Kef.  Int.,  240.  Cf. 
ibid.,  43-5;  Dr.  Ph.,  85,  99. 

In  1871  he  writes  in  a  letter  to  his  friend  Berthelot: 

aLa  France  s'est  trompee  sur  la  forme  que  peut  prendre  la 
conscience  d'un  peuple.  Un  tas  de  sable  n'est  pas  une  nation ; 
or,  le  suffrage  universel  n'admet  que  le  tas  de  sable.  .  .  La 
civilisation  a  ete  de  tout  temps  une  oeuvre  aristocratique,  main- 
tenue  par  un  petit  nombre ;  Tame  d'une  nation  est  chose  aristo- 
cratique aussi :  cette  ame  doit  etre  guidee  par  un  certain  nombre 
de  pasteurs  officiels,  formant  la  continuite  de  la  nation."  Corr., 
395-6.  Ref.  Int.,  67,  147. 
7 


306  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

He  explains  that  this  "pasteur  officiel"  is  not  necessarily  a 
dynasty.  Leadership  may  be  exercised  by  a  senate,  like  that  of 
ancient  Rome,  or  of  Venice;  or  better  still  by  religious,  social, 
educational  or  gymnastic  institutions,  like  those  of  the  Greek 
cities.  But  a  thing  that  has  never  been  seen,  he  insists,  is  a 
society  without  traditional  institutions,  a,  national  education, 
or  an  accepted  religion.  Corr.,  p.  68. 

The  most  sympathetic  attitude  which  he  has  anywhere 
taken  towards  democracy  occurs  in  his  preface  to  the  Souvenirs, 
pp.  X-XX,  where  different  forms  of  political  organization  are 
compared  with,  regard  to  the  influence  they  are  likely  to  exert 
on  the  progress  of  reason,  of  which  the  first  condition  is  declared 
to  bo  freedom]  of  thought  and  speech. 

"Le  but  du  monde  est  le  developpement  de  resprit^  et  la 
premiere  condition  du  developpement  de  1' esprit,  c'est  la  li- 
berte."  Souv.,  XIIL  Cf.  Ref.  Int.,  99-100. 

"Le  monde  marche  vers  line  sorte  d'americanisme,  qui  blesse 
nos  idees  raffinees,  mais  qui,  une  fois  les  crises  de  I'heure 
actuelle  passees,  pourra  bien  n'etre  pas  plus  mauvais  que 
1'ancien  regime  pour  la  seule  chose  qui  importe,  c?est-a-dire 
raffranchissement  et  le  progres  de  Tesprit  humiain."  Souv., 
X-XI. 

With  reference  to  the  ancien  regime,  he  continues:  Les  con- 
cessions qu'il  f allait  faire  a  la  cour,  a  la  societe,  au  clerge 
etaient  pires  que  les  petite  desagrements  que  peut  nous  infliger 
la  democratie.?>  Souv.,  XII. 

But  even  these  attenuations  of  his  habitual  bias  are  made  re- 
luctantly, and  not  without  reserve.  For  a  few  pages  forward 
in  the  same  preface,  contrasting  democracy  in  France  with  its 
better  organization  in  England  and  America,  he  says  of  the 
former : 

"Je  crois  bien  que,  si  les  idees  democratiques  venaient  a  tri- 
onrpher  definitivement,  la  science  et  Tenseignemient  scientifique 
perdraient  assez  vite  leurs  modestes  dotations.  II  en  faudrait 
faire  son  deuil."  p.  XVI-XVII.  "Noli  me  t&ngere  est  tout 
ce  qu'il  faut  demander  a  la  democratie."19  Ibid.  XX.  Of. 
Dial.,  Y7 ;  Ref.  Int.,  218. 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      307 

On  the  other  hand,  the  praises  which  aristocracy  gets  from  his 
pen  are  many  and  generous.  All  civilization  is  of  aristocratic 
origin.  Dr.  Ph.,  85.  An  aristocracy  of  the  wise  was  the  law 
of  primitive  man.  Or.  Lang.,  25.  It  is  by  aristocracy  that 
the  inferior  races  have  been  disciplined,  grammatical  language 
created,  that  laws  have  been  framed,  and  morality  and  reason 
developed.  Dr.  PL,  99 ;  Oorr.,  395.  Even  to-day  its  service^ 
to  the  State  are  incalculabla  C.  d'Angl.,  122 ;  also  Kef.  Ink 
67,  244;  Dial.,  64-65.  Seailles,  269-70. 

"La  vertu  diminue  ou  augmente  dans  Phumanite  selon  quo 
Pimlperceptible  aristocratie  en  qui  reside  le  depot  de  la  noblesse 
humaine  trouve  ou  non  une  atmosphere  pour  vivre  et  se  pror- 
pager."  Mor.  Grit,  23.  Of.  A.  SI  319  ff. 

This  one-sided  antagonism  is  all  the  more  remarkable  as  it 
was  characteristic  of  his  method  to  advocate  both  sides  of  a 
question  in  turn,  whenever  it  seemed  fairly  debatable!.  Can  it 
be  that  he  really  had  nothing  to  say  in  favor  of  democracy  ? 

It  is  plain  that  his  preference  for  aristocratic  institutions  ig 
based  on  something  more  than  an  impartial  examination  of  thei* 
comparative  merits.  An  obvious  criticismi  which  his  treatment 
of  democracy  provokes  is  that  he  condemns  it  in  general  terms, 
without  considering  the  conditions'  in  which  it  is  placed  (his- 
torical, geographical,  ethnographical,  political).  If  demjocracy 
is  a  failure  in  one  country,  that  can  prove  nothing  against  its 
being  a  permanent  success  in  another.  The  same  nation,  inr 
deed,  not  only  may  but  does  need  different  forms,  of  social  and 
political  organization  at  different  stages  in  its  development.  It 
is  of  course  impossible  to  decide  questions  as  to  the  relative 
worth  of  political  institutions  one  way  or  another  in  the  form  of 
general  propositions,  regardless  of  the  special  conditions  under 
which  these  institutions  are  tested. 

In  the  Dialogues  philosophiquzs,  half  in  jest  and  half  m 
earnest,  Renan  describes  an.  ideal  social  order,  in  which  reasoni  at 
last  is  the  undisputed  sovereign  of  the  world.  The  progress  of 
science,  he  suggests,  may  conceivably  lead  to  the  discovery  of 
new  forms  of  force,  so  hard  to  wield  and  so  dangerous  to  maniph 
ulate  that  only  a  few  superior  minds  would  be  capable  of  turn- 


308  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

ing  the  same  to  practical  use.  In  the  hands  of  these  intellectual 
giants,  veritable  gods  as  compared  with  even  the  choicest  intel- 
lects of  the  present  day,  these  hidden  forces  would  be  instru- 
ments of  truly  super-human  power.  The  mass  of  mankind, 
lacking  capacity  for  such  knowledge,  would  be  forced  to  submit. 
Dial.,  82.  The  power  which  popular  fancy  ascribed  to  magicians 
of  old  would  then  become  a  reality.  A  select  few  would 
rule  the  many  in  virtue  of  mysterious  influences  which  they 
alone  understood.  Such  a  government  would  be  despotic,  to  be 
sure,  but  not  therefore  unjust;  for  he  supposes  these  magicians 
to  be  as  high  above  the  average  in  virtue  as  in  knowledge.  It- 
would  be  the  beneficent  tyranny  of  justice  and  truth.  As  soon 
as  it  was  discovered  that  the  power  of  these  demi-gods  was  al- 
ways in  the  service  of  the  right,  there  would  be  no  objection  to 
its  exercise ;  and  very  soon  these  heaven-born  rulers  would  come 
to  be  loved,  and  their  commands  be  accepted  like  irresistible 
natural  laws.  Dial.,  112.  In  course  of  time,  having  discov- 
ered the  secrets  of  matter  and  of  life,  they  would  rule  over  phys- 
ical creation  likewise,  and  eventually  come  to  be  worshipped 
as  gods.  "Primos  in  orbe  deos  fecit  limor."  Dial.,  113,  Cf. 
Frag.,  153  ff. 

This  is  mere  dreaming,  of  course ;  but  it  points  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Kenan's  ideal  of  social  organization.  An  enlightened 
despotisms,  not  supposedly  merely  but  truly  enlightened,  and 
despotic  only  in  the  sense  of  being  all-powerful,  was  his  beau 
ideal  of  political  order.  Cf.  A.  S.,  350-2 ;  Souv.,  335. 

But  notwithstanding  his  strictures  upon  democracy,  Renan 
was  at  all  times  an  ardent  advocate  of  personal  liberty. 

"Le  regime  liberal  est  une  necessite  absolue,"  he  writes, 
"pour  toutes  les  nations  modernes.  Qui  ne  pourra  s'y  aceom- 
moder  perira.  .  .  .  Une  nation  qui  ne  sera  capable  ni  de 
la  liberte  de  la  presse,  ni  de  la  liberte  de  reunion,  ni  de  la  li- 
berte politique,  sera  certainement  depassee  et  vaincue  par  les 
nations  qui  peuvent  supporter  de  telles  libertes.  Ces  dernieres 
seront  tou jours  mieux  infonnees,  plus  instruites,  plus  seri- 
euses,  mieux  gouvernees."  Ref.  Int.,  273. 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.  309 

"Le  but  supreme  de  rhumanite  est  la  liberte  des  individus." 
M.-Aur.,  588. 

Many  other  passages  of  like  tenor  might  be  quoted  from)  his 
books. 

Conservatism,  to  be  sure,  is  also  indispensable.  Radicalism 
and  conservatism  are  the  two  weights,  so  to  speak,  by  which 
society  maintains  its  balance  over  the  tight-ropes  of  destiny. 

"La  vie  est  le  resultat  d'un  conilit  entre  deux  forces  con- 
traires.  On  meurt  aussi  bien  par  1?  absence  de  tout  souffle  re- 
volutionnaire  que  par  1'exces  de  la  revolution."  C.  d'Angl., 
100. 

It  is  liberalismi,  however,  that  needs  most  encouragement, 
for  of  conservatism  there  is  always  an  abundant  supply.  Lil> 
eralism  itself  becomes  eonservatismi  through  mere  lapse  of 
time.  The  liberals  of  to-day  are  the  conservatives  of  to-mor- 
row. Dr.  Ph.,  269. 

In  a  letter  of  1847  to  his  friend  Berthelot  the  relation  of 
these  opposite  forces  to  social  progress  is  clearly  set  forth: 

"La  loi,  en  politique,  e'est  de  m|archer  toujours.  L'opinion 
ne  peut  rester  un  instant  stationnaire.  .  .  Mais  1'opinion 
marchant  toujours  et  le  gouve>rnement  etant  necessairement 
stationnaire  et  conservateur,  le  lendemain  de  la  revolution  1' ac- 
cord est  rompu,  et  une  nouvelle  revolution  est  necessaire* 
Elle  ne  se  fera  pas,  et  cela  fort  heureusemient,  parce  que  Fop- 
position  n'a  pas  encore  la  force;  cela  arrivera  plus  ta,rd,  quand' 
le  desaccord  sera  trop  criant;  alors  une  nouvelle  revolution^ 
puis  a  recommencer.  Eoi  un  mot,  j 'imagine  Topinion  conune 
avan^ant  d'un  mouvement  continu  et  les  gouvernements  avan- 
gant  par  soubresaiits,  en  sorte  qu'ils  ne  peuvent  que  par  in- 
stants se  trouver  de  front"  Corr.,  26. 

Kenan  was  thoroughly  modern  in  the  distrust  he  showed  for 
abstract  "natural  rights."  A  liberty  which  exists  in  fact  as 
well  as  name  is  not  the  result  of  mere  constitutional  enactment. 
Civil  liberty  is  not  assured,  he  says,  until  it  is  rooted  in  insti- 
tutions which  have  long  endured.  It  might  be  shown  that  the 
only  ground  upon  which  a  certain  amount  of  independence 
still  finds  refuge  in  our  time  is  a  remnant  of  what 


310  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

in  France  is  known  as  the  ancien  regime.  Mor.  Grit.,  335. 
The  French  revolution  made  the  mistake  of  all  revolu- 
tions which  are  founded  on  abstract  ideas,  instead  of  antece- 
dent rights.  Ibid.,  98 ;  also  37-8. 

"La  liberte  achetee  ou  arrachee  pied  a  pied  a  ete  plus  du- 
rable que  la  liberte  par  nature.  En  croyant  fonder  le  droit  ab- 
strait,  on  fondait  la  servitude,  tandis  que  les  hauts  barons 
d'Angleterre,  ...  en  defendant  leurs  privileges,  ont 
fonde  la  vraie  liberte."  Mor.  Grit.,  39. 

"L'Angleterre,  sans  rompre  avec  sa  royaute,  avec  sa  no- 
blesse, avec  see  oomtes,  avec  ses  communes,  avec  son  figlise, 
aveo  sea  universites,  a  trouve  moyen  d'etre  Ffitat  le  plus  libre, 
le  plus  prospere  et  le  plus  patriote  qu'il  j  ait."20  Ref.  Int.,  5. 
Of.  ibid.,  239. 

Foremost  among  civil  liberties,  in  his  estimation,  are  free 
thought  and  free  speech.  Without  this  personal  freedom  po- 
litical liberty  is  1iie  merest  sham.  Q.  G.,  411. 

This  seemjs  to  have  been  his  normal  point  of  view,  though 
he  did  not  hold  to  it  consistently.  In  the  Avenir  de  la  science , 
for  example,  he  defends  the  opposite  view,  insisting  that  free 
speech,  like  universal  suffrage,  cannot  be  reasonable  until  all 
men  have  acquired,  the  capacity  to  distinguish  between  truth 
and  error.  The  right  freely  to  express  one's  thoughts  presup- 
poses a  capacity  to  think  aright,  for  there  can  be  no  such  thing 
as  a  right  to  disseminate  falsehood.  A.  S.,  357.  Gf.  Mor. 
Grit,  161. 

A  far  more  urgent  duty  of  society  than  the  guarantee  of  uni- 
versal free  speech,  he  declares,  is  to  improve  the  minds  and 
characters  of  its  members.  So  long  as  the  mtasses  are  kept 
in  ignorance,  it  is  simply  absurd  to  claim  in  their  behalf  the 
right  to  free  assembly  and  free  speech. 

"Le  vrai  trouve  tou  jours  assez  de  liberte  pour  se  faire  jour, 
et  la  liberte  ne  pent  etre  que  prejudiciable,  quand  ce  sont  des 
insenses  qui  la  reclament.  .  .  .  Nous  usons  la  force  pour 
conserves  a  tous  le  droit  de  radoter  a  leur  aise;  ne  vaudrait-il 
pas  mienix  chercher  a  parler  raison  et  enseigner  a  tous  a  parler 
et  a  comprendre  ce  langage?  Fermer  les  clubs,  ouvrez  les 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      311 

ecoles,  et  vous  servirez  vraiment  la  cause  populaire."     A.  S., 
356.     Also  Q.  O.,  477.       C.  d'Angl.,  26-7. 

Legal  guarantees  of  free  speech  he  considered  of  little  im- 
portance. A  mian  who  is  really  in  the  right  is  always  suffi- 
ciently free  to  disseminate  his  convictions.  In  some  respects, 
indeed,  opposition  to  innovating  ideas  is  a  good  thing.  When 
would-be  reformers  are  obliged  to  risk  their  own  life  in  the 
advocacy  of  their  cause,  the  peace  will  be  disturbed  only  by 
those  who  are  sure  of  their  mjessage.  A.  S.,  362. 

"La  persecution  a  le  grand  avantage  d'ecarter  la  petite  ori- 
ginalite  qui  cherche  son  profit  dans  une  mesquine  opposition. 

.  .  .  Autrefois,  sur  dix  novateurs,  neuf  etaient  violem- 
ment  etouffes,  aussi  le  dixieme  etait  bien  vraiment  et  franche- 
ment  original.  La  serpe  qui  emonde  les  rameaux  faibles  ne 
fait  que  donner  aux  autres  plus  de  force.  Aujourd'hui  plus 
de  serpe;  mais  aussi  plus  de  seve.  En  somme,  tout  cela  est 
assez  indifferent,  et  I'humanite  fera  son  chemin  sans  les  li- 
beraux  et  malgre  les  retrogrades."  A.  S.,  362. 

"L'idee  vraie  ne  demande  pas  de  permission;  elle  so  soucie 
peu  que  son  droit  soit  ou  non  reconnu.  Le  christianismje  n'a 
pas  eu  besoin  de  la  liberte  d©  la  presse  ni  de  la  liberte  de  re- 
union pour  conquerir  le  monde.  .  .  .  Occupons^nous  done 
un  peu  plus  de  penser,  et  un  peu  mmns  d' avoir  le  droit  d'ex- 
primer  notre  pensee.  L'homme  qui  a  raison  est  toujours  assez 
libre."  Q.  C.,  303-4 

Moreover,  the  suppression  of  free-thought  is,  strictly  speak- 
ing, impossible.  A  heretic  placed  on  the  rack  may  alter  his  lan- 
guage, but  his  private  conviction  is  beyond  the  reach  of  external 
coercion.  Even.!  in  the  days  when  free-thinking  meant  reasoning 
that  was  not  consistent  with  statements  in  the  Bible,  or  the 
Goran,  and  people  were  burnt  alive  for  professing  their  real 
beliefs,  free-thinking  was  not  in  reality  suppressed.  All  that 
philosophers  needed  to  do  was  to  twist  their  own  language  into 
harmony  with  the  scriptures,  or  vice  versa;  in  which  case  ex- 
ternal coercion  resulted  merely  in  the  mlultiplication  of  glos- 
saries and  commentaries.  A.  S.,  58.  What  else  are  the  in- 
tricate commiefnts  on  knotty  points  in  the  scriptures  but  the  pro- 


312  BULLETIN   OF    THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

test  of  reason  against  the  enslaving  letter  of  the  text?  And 
what  is  the  cause  of  all  the  hermeneutical  dodges  and  subter- 
fuges of  theological  apologetics,  both  Christian  and  pagan,  save 
the  rebellion  of  present  knowledge  against  past  ignorance? 

"La  liberrte  de  penser  est  imprescriptible.  .  .  Sous  le  re- 
gime d'Aristote,  comme  sous  celui  de  la  Bibkj  on  a  pu  penser 
presque  aussi  librement  que  de  nos  jours,  mais  a  la  condition 
de  prouver  que  telle  pensee  etait  reellement  dans  Aristote  ou 
dans  la  Bible,  ce  qui  ne  faisait  jamais  grande  difficulte.  .  . 
Tous  les  comjmjentaires  des  livres  sacres  se  ressemblent,  depuis 
ceux  de  Manou,  jusqu'a  ceux  de  la  Bible,  jusqu'a  ceux  du 
Goran.  Tous  sont  la  protestation  de  1'esprit  humain  centre 
la  lettre  asservissante.  .  .  C'est  la  regie  etroite  que  fait 
naitre  Fequivoque."  A.  S.,  58-9.  Cf.  ibid.,  290. 

So  little  did  Kenan  mjake  of  the  right  to  free  speech  at  the 
most  rationalistic  period  of  his  own  life  that  even  the  inquisi- 
tion itself,  with  all  its  cruelty,  is  condemned  solely  on 
the  ground  of  not  being  in  the  service  of  truth.  If  the  doc- 
trine of  the  church  had  been  true,  he  says,  the  inquisi- 
tion would  have  been  a  beneficient  institution.  The  moment 
a  doctrine  acquires  universal  acceptance  and  is  made  the  foun- 
dation of  social  and  national  existence,  society  is  right  in  pun- 
ishing those  who  attempt  to  subvert  it.  A.  S.,  345-7. 

"Du  moment  qu'une  societe  entiere  accepte  un  dogme  et  pro- 
clame  que  ce  dogme  est  la  verite  absolue,  et  cela  sans  opposi- 
tion^ on  est  charitable  en  persecutant.  C'est  defendre  la  soci- 
ete." A.  S.,  345.  Cf.  Mor.  Grit.,  161. 

"Je  concois  Tfitat  reconnaissant  un  seul  culte;  je  le  concois 
ne  reconnaissant  aucun  culte;  nxais  je  ne  le  concois  pas  recon- 
naissant tous  les  cultes.  II  faut  de  la  doctrine  a  Thumauite. 
Si  le  catholicisme  est  le  vrai,  les  pretentious  les  plus  extremes 
des  ultramjontains  sont  legitimes,  I'lnquisition  est  une  institu- 
tion bienfaisante.  .  .  De  ce  point  de  vue,  .  .  le  sou- 
verain  fait  acte  de  pere  en  separant  le  bon  grain  de  Tivraie  et 
brulant  celleHci.  Rien  ne  tient  devant  la  seule  chose  neces- 
saire,  sauver  les  ames.?>  A.  S.,  348-9.  Cf.  Souv.,  112-13. 

The  needs  of  society^  he  repeatedly  affirms,  must  in  all  cases 


BEAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.  313 

take  precedence  of  individual  rights.  Whenever  personal  lib- 
erty comes  in  conflict  with  social  welfare,  it  is  the  latter  which 
otight  to  prevail.  It  is  so,  he  believed,  throughout  nature. 
He  goes  so  far  as  to  declare  that  any  curtailment  of  individual 
liberties  is  right,  even  to  slavery  itself,  if  the  welfare  of  soci- 
ety demands  it.20a 

The  first  and  most  imperative  duty  of  any  society,  as  of  any 
individual,  is  the  duty  of  self -preservation.  Fighting-ability, 
lie  insists,  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  a  nation's  welfare. 
A  society  which  is  too  kindly  in  disposition  is  weak.  The 
world  is  not  made  up  of  perfect  people;  certain  abuses,  there- 
fore, are  necessary  and  unavoidable.  It  is  dangerous  for  a 
nation  to  be  more  civilized  than  its  neighbors.  P.  Isr.,  Ill, 
230;  Dr.  Ph.,  346. 

A  sound  philosophy  of  life  should  fit  men  for  killing  as  well 
as  for  dying.  Dr.  Ph.,  349.  The  surest  guarantee  of  peace 
is  preparation  for  war. 

Speaking  of  the  regime  under  which  the  happiness  of  the 
individual,  guaranteed  by  the  social  group  to  which  he  belongs, 
is  the  sole  object  of  the  law:  "Who  will  maintain  this  fine 
ideal  ?"  he  asks ;  "who  will  protect  this  little  paradise  of  broth- 
ers against  the  attacks  of  external  force?"  P.  Isr.,  Ill:  354. 

"(Test  une  verite  bien  constatee  que  le  progres  philoso- 
phique  des  lois  ne  repond  pas  toujours  a  un  progres  dans  la 
force  de  Pfitat.  La  guerre  est  chose  brtitale ;  elle  veut  des  bru- 
taux;  souvent  il  arrive  ainsi  que  les  ameliorations  morales  et 
sociales  entrainent  un  affaiblissement  militaire."  M.-Aur., 
253-4. 

He  reminds  his  readers  that  war  is  a  legacy  from  uncivil- 
ized times,  a  relic  of  primitive  barbarism.  M.-Aur.,  253. 
Militarism  therefore,  appealing  as  it  does  to  instincts  deep- 
rooted  in  human  nature,  cannot  be  suddenly  abolished  by  mere 
resolutions;  nor  the  cannon  be  safely  discarded  by  any  sin- 
gle nation  alone.  He  believed  that  peoples,  far  more  than  in- 
dividuals even,  are  compelled  to  be  selfish  by  the  very  condi- 
tions of  existence.  P.  Isr.,  I:  210.  The  way  to  certain  na- 
tional death  is  persistence  in  a  policy  of  unselfish  humanitar- 


314  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

ianism.  A  nation  that  labors  for  humanity  is  always  a  victim 
of  the  universal  work  which  it  accomplishes.  P.  Isr.,  HI: 
224 ;  XII.  A  nation  which  devotes  itself  to  social  and  religious 
problems,  courts  its  own  ruin.  C.  d'Angl.,  106. 

This  is  one  of  his  oft-repeated  inductions  from  history.  In 
the  Hibbert  lecture  for  1880,  he  writes: 

"Presque  toujours  les  nations  creees  pour  jouer  un  role  de 
civilisation  universelle,  comme  la  Judee,  la  Grece,  PItalie  de 
la  renaissance,  n'exercent  leur  pleine  action  sur  le  monde 
qu'apres  avoir  ete  victimes  de  leur  propre  grandeur.  .  . 
Lea  peuples  doivent  choisir,  en  effet,  entre  les  destinees  lon- 
gues,  tranquilles  et  obscures,  de  celui  qui  vit  pour  soi,  et  la 
carriere  troublee,  orageuse,  de  celui  qui  vit  pour  rhumanite. 
La  nation  qui  agite  daus  son  sein  des  problemes  sociaux  et  re- 
ligieux  est  presque  toujours  faible  politiquement.  Tout  pays 
qui  reve  un  royaume  de  Dieu,  qui  vit  pour  les  idees  generales, 
qui  poursuit  une  oeuvre  d'interet  universel,  sacrifie  par  la 
meme  sa  destinee  particuliere,  affaiblit  et  detruit  son  role 
comme  patrie  teirestre.  On  ne  porte  jamais  impunement  le 
feu  en  soi."  C.  d'Angl.,  103-4.  Kef.  Int.,  236;  Q.  C,, 
XXVIII. 

Renan  had  little  sympathy,  on  the  whole,  with  socialism,  as 
a  project  for  the  re-organization  of  society  on  a  basis  of  equal 
rights  for  all  men.  ^ot  that  he  was  blind  to  the  manifold  in- 
justice of  the  present  social  regime,  or  felt  no  sympathy  with 
the  undeserved  sufferings  of  the  less  fortunate  classes.  The 
reverse  is  the  truth.  Nor  would  he  deny  that  socialism  is  a 
well-grounded  protest  against  the  present  regime.  His  want 
of  sympathy  with  the  movement  appears  rather  to  have  sprung 
from  a  conviction  that,  at  bottom,  the  wrongs  for  which  social- 
ists are  seeking  a  remedy  are  beyond  the  power  of  man  to  re> 
move,  being  inherent  in  the  nature  of  things. 

He  was  much  impressed  with  the  analogy  of  socialism  to 
early  Christianity.  The  two  movements  appeared  to  him  to 
spring  from]  a  common  source:  the  evils  and  sufferings  and 
general  unsatisfactoriness  of  average  humlan  life  in  this  world. 
The  great  consolation  of  man,  he  says  with  reference  to  the 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  REN  AN.  315 

!N"ew  Jerusalem,  in  the  presence  of  the  incurable  evils  of  soci- 
ety, is  to  imagine  an  ideal  city,  from  which  he  excludes  every 
sorrow  and  which  he  endows  with  every  perfection.  P.  Isr., 
Ill:  400. 

He  notes  a  fundamental  difference.,  however,  amounting  to 
contrast,  in  their  respective  conceptions  of  the  possibilities  of 
human  nature.  In  the  Christian  eceonomy  the  reign  of  jus- 
tice, impossible  on  earth  because  the  "prince  of  this  world"  is 
the  "prince  of  darkness,"  is  deferred  to  another  life  and  con- 
stitutes the  reward  of  those  who  are  worthy  to  enter  the  heav- 
enly city.  Socialism,  on  the  other  hand,  with  its  different  con- 
ception of  nature  and  of  man's  place  in  nature,  also  less  cer- 
tain of  man's  future  and  with,  more  faith  in  his  present,  hopes 
to  establish  its  New  Jerusalem  on  this  planet.  In  a  word,  so- 
cialism is  Christianity  modernized  and  secularized.  Christi- 
anity is  socialism  minus  its  faith  in  man;  socialism  is  Chris- 
tianity minus  its  faith  in  God. 

The  parallelism  of  the  two  extends  to  details.  Like  Christi- 
anity, socialism  is  international  in  its  sympathies  and  aspira- 
tions, which  is  a  serious  matter,  considering  that  socialism  is 
a  live  issue  in  politics. 

Socialism  again,  with  its  phalansteries,  communities,  unions, 
orders,  and  brotherhoods,  tends,  like  Christianity,  to  create 
separate  allegiances  within  the  state,  in  rivalry  with  patriot- 
ism. 

All  religious  orders,  he  writes,  are  in  the  same  position.  If 
socialism  could  attain  any  organization,  its  phalansteries, 
groups,  syndicates,  would  exist  in  the  state,  like  small  egoisms 
caring  very  little  for  public  interests.  .  .  .  Ideal  Jerusa,- 
lems  bring  misfortune.  P.  Isr.,  Ill:  355.  Of.  Y.  J.,  172. 

Above  nationalities  there  is,  in  fact,  an  eternal  ideal.  So- 
cialism, according  to  the  Israelite  and  Christian  dream,  will 
probably  one  day  kill  the  patriots,  and  make  a  reality  of  the 
words  read  in  the  service  for  the  dead :  Judicare  secidum  per 
ignem.  P.  Isr.,  Ill:  386. 

Socialism,  moreover,  is  unmilitary  in  spirit  and  policy,- 
further  trait  of  resemblance  with  early  Christianity. 


316  BULLETIN   OF   THE  UNIVERSITY    OF    WISCONSIN. 

"II  est  clair  que  le  socialisme  des  ouvriers  est  1'antipode  de 
Pesprit  militaire;  c'est  presque  la  negation  de  la  patrie;  les 
doctrines  de  I'lnternationale  sont  la  pour  le  prouver."  Ref. 
Int.,  23. 

But  if  socialism  and  Christianity  are  so  nearly  related,  it 
may  be  asked,  how  comes  it  that  the  church  is  commonly  re- 
garded by  socialists  as  one  of  their  very  worst  enemies? 
Should  we  not  expect  that  so  far  as  they  are  pursuing  common 
aims,  such  as  the  extension  of  human  brotherhood,  Christian- 
ity and  socialism  would  reinforce  each  other? 

Renan  admits  that  in  some  respects  Christianity  is  a  formid- 
able barrier  to  socialism.  It  is,  in,  fact.,  at  once  an  obstacle 
and  a  reinforcement;  a  reinforcement  through  its  doctrine  of 
universal  brotherhood,  and  an,  obstacle  through  its  doctrine  of 
the  future  life.  The  Christian  who  really  tries  to  love  his 
neighbor  as  himself  and  to  do  unto  others  as  he  would  that  they 
should  do  unto  him,  is  so  far  a  socialist.  But  on  the  other 
hand,  so  far  as  the  disciple  of  Jesus  loves,  not  the-  world  nor 
the  things  that  are  in  the  world,  and  considers  life  on  earth 
as  a;  pilgrimage  to  his  heavenly  home ;  so  far  as,  concerned  only 
to  lay  up  treasures  in  heaven,  he  despises  earthly  riches  and, 
embracing  poverty,  welcomes  suffering  and  sorrow  as  a  disci- 
pline to  fit  him  for  the  kingdom;  of  God :  in  so  far  his  relig- 
ion is  the  very  opposite  of  socialism.  Imagine  Simeon  Styl- 
ites  heading  a  procession  for  a  fairer  distribution  of  the  com- 
forts and  pleasures  of  life! 

Already  in  his  first  book  Kenan  calls  attention  to  the  fact 
that  an  excessive  regard  for  the  life  to  come  is  an  obstacle  to 
social  reform!. 

"Quand  on  pense  que  toute  chose  se  trouvera  la-haut  retablie, 
ce  n'est  plus  tant  la  peine  de  poursuivre  Pordre  et  Tequite 
ici-bas.  Notre  principe,  a  nous,  c'est  qu'il  faut  regler  la  vie 
presente  comme  si  la  vie  future  n'existait  pas,  qu'il  n'est  ja- 
mais  permis  pour  justifier  un  etat  ou  un  acte  social  de  s'en 
referer  a  Tau-dela.  En  appeler  incessamment  a  la  vie  fu- 
ture, c'est  endormir  P  esprit  de  reforme,  c'est  ralentir  le  zele 
pour  Forganisation  rationnelle  de  rhum'anite."  A.  S.,  331-2. 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.  317 

Cf.  P.  Isr.,  Ill:  208.  He  is  especially  indignant  against 
those  who  feign  a  belief  in  the  hereafter  because  they  imagine 
this  to  be  in  the  interests  of  social  order: 

"Quand  un  sceptique  preche  au  pauvre  le  dogme  consolateur 
de  I'immortalite,  afin  de  le  f  aire  tenir  tranquille,  cela  doit  s'ap- 
peler  une  escroqnerie ;  c'est  payer  en  billets  qu'on  sait  faux, 
<s'est  detO'iirner  le  simple  par  une  chimere  de  la  poursuit©  du 
reel/'  A.  S.,  331. 

That  this  side  of  religion  is  unfavorable  to  social  reform,  is 
further  shown,  according  to  Renan,  by  the  fact  that  contempo- 
rary socialism  finds  its  very  tap-root  in  the  wide-spread  dis- 
belief in  a  future  life.  The  reason  the  masses  are  insisting 
so  energetically  on  a  fairer  distribution  of  the  good  things  of 
life  is  because  they  have  ceased  to  believe  that  one  can  merit 
heaven  by  miaking  earth  a  hell. 

"C'est  fatalement  que  1'humanite  cultivee  a  brise  le  joug  des 
anciennes  croyances ;  .  .  .  est-ce  sa  f  aute  ?  Peut-on 
croire  ce  que  Ton  veut  ?  II  n'y  a  rien  de  plus  fatal  que  la  rai- 
son.  Of.  Souv.,  383.  C'est  fatalement  .  .  .  que  le  peu- 
ple  est  devenu  a  son  tour  incredule.  .  .  C'est  fatalemient 
enfin  que  le  peuple  incredule  s'est  eleve  contre  ses  maitres  eoi 
incredulite  et  leur  a  dit :  Donnez-moi  une  part  ici-bas,  puis- 
que  vous  m'enlevez  la  part  du  ciel.  .  .  Maintenir  une  por- 
tion de  1'humianite  dans  la  brutalite,  est  immjoral  et  dangereux ; 
lui  rendre  la  chaine  des  anciennes  croyances  religieuses,  qui 
la  moralisaient  suffisamment,  est  impossible.  II  reste  done  un 
seul  parti,  c'est  d'elargir  la  grande  famille,  de  donner  place 
A  tons  au  banquet  de  la  lumiere."  A.  S.,  333-4. 

This  view  of  the  question  is  repeated  in  all  his  later  works. 

"II  faut  aiigmenter  la  sommle  de  bonheur  de  la  vie  hu- 
m,aine,"  he  says  in  his  article  on  Amiel.  "Ce  n'est  pas  de 
peche,  d'expiation,  de  redemption  qu'il  faut  desorniiais  parler 
a  rhomme;  c'est  de  bonte,  de  gaiete,  d'indulgence,  de  bonne 
humeur,  de  resignation.  A  mesure  que  les  esperances  d'outre- 
tombe  disparaissent,  il  faut  habituer  les  etres  passagers  a  re- 
garder  la  vie  cO'mlme  supportable;  sans  cela  ils  se  revolteront 
On  ne  maintiendra  plus  1'hommie  en  repos  que  par  le  bonheur. 


318  BULLETIN   OE   THE  UNIVERSITY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

.  .  Le  pessimism©  et  le  nihilisme  ont  pour  cause  1'ennui 
d'une  vie  qui,  par  suite  d'une  organisation  sociale  defectueuse, 
ne  vaut  pas  la  peine  d'etre  vecue.  La  vie  ne  vaut  que  par  ses- 
fruits;  si  Ton  desire  que  rhomm,e  y  tienne,  il  faut  la  rendre 
savoureuse  et  delectable  a  mener."  F.  Det.,  381-2. 

Kenan  is  sometimes  accused  of  an  absence  of  sympathy 
with  the  lower  classes,  and  it  must  be  admitted  that  his  habit- 
ual attitude  towards  certain  questions  of  social  policy,  his  ap- 
parent indifference  to  social  reforms,  his  dislike  of  the  ballot- 
box  and  general  distrust  of  democracy,  lend  countenance  to  the 
charge.  But  the  accusation  is  false,  nevertheless.  Nobody  fa- 
miliar with  his  writings,  especially  those  of  the  earlier  period,, 
can  doubt  for  a  moment  that  his  sympathy  with  the  poor  was 
genuine  and  deep. 

"S'il  etait  vrai  que  rhumanite  fiit  constitute  de  telle  sorte 
qu'il  n'y  edit  rien  a  faire  pour  le  bien  general,  s'il  etait  vrai 
que  la  politique  consistat  a  etouffer  le  cri  des  mialheureux  et  a 
se  croiser  les  bras  sur  des  maux  irremediables,  rien  ne  pour- 
rait  decider  les  belles  ames  a  supporter  la  vie.  Si  le  monde 
etait  fait  comonje  cela,  il  f  audrait  maudire  Dieu  et  puis  se  sui- 
cider."  A.  S.,  325.  Of.  ibid.,  319-329;  also  Souv.,  148; 
349-50 ;  Dr.  Ph.,  173-6. 

And  again  in  a  later  work: 

"Quand  on  a  charge  d'anues,  il  faut  done  s'exprimer  avec  as- 
sez  de  reserve  pour  que,  dans  Thypothese  de  la  grande  ban- 
queroute,  ceux  qu'on  y  a  compromis  se  trouvent  n' avoir  pas 
ete  trop  victimies."  F.  Det,  395-6. 

Kenan's  apparent  hostility  to  political  and  social  reforms  in 
reality  reflects  his  indifference  to  material  interests  and  pre- 
occupations as  such;  and  from  a  passage  in  the  Souvenirs  it 
appears  that  his  attitude  was  due  to  impressions  received  in 
early  youth.  That  spirit  of  unworldly  idealism  which  he 
caught  from  his  earliest  teachers,  the  priests  of  Treguier  Col- 
lege, while  it  heightened  his  sympathy  for  the  poor,  inspired  dis- 
taste for  the  vulgar  methods  and  selfish  motives  of  secular 
affairs.  Indeed,  he  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  he  alone  in  his 
century  has  rightly  understood  Jesus  and  St.  Francis, — a  slip 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      319 

of  the  pen  for  which,  he  has  often  been  censured  by  his  numer- 
ous critics.  Cf.  Souv.,  148 ;  also  11,  135,  140. 

It  is  interesting  to  compare  the  epicureanism  of  his  old  age, 
with,  the  stoicism  of  his  youth.  In  his  earlier  books  he  is  always 
insisting  that  nobody  has  a  right  to  enjoyment;  for  the  end  of 
society  is  not  the  happiness  of  its  members,  but  the  greatest 
attainable  moral  and  intellectual  perfection  of  all.  A.  S.  378, 
421,  386;  Hist.  KeL,  393. 

"Le  but  de  Thumanite  n'est  pas  le  repos;  c'est  la  perfection 
intellectuelle  et  morale.  II  s'agit  bien  de  se  reposer,  grand 
Dieu !  quand  on  a  Finfini  a  parcourir  et  le  parf ait  a  atteindre ! 
L'humanite  ne  se  reposera  que  dans  le  parfait."  Q.  C.,  306  Cf. 
ibid.,  49.  For  Kenan's  conception  of  human  perfection,  see 
A.  S.,  12,  355,  376,  387. 

"La  devise  des  saintrsimoniens:  "Sanctifiez-vous  par  le 
plaisir,"  est  abominable;  c'est  le  pur  gnosticisme.  Celle  du 
christianisme :  "Sanctifiez-vous  en  vous  abstenant  du  plaisir," 
est  encore  imparf  aite.  Nous  disons,  nous  autres  spiritualistes : 
"Sanctifiez-vous  et  le  plaisir  deviendra  pour  vous  insignifiant, 
et  vous  ne  songerez  pas  an  plaisir."  La,  saintete,  e'est  de  vivre 
de  1' esprit,  non  du  corps."  A.  S.,  404. 

As  pleasure-seeking  is  destructive  of  all  that  is  best  in  the 
individual,  so  is  it  the  bane  of  nations.  A  people  that  gives 
itself  up  to  frivolity  and  ease  is  doomed  to  certain  decadence. 
Socialism  is  expressly  condemned  on  the  ground  that  it  springs 
from  a  false,  hedonistic  conception  of  life. 

If  socialism  ever  becomes  an  established  fact,  he  declares,  it 
must  sooner  or  later  lead  to  national  decay.  The  pinch  of 
necessity  is  the  mother  of  all  effort.  All  progress  comes  from 
the  hope  of  doing  better  or  avoiding  worse.  A.  S.,  373 ;  also 
note  158. 

"Si  Tideal  du  bien-etre  materialiste  que  revent  quelques  re- 
formateurs  venait  a  se  realiser,  le  mionde,  prive  de  Faiguillon  de 
la  soufFrance,  perdrait  un  des  moyens  qui  ont  le  plus  contribue 
a  faire  de  1'hommie  un  etre  intelligent  et  moral."  Mor.  Grit, 
18.  Of.  A.  S.,  421-2,429  ;  Kef  Int.,  111. 

"L'erreur  commune  des  socialistes  et.  de  leurs  adversaires  est 


320  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

de  supposer  que  la  question  de  I'humJanite  est  une  question  de 
bien-etre  et  de  jouissance.  Si  cela  etait,  Fourier  et  Cabet  aurai- 
ent  parfaitement  raison  .  .  .  S'il  ne  s'agissait  que  de  jouir, 
mieux  vaudrait  pour  tons  le  brouet  noir  que  pour  les  unes  les 
delices,  pour  les  autres  la  f  aim."  A.  S.,  377-8 ;  also  431-2. 

"Malheur  a  la  generation  .  .  .  qui  a  concu  la  vie 
oomme  un  repos  et  Tart  comme  une  jouissance!  Les  grandes 
ehoses  n'apparaissent  jamais  dans  ces  tiedes  milieux."  A.  S., 
421. 

Even  war  itself  acquires  a  redeeming  feature  from  its  con- 
ducing to  a  strenuous  life: 

"Le  jour  ou  I'humanite  deviendrait  un  grand  empire  remain 
pacifie  et  n'ayant  plus  d'ennemis  exterieurs,  serait  le  jour  ou  la 
moral ite  et  Tintelligence  courraient  les  plus  grands  dangers." 
Ref.  Int.,  111.  Of.  ibid.,  40;  also  A.  S.,  IX;  Dial.,  23. 

"II  f  aut  done  s'y  resigner :  les  belles  choses  naissent  dans  les 
larmies ;  ce  n'est  pas  acheter  trop  chere  la  beaute  que  de  Tacheter 
au  prix  de  la  douleur."  A.  S.,  426.  Of.,  Q.  C.,  466-7. 

Now  turn  to  the  gospel  which  prevails  in  his  writings  half  a 
century  later: 

"La  plus  dangereuse  erreur,  en  fait  de  morale  sociale,  est  la 
suppression  svstematique  du  plaisir."  F.  Det.,  383. 

"Moraliser  les  masses!"  exclaims  Prospero-Renan.  A  notre 
age,  peut-on  dire  de  pareils  enf  antillages  ?  Si  nous  ne  sommes 
pas  des abuses,  quand  le  serons-nous,  mon  cher  ?  ...  La 
moralite  doit  etre  reservee  pour  ceux  qui  ont  une  mission  comme 
nous  .  .  .  Mais  les  pauvres  gens,  les  gens  ordinaires, 
allez  done!  Us  sont  pauvres,  et  vous  voulez  que,  par-dessus  le 
marche,  ils  soient  vertueux!  C'est  trop  exiger.  ...  Si 
Fhomrne  n'existait  pas,  les  formes  les  plus  elevees  de  Tadoration 
sur  notre  planete  eussent  ete  les  jeux  des  dauphins,  le  tourbil- 
lonnement  folatre  des  papillons,  le  chant  des  oiseaux."  Dr. 
Ph.,  170-2. 

"Le  peuple  doit  s'amuser;  c'est  la  sa  grande  compensation. 
Un  peuple  gai  est  le  meilleur  des  peuples.  Ce  qu'un  peuple 
donne  a  la  gaiete,  il  le  prend  presque  tou jours  sur  la  median- 
oete." 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.  321 

As  for  expecting  the  masses  to  be  temperate  in  drink : 

"Mais  c'est  la  une  veritable  indignite.  Priver  lea  simjples 
gens  de  la  seule  joie  qu'ils  ont,  en  leur  promettant  un  paradis 
qu'ils  n'auront  pas  !  .  .  .  Aliens  done !  Pauvres  vies  de- 
florees !  Pourquoi  voulez-vous  empecher  ces  malheu- 

reux  de  se  plonger  un  moment  dans  P  ideal  ?  Ce  sont  peut-etre 
les  heures  on  ils  valent  quelque  chose."21  Dr.  Ph.,  172-3. 

It  mjust  be  admitted  that  Kenan's  later  writings  have  con- 
tributed not  a  little  to  render  public  opinion  in  France  as  in- 
dulgent as  possible  in  matters  of  sexual  immorality.  He  seems 
to  have  grown  more  and  more  lax  in  his  speech  as  he  grew 
older;  though  not,  of  course,  in  his  personal  life.22  He  appa- 
rently had  lost  all  faith  in  the  very  possibility  of  effecting  any 
considerable  permanent  improvement  in  the  economic  condition 
of  the  mass  of  mankind.  Equality,  even  the  more  modest 
claim  to  equality  of  opportunity,  he  had  come  to  consider  an 
unrealizable  dream.  In  his  earlier  period  he  enthusiastically 
hoped  that  all  men  might  be  lifted  to  a  level  of  culture  where 
the  coarser  pleasures1  would  be  too  repulsive  to  bring  satisfaction 
to  a  human  soul.  But  in  these  ideals  he  now  believed  no  longer. 
In  his  later  position  he  reasoned  like  this:  If  life  is  a  good 
only  in  proportion  to  its  surplus  of  pleasures  over  pains,  why 
should  not  the  masses,  these  "pauvres  vies  deflorees,"  be  allowed 
to  indulge  those  forms  of  amusement  by  which  alone  they  are 
reconciled  to  the  hardships  of  their  brutal  existence? 

But  this  is  plainly  a  gospel  of  decadence,  individual  and 
national.  It  overlooks  the  all-important  fact  that  pleasure- 
seeking,  like  any  other  degrading  habit,  must  grow  by  what  it 
feeds  on.  The  more  this  conception  of  life  is  allowed  to  gain 
prevalence,  the  more  animalistic  and  bestial  must  men  become. 
Remove  the  restraints  and  supports  of  a  healthy  public  opinion, 
and  who  shall  predict  ati  what  point  in  the  decalogue  the  down- 
ward drift  will  come  to  a  stop? 

But  perhaps  we  should  judge  his  later  effusions  in  the  light 
of  the  following  warning,  with  which  he  concludes  his  Sou- 
venirs: 

"Je  proteste  d'avance  contre  les  faiblesses  qu'un  cerveau 
8 


322  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

ramolli  pourrait  me  faire  dire  on  signer.  C'est  Renan  sain 
d'esprit  et  de  coeur,  comme  je  le  snis  aujourd'hui,  ce  n'est  pas 
Renan  a  moitie  detruit  par  la  mjort  et  n'etant  plus  lui-meme, 
comjme  je  le  serai  si  je  me  decompose  lentement,  que  je  veux 
qu'on  croie  et  qu'on  ecoute.  Je  renie  les  blasphemes  que  les 
defaillances  de  la  derniere  heure  pourraient  me  faire  prononcer 
contre  P  fi'ternel."  Souv.,  377. 

His  habitual  attitude  in  later  years  towards  social  and  politi- 
cal questions  is  well  expressed  in  a  'New  Year's  message  to  his 
friend  M.  Berthelot,  then  prime  minister  of  his  country.  It  re- 
veals again  the  capital  defect  of  all  his  later  philosophy:  the 
inveterate  habit  of  contemplating  all  things,  even  morality  itself, 
sub  specie  aeterndtatis. 

"Los  accidents  les  plus  graves  des  choses  humaines,  quand 
on  se  place  au  point  de  vue  de  la  terre  entiere,  n'ont  pas  plus 
d'importance  que  le  mouvement  d'un  guepier  ou  le  va-et-vient 
d'une  fourmiliere,  Quand  on  se  place  an.  point  de  vue  du  sys- 
teme-  solaire,  nos  revolutions  ont  a  peine  T amplitude  de  mouve- 
ments  d'atomes.  Du  point  de  vue  de  Sirius,  c'est  moins  encore. 
Du  point  de  vue  de  Pinfini,  ce  n'est  rien.  Oe  point  de  vue  est 
le  seul  d'ou  Pon  juge  bien  les  choses  dans  leurs  verite."22a  F. 
D^t,  156-7.  Of.  A.  S.,  330. 

Renan  has  somewhere  argued  that  belief  in  a  future  life  tends 
to  make  people  indifferent  to  the  bettering  of  the  conditions  of 
life  in  this1  world,  and  this  may  perhaps  be  true  in  some  cases. 
But  if  any  lesson  is  taught  by  the  example  of  his  own  life,  it  is 
this  that  the  most  universal  disillusionment  may  lead  to  at  least 
an  equal  indifference;  and  indeed  he  himself  has  affirmed  this 
in  so  many  words: 

"To  have  recognized  that  human  aifairs  are  an  approximation 
without  earnestness  and  without  precision  is  a  great  result  in 
philosophy,  but  involves  the  abdication  of  every  active  role. 
The  future  lies  in  the  hands  of  those  who  are  not  undeceived. 
Woe  to  those  of  whom  Saint  Paul  speaks:  qui  spem  non  habent! 
P.  Isr.,  Ill,  404.  Of.  James,  Yar.  Rel.  Exp.,  265. 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.  323 


CHAPTER  V. 

CRITICAL   SUMMARY  OF  RESULTS. 

The  reader  who  has  followed  the  exposition  in  the  preceding 
pages,  especially  the  numerous  quotations  from  Renani  himself, 
can  hardly  help  feeling  that  his  philosophical  speculations,  when 
stripped  of  the  charm,  they  derive  from  the  beautiful  language 
in  which  they  invariably  are  clothed,  are  too  often  characterized 
either  by  unprofitable  vagueness  or  fundamental  incoherence; 
that  his  conclusions  are  either  so  indefinite  as  to  accord  with 
almost  any  view  of  the  question  under  discussion,  or  so  hope- 
lessly inconsistent  as  to  lead  to  no  positive  results. 

And  this  is  the  truth.  Andrew  Lang  was  quite  right  when 
he  wrote : 

"Renan  has  no  fixed  theory  of  philosophy.  .  .  .  ;  the  is 
Jeckyl  and  he  is  also  Hyde ;  he  is  Pulvis  and  he  is  Umbra ;  he 
is  Indra  and  he  is  the  sacrifice  on  the  altar  of  Indra ;  he  is  Jean,' 
qui  pleure  and  he  is  Jean  qui  rit ;  he  is  Democritus  and  he  is 
Heraclitus."  Fort,  Rev.,  vol.,  47.  Of.  Seailles,  E.  R,  293. 

Renan's  characterization  of  the  philisophy  of  Plato,  in  fact, 
applies  equally  well  to  his  own : 

"Platon  n'a  pas  de  symbole,  pas  de  propositions  arretees> 

.  .  dans  le  sens  scolastique  que  nous  attachons  a  ce  mot;, 
c'est  fausser  sa  peonsee  que  de  vouloir  en  extraire  une  theorie 
dogmatique.  Et  pourtant,  Platon  represente  un  esprit;  Platon, 
est  une  religion."  A.  S.,  54.  Of.  ibid.,  446-7. 

These  words  are  true  of  himself.  Renan,  like  Plato,  repre- 
sents an  esprit,  a  philosophy,  a  religion  if  you  will. 

He  sometimes  writes,  as  if  this  esprit,  this  personal  note,  this 
religion,  were  the  whole  of  philosophy,  or  at  least  its  chief  char- 
acteristic. He  expressly  defines  philosophy  as  a  species  of 
poetry: 


324  BULLETIN"   OF   THE    UNIVERSITY   OF    WISCONSIN". 

"De  la  poesie  a  la  critique,  il  n'y  a  pas  si  loin  qu'on  le  sup- 
pose ;  les  races  poetiques  sont  les  races  philosophiques,  et  la  phi- 
losophie n'est  au  fond  qu'une  maniere  le  poesie  comme  une 
autre."  Mor.  Or.,  4-55. 

"Tin  systeme,  c'est  une  epopee  sur  les  choses.  II  serait  aussi 
absurde  qu'un  systeme  renfermat  le  dernier  mot  de  la  realite 
qu'il  le  serait  qu/une  epopee  epuisat  le  cercle  entier  de  la 
beaute.  A.  8.,  57  Of.  P.  Sem,,  40. 

And  again  in  his  article  I'Avenir  de  la  metaphysique: 
La  philosophic  est  moins  une  science  qu'un  cote  de  toutes  les 
sciences  ...  La  plus  humble  commie  la  plus  sublime  in- 
telligence a  eu  sa  f  agon  de  concevoir  le  monde ;  chaque  tete  pen- 
sante  a  ete  a  sa  guise  le  miroir  de  Tunivers ;  chaque  etre  vivant 
a  eu  son  reve  qui  Fa  charme,  eleve,  console :  grandiose  ou  mes- 
quin,  plat  ou  sublime,  ce  reve  a  ete  sa  philosophie."  Frag., 
286-T. 

There  would  thus  be  as  many  different  philosophies  as  dif- 
ferent personalities;  and  indeed,  he  says  this  in  so  many  words: 
"La  philosophie,  c'est  rhomme  meme;  chacun  nait  aveo  sa 
philosophie  comme  avec  son  style."     Frag.,  288. 

Only  a  few  pages  earlier,  however,  in  the  same  article,  philos- 
ophy is  described  in  a  manner  quite  incompatible  with  this  view, 
Joeing  practically  identified  with  ^positive  science : 

"Les  vrais  philosophes  se  sont  faits  philologues,  chimistes, 
physiologistes  .  .  .  Aux  vieilles  tentatives  d'explication 
universelle  se  sont  substitut^es  des  series  de  patientes  investigar 
tions  sur  la  nature  et  Fhistoire.  La  philosophie  semble  ainsi 
aspirer  a  redevenir  co  qu'elle  etait  a  Torigine,  la.  science  uni- 
verselle."  Frag.,  265.  The  same  idea,  A.  S.,  301. 

But  two-sided  statements  from  Renan,  or  even  many-sided 
ones,  no  longer  surprise  us.  We  have  learned  to  regard  them 
as  an  essential  part  of  his  philosophical  miethod,  not  to  say  its 
leading  characteristic.  He  seems  to  have  really  believed  and 
practiced,  what  in  his  later  period  he  so  often  preached,  that 
in  philosophy  and  religion,  the  only  way  to  mjake  sure  of  being 
right  sometimies,  is  to  affirm  in  turn  all  the  alternatives.  Dr. 
Ph.  256.  Of.  James,  Hum.  Im.,  12,  16. 


BEAUEB THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  BEN  AN.  325 

A  complete  explanation  of  Kenan's  heterogeneous  personal- 
ity, and  the  numerous  contradictions  in  his  writings  to  which  it 
led,  is  of  course  not  attempted  ini  this  chapter.  All  that  can  be 
accomplished  here  is  to  indicate  the  direction  in  which,  as  the 
writer  believes,  a  more  exhaustive  study  of  the  subject  must 
turn.23 

Perhaps  we  may  best  begin  by  examining  first  the  explana- 
tions he  jhimself  has  offered. 

In  his  Souvenirs  d'enfance  et  de  jeunesse,  he  tries  to  account 
for  what  he  is  pleased  to  call  his  apparent  contradictions,  by 
tracing  them  back  to  a  certain  dualism  in  his  character,  which 
in  turn  is  variously  ascribed,  now  to  an  atavistic  influence  of 
his  complex  descent,,  and  again  to  a  later  disillusionment. 

"Par  m|a  race,"  he  says,  "j'etais  part-age,  et  comme  ecartele, 
entre  des  forces  contraires  .  . .  Cette  complexite  d'origine 
est  en  grande  partie,  je  crois,  la  cause  de  mes1  apparentes  con- 
tradictions. Je  suis  double;  quelquefois  une  partie  de  moi 
rit  quand  Tautre  pleure."  S'ouv.,  141-5 ;  73,  90. 

But  a  few  pages  earlier  in  the  same  book  we  find  this  dualism 
attributed  to  a  later  disenchantment,  due  to  a  wider  knowledge 
of  men  and  a  deeper  insight  into  the  ways  and  the  needs  of  the 
world.  His  native  idealism,  he  tells  us,  seemed  to  him  out  of 
place  in  a  world  such  as  ours,  and  this  discovery  led  hint  to  apply 
8  double  standard  of  worth  in  his  judgments  of  men  and  things; 

.  .  .  "de  prendre  pour  me®  jugements  pratiques  le  con- 
trepied  exact  de  mfes  jugements  theoriques,  de  ne  regarder 
commc  possible  que  ce  qui  contredisait  mies-  aspirations." 
Souv.,  123. 

"Alors  s'etablit  en  moi  une  lutte  ou  plutot  une  dualite  qui  a 
ete  le  secret  de  toutes  mes  opinions  .  .  .  Je  vis  que 
Pideal  et  la  realite  n'ont  rien  a  faire  ensemble;  que  le  monde, 
jusqu'a  nouvel  ordre,  est  voue  sans  appel  a  la  platitude,  a  la 
mediocrite ;  que  la  cause  qui  plait  aux  ames  bien  njees  est  sure 
d'etre  vaincue ;  que  ce  Ojui  est  vrai  en  litterature,  en  poesie,  aux 
yeux  des  gens  raffines,  est  tou jours  faux  dans  le  monde  grossier 
des  faits  accomplis."  Souv.,  122 ;  123-4. 

Still  another  explanation  is  suggested  in  his  preface  to  the 


326  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

samje  book,  whore  opposite  tendencies  and  temperaments  within 
the  same  personality  are  explained  as  a  case  of  opposite  poles 
attracting  each  other. 

"Presque  tons  nous  sommes  doubles.  Plus  I'homme  se  deve- 
loppe  par  la  tete,  plus  il  reve  le  pole  contraire,  c'est  a  dire  Fir- 
ratioimel,  le  repos  dans  la  complete  ignorance,  la  femme  qui 
n'est  que  femme,  1'etre  instinctif  qui  n'agit  que  par  1'impulsion 
d'une  conscience  obscure."  Souv.,  VII-VIII ;  Of.,  F.  Det.,  39. 

Comparing  these  explanations  with  one  another,  it  seems  at 
first  glance  that  Kenan  has  fallen  merely  into  new  contradictions 
in  attempting  to  explain  the  old  ones.  But  it  is  quite  probable 
that  his  explanations  are  all  of  them  true  as  far  as  they  go; 
heredity,  experience,  the  attraction  of  opposites,  have  doubtless 
all  co-operated  in  the  total  result. 

It  is  easy  to  present  these  contradictions  in  such  a  way  as  to 
insinuate  that  Ren  an  was  incapable  of  close  reasoning,  or  a 
stranger  to  sound  scientific  methods  ;  and  to  assume  that  his  con- 
tradictions are  merely  the  result  of  flippant  levity  or  self-satis- 
fied superficiality.  But  such  a  procedure  is  too  absurd,  and 
reveals  a  total  misapprehension  of  the  nature  of  his  contradic- 
tions, as  well  as  of  his  true  character. 

Two  prime  factors  seem  to  lie  at  the  root  of  all  his  contra- 
dictions :  sincerity  and  progressiveness.  A  more  unfeigned  sin- 
cerity there  never  was,  either  in  seeking  the  truth  or  ini  stating 
it..  In  Kenan's  own  explanations,  ascribing  these  contradic- 
tions to  a  kind  of  double  personality,  this  ultimate  trait,  sin- 
cerity, is  taken  for  granted ;  but  it  has  to  be  made  explicit  if  the 
explanation  is  to  be  complete. 

It  is  quite  possible,  of  course,  for  contradictory  impulses  and 
opposite  points  of  view  to  exist  together  within  the  same  per- 
sonality, without  appearing  in  speech  and  conduct ;  and  it  is 
only  because  in  Kenan's  case  these  opposite  promptings  were  all 
expressed  with  an  equal  freedom  and  frequency  that  his  double 
personality  gave  rise  to  that  systematic  two-sidedness  which 
uninitiated  readers  of  Kenan  find  so  bewildering.  Whatever 
Beeoued  to  himj  to  be  true,  in  different  moods  and  from,  different 
points  of  view,  he  frankly  and  fully  expressed,  quite  regard- 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RESTAN.  327 

less  of  consistency  with  other  moods  or  other  points  of  view. 
His  own  testimony  on  this  question  will  not  be  disputed  by 
any  one  familiar  with  his  works. 

"Dans  mes  ecrits,  j'ai  ete  d'une  sincerite  absolue.  Non  seulo- 
ment  je  n'ai  rien  dit  que  ce  que  je  pense;  chose  bien  plus  rare 
et  plus  difficile,  j'ai  dit  tout  ce  que  je  pense."  Souv.,  151. 

"Le  public  m'a  eu  autant  que  mes  amis.  ...  II  m'est 
arrive  frequemment,  en  ecrivant  une  lettre,  de  m'arreter  pour 
tourner  en  propos  general  les  idees  qui  me  venaient.  Je  n'ai 
existe  pleinement  que  pour  le  public.  II  a  eu  tout  de  moi;  il 
n'aura  apres  ma  mort  aucune  surprise ;  je  n'ai  rien  reserve  pour 
person  ne."  Souv.,  365. 

And  few  indeed  are  those  who  have  had  a  wider  range  of 
thoughts  and  feelings,  of  facts  and  fancies  to  express.  His  life 
has  been  compared  to  a  voyage  through  the  realm]  of  ideas  and 
sentiments. 

"II  avait  connu  1'etat  d?ame  religieux,  Fetat  d'ame  scien- 
tifique,  un  etat  d'ame  oil  science  et  religion  co-existaient  sans 
s'exclure;  il  connut  Tetat  d'ame  optimiste,  Fetat  d'ame  pessi- 
miste,  la  hautaine  ironie  et  rindulgence  indefinie,  la  resignation 
et  le  sarcasm©,  Felevation  religieuse  et  le  persiflage  Voltairien, 
tous  les  modes  en  quelque  sorte,  de  penseo  et  meme  de  croyance, 
donjiant  a  chacune  une  expression  si  vive  qu'on  eut  pu  croire  a 
chaque  fois,  que  c?etait  le  seul  qu'il  entendit  et  pratiquat." 
M.  Faguet,  Hev.  Par.,  Vol.  4,  p.  119. 

"By  his  mastery  of  Eastern  and  Oriental  languages  and  liter- 
atures," says  Mr.  Oonway,  "he  had  familiarly  dwelt  among 
primitive  tribes,  with  them;  set  up  their  dolmens,  knelt  at  their 
altars,  travelled  with  their  migrations  in  India,  Persia,  Egypt, 
Syria,  shared  their  pilgrimages  from  lower  to  higher  beliefs, 
had  listened  to  their  prophets,  visited  the  home  of  Mary  and 
Joseph,  walked  with  the  disciples."  Monist,  vol.  3,  pp.  201  ff. 
Cf.  Monod,  Kenan,  etc.,  p.  40,  48. 

"Pour  moi,"  says  Theoctiste-Benan,  "je  goute  tout  Funivers 
par  cette  sorte  de  sentiment  general  qu  fait  que  nous  sommes 
tristes  en  une  ville  triste,  gais  en  une  ville  gaie.  Je  jouis  ainsi 
des  voluptes  du  voluptueux,  des  debauches  du  debauche,  de  la 


328  BULLETIN   OF   THE    UNIVERSITY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

mondanite  du  mondain,  de  la  saintete  de  rhomme  vertueux,  des 
meditations  du  savant,  de  Fausterite  de  Tascete.  Par  une  sorte 
de  syrnpathie  douce,  je  me  figure  que  je  suis  leur  conscience. 
Les  decouvertes  du  savant  sont  mon  bien;  les  triomtphes  de 
rambitieux  me  sont  une  fete.  Je  serais  f ache  que  quelque 
chose  manquat  au  monde;  car  j'ai  conscience  de  tout  ce  qu'il  en- 
ferme."  Dial.,  133-4.  Of.,  ibid.,  XIII;  Dr.  Ph.,  233;  F. 
Det.,  382-3  ;  A.  S.,  1C,  123  ;  Ant.,  140. 

It  was  this  universal  recognition  and  comprehensive  apprecia- 
tion of  all  codes  and  customs  and  philosophies,  this  ubiquity  of 
interest  and  unprejudiced  intellectual  hospitality,  mjore  than 
any  other  single  trait  that  could  be  named,  which  made  Kenan 
the  spokesman  of  all  sorts  and  conditions  of  men.  lie  was  con- 
tinually making  new  acquisitions,  and  at  the  same  timje  was 
unable  to  give  up  the  old  ones.  His  thirst  for  knowledge  and 
experience  was  insatiable.  His  wish  was  to  lead  a  multitude  of 
lives  all  abreast  of  each  other. 

"Je  voudrais,  dans  un  antre  monde,  parler  au  feminin,  d'une 
voix  de  femme,  penser  en  femme,  aimer  en  femjme,  prier  en 
femime,  voir  comment  les  femmes  ont  raison."  F.  Det.,  39. 
Cf.  Benjamin'  Constant,  Journal,  Paris,  1895,  p.  56. 

Speaking  in  1890  of  the  faults  of  his  early  manner  of  writing, 
he  sumis  them  all  up  in  the  sentence:  Je  tenais  trop  a  ne  rien 
perdre,  A.  Si,  VI ;  and  this  remained  to  the  end  the  condition  of 
his  mind,  though  not  of  his  style.  He  had  learned  the  capital 
art  of  omitting,  indeed ;  but  only  to  embrace  the  next  occasion 
for  expressing  the  opposite  side. 

Three  orders  of  reality  in  particular  are  sharply  distin- 
guished and  made  very  prominent  in  all  Kenan's  writings;  so 
prominent,  in  fact,  that  one  of  his  best  and  most  appreciative 
critics,  M.  Gabriel  Monod,  declares  this  three-fold  grouping 
of  experience,  and  the  assertion  of  mutual  equivalence  among 
the  groups  thus  obtained,  to  be  the  chief  characteristic  and  the 
central  feature  in  Kenan's  philosophical  thought.  These 
groups  are:  Truth,  Goodness,  and  Beauty. 

The  following  passage,  from  his  earliest  book,  is  typical  of 
scores  of  others  throughout  his  writings: 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.  329 

"Tin  beau  sentiment  vaut  une  belle  pensee ;  une  belle  pensee 
vaut  une  -belle  action.  Un  systeine  de  philosophic  vaut  un 
poeme,  un  poeme  vaut  une  decouverte  scientifique,  une  vie  de 
science  vaut  une  vie  de  vertu.  L'homnie  parfait  serait  celui 
qui  serait  a  la  fois  poete,  philosophe,  savant,  homme  vertueux." 
A.  S.,  11 ;  also  101 ;  Mor.  Grit.,  358-9. 

Truth,  goodness  and  beauty,  according  to  Kenan,  represent 
different  modes  in  which  the  ultimate  cosmic  reality,  whatever 
that  may  be,  is  reflected  in  human  consciousness. 

The  question  arises  whether  this  is  not,  after  all,  simply  an 
interpretation  of  reality  in  terms  of  human  nature,  a  projection 
of  his  own  self  into  external  facts;  in  other  words,  a  return  to 
that  very  anthropocentricism  which  he  so  often  condemned  in 
other  people? 

The  truth  is  that  a  man  so  many-sided  as  Renan,  who  has 
run  the  entire  gamut,  one1  may  fairly  say,  of  feelings  and  tem- 
peraments, and  who  lived  so  many  lives  in  one,  is  too  complex 
and  abnormal  a  character  to  be  fairly  judged  by  ordinary- 
standards.  Is  it  any  wonder  that  a  personality  so  heteroge- 
neous, who  in  thought  was  a  m'an,  in  feeling  a  woman  and  in 
action  a  child;  whose  writings  reflect  now  the  reminiscent 
poetry  of  an  outworn  faith  and  again  the  subtle  criticism  of 
an  aridly  erudite  intellect;  a  "tissue  of  contradictions,"  as  he 
calls  himself:  is  it  any  wonder  that  such  a  man  should  find  it 
impossible  to  represent  on  paper  all  the  disparate  medley  of 
his  conflicting  judgments  upon  experience,  even  to  their  finest 
shades  and  transitions,  within  the  inflexible  limits  of  syllogistic 
logic? 

But  perhaps  a  more  im*portant  cause  still  of  logical  contradic- 
tion than  the  freedom  he  at  all  times  practiced  in  expressing  his 
judgments  is  the  freedom  with  which  he  allowed  these  judg- 
ments to  form  in  his  mind.  Imbued  with  the  Cartesian  ration- 
alism of  the  seventeenth  century,  especially  as  represented  in 
Malebranche,  he  had  early  embraced  the  doctrine  that  reason, 
and  reason  alone,  unhampered  by  will  or  desire,  is  the  judge 
of  all  truth.  Reason  .was  conceived  as  a  kind  of  balance  for 
weighing  ideas,  producing  belief  or  disbelief,  according  as  the 


330  BULLETIN"   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

scales  dip  this  way  or  that.  All  reasoning,  therefore,  to  be 
trustworthy,  must  be  an  objective  process,  unbiased  as  the  mar- 
iner's compass. 

"Les  gens  du  monde  qui  croient  qu'on  se  decide  dans  le  choix 
de  sea  opinions  par  des  raisons  de  sympathie  ou  d'antipathie 
s'etonneront  certainemjent  du  genre  de  raisonnements  qui 
m'ecarta  de  la  foi  chretienne,  a  laquelle  j 'avals  tant  de  motifs 
de  coeur  et  d'  interet  de  raster  attache.  Les  personnes  qui  n'ont 
pas  Fesprit  scientifique  ne  comprennent  guere  qu'on  laisse  ses 
opinions  se  fornuer  hors  de  soi  par  une  sorte  de  concretion.  in> 
personnelle,  dont  on  n'est  en  quelque  sorte  que  le  spectateur.  En 
me  livrant  ainsi  a  la  force  des  choses,  je  croyais  me  oonformer 
aux  regies  de  la  grande  ecole  du  XVIIe  siecle,  surtout  de  Male- 
branche,  dont  le  premier  principe  est  que  la  raison  doit  etre  con- 
templee,  et  qu'on  n'est  pour  rien  dans  sa  procreation ;  en  sorte 
que  le  devoir  de  Phomme  est  de  se  mettre  devant  la  verite,  denue 
de  toute  personnalite,  pret  a  se  laisser  trainer  ou  voudra  la 
demonstration  preponderante.  Loin  de  viser  d'  avance  certains 
resultats,  ces  illustres  penseurs  voulaient  que,  dans  la  recherche 
de  la  verite,  on  s'interdit  d'avoir  un  desir,  une  tendance,  un 
attachment  personnel."24  Souv.,  296-7. 

But  so  far  is  this  conception  of  reason  from  corresponding  in 
fact  to  the  psychical  processes  of  humanity  at  large,  that  the 
opposite  appears  to  be  implied  in  nearly  all  the  mental  opera- 
tions of  the  vast  majority  of  mankind. 

The  position  of  Prof.  James,  for  example,  is  the  very  oppo- 
site of  that  maintained  by  Renan  in  the  passages  above  quoted. 
This  writer  insists  that  not  only  do  men,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
allow  their  beliefs  to  be  influenced  by  their  emotions,  such  as 
hope,  fear,  prejudice  and  passion,  imitation  and  partisanship, 
but  that  it  is  right  we  should  be  so  influenced  in  certain  cases. 

"Oar  passional  nature,"  he  writes,  "not  only  lawfully  may, 
but  must,  decide  an  option,  whenever  it  is  a  genuine  option  that 
cannot  by  its  nature  be  decided  on  intellectual  grounds;  fo>r  to 
say,  under  such  circumstances,  "do  not  decide,  but  leave  the 
question  open,"  is  itself  a  passional  decision, — just  like  deciding 


BRAUEB THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.  331 

yes  or  no, — and  is  attended  with  the  same  risk  of  losing  the 
truth."     The  Will  to  Believe,  1897,  p.  II. 

"Is  it  wiser  or  better,"  he  asks,  "to  yield  to  the  fear  that  re- 
ligion may  be  an  error  than  to  yield  to  the  hope  that  it  inlay  be 
be  true  I  p.  27. 

"Where  faith  in  a  fact  can  help  create  the  fact,  that  would  be. 
an  insane;  logic  which  should  say  that  faith  running  ahead  of 
scientific  evidence  is  the  lowest  kind  of  immortality  into  which 
a  thinking  being  can  fall."  p.,  25. 

"A  rule  of  thinking  which  would  absolutely  prevent  me  from 
acknowledging  certain  kinds  of  truth  if  those  kinds  of  truth 
were  really  there,  would  be  an  irrational  rule."  p.  28. 

So  far  is  reason  from  being  the  sole  and  ultimate  arbiter  of 
all  truth,  or  an  infallible  and  sufficient  guide  for  attaining  it, 
according  to  Prof.  James,  that 

"Our  reason  is  quite  satisfied,  in  999  cases  out  of  every  thou- 
sand of  us,  if  it  can  find  a  few  arguments  that  will  do  to  recite 
in  case  our  credulity  is  criticised  by  some  one  else.  Our  faith 
is  faith  in  some  one  else's  faith,  and  in  the  greatest  matters  this 
is  most  the  case."  P.,  9. 

But  why  quote  this  writer  against  Renan  ?  The  truth  is 
that,  notwithstanding  the  statements  of  Rienan  above  quoted, 
and  many  others  in  the  same  key,  he  has  himself  affirmed  the 
Tery  position  for  which  Prof.  James  contends.  It  is  interest- 
ing to  contrast  the  following  passages  with  those  last  cited : 

"L' attitude  la  plus  logique  du  penseur  devant  la  religion  est 
de  faire  comme  si  elle  etait  vraie.  II  faut  agir  commie  si  Dieu 
et  Fame  existaient.  La  religion  entre  ainsi  dans  le  cas  de  ces 
nombreuses  hypotheses  telles  que  Tether,  les  fluides  electriques, 
lumineux,  caloriques,  nerveux,  Patome  lui-meme,  que  nous  sa- 
vons  bien  n'etre  que  des  sym  boles,  des  moyens  commjodes  pour 
•expliquer  les  phenomenes,  et  que  noiis  maintenons  tout  de 
mfeme."  F.  Det.,  432 ;  cf.  ibid.,  XVII. 
And  again: 

"La  Nature  est  imniorale.  .  .  Mais  dans  la  conscience 
s'eleve  une  voix  sainte  qui  parle  a  1'homme  d'un  tout  autre 
monde,  le  mpnde  de  Tideal,  le  inonde  de  la  verite,  de  la  bonte, 


332  BULLETIN   OF    THE    UNIVEKSITY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

de  la  justice.  S'il  n'y  avait  que  la  nature,  on  pourrait  se  de- 
mander  si  Dieu  est  necessaire.  Mais,  depuis  qu'il  a  existe  un 
honnete  homime,  Dieu  a  ete  prouve."  Frag.,  250.  Cf.  Job, 
XC;  Frag.,  321-323;  A.  S.,  17-18,  56,  58,  152-3,  477;  note 
26;  C.  d'Angl.,  6-7;  Dial.,  VI,  30-1,  38,  147;  Mor.  Or.,  II; 
Q.  C.,  235,  414. 

But  while  in  his  writings,  where  it  was  a  question  merely  of 
theorizing  on  the  subject,  we  find  both  sides  of  his  tempera- 
ment affirmed  in  turn;  it  was  tlte  rationalistic  side  that  seems 
to  have  prevailed  in  his  conduct  throughout.  It  was  this  pre- 
dominance of  the  intellect  over  the  emotions  and  the  will  which 
in  early  life  had  led  him  out  of  the  church ;  and  this  event,  in  a 
psychological  view  of  his  development,  was  by  far  the  most  im- 
portant of  his  life. 

His  separation  from  the  church,  in  fact,  marks  the  epoch  of 
his  mental  growth  when  the  torturing  strain  of  his  opposite 
tendencies  had  become  unbearable,  and  it  is  impossible  to  sepa- 
rate a  study  of  the  causes  of  his  contradictions  from  an  exam- 
ination of  the  factors  which  produced  this  central  crisis  in  his 
life.  The  same  causes  operate  in  both  cases.  It  was  the  sharp 
distinction  Between  the  rational  and  the  emotional  nature  which 
his  studies  had  led  him  to  observe,  combined  with  the  unfinality 
of  his  unusually  progressive  mind,  that  made  it  impossible  for 
him  to  continue  in  the  career  of  a  priest;  and  these  same  ulti- 
mate factors,  intellectual  duality  and  progressive  unfinality,  are 
responsible  for  many  of  the  contradictions  in  his  work. 

Indeed,  the  more  closely  one  examines  the  psychological  fac- 
tors of  his  apostacy,  the  more  does  this  crisis  appear  as  an  ex- 
periment, under  exceptionally  favorable  conditions,  with  the 
Cartesian  principle  of  objective  reason,  rigorously  and  consist- 
ently applied  in  the  sphere  of  theology  and  religion.  It  wa& 
Descartes  and  Malebranche,  far  more  than  Strauss  or  Gesenius, 
that  led  him  away  from1  the  faith  of  his  childhood.25 

His  intense  rationalism  at  the  time  of  his  apostacy  is  in  strik- 
ing contrast  with  the  poetic  idealism  of  his  early  surroundings ; 
and  these  opposite  temperaments  no  doubt  underlie  that  system- 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.  333 

atic  two-sidedness  so  obtrusively  characteristic  of  all  his  philo- 
sophic speculations. 

For  the  idealistic  side,  his  "moral  romanticism"  as  he  calls 
it,  no  explanation  seeins  necessary,  or  rather  none  is  possible, 
beyond  the  general  recognition  of  environmental  pressure,  the 
passive  contagion  of  example  and  precept,  working  upon  he- 
reditary predispositions  in  the  same  direction.  The  general 
character  of  these  influences  has  been  sufficiently  indicated  in 
an  earlier  chapter. 

For  the  rational  side,  however,  which  represents  a  later  de- 
velopment, it  is  possible  to  assign  more  specific  causes,  and 
these  must  now  be  briefly  set  forth. 

The  more  closely  one  looks  at  Kenan's  early  development, 
the  more  does  the  course  he  actually  followed  appear  to  have 
been  inevitable.  Everything,  after  liis  removal  to  Paris, 
seems  to-  have  combined  to  undo  the  work  of  his  childhood  sur- 
roundings, by  which  he  had  been  moulded  for  sixteen,  years. 

The  mere  geographical  change,  from  the  quiet  seclusion  of 
T'reguier  to  cosmopolitan,  glittering  Paris,  marks  an  epoch  in 
his  mental  development.  It  was  not  merely  a  transfer  from 
country  to  city,  but  a  change  to  a  different  civilization ;  a  sud- 
den leap  from  medievalism  into  the  modern  age. 

At  Treguier  he  had  been  in  actual  contact,  he  tells  us,  with  the 
primitive  woirld.  The  most  remote  past  was  still  in  existence 
in  Brittany  up  to  1830.  The  life  of  the  fourteenth  and  fif- 
teenth centuries  was  daily  before  the  eyes  of  those  who  lived 
in  the  towns.  In  the  country,  the  epoch  of  the  Welsh  emdgra'- 
tion?  the  fifth  and  sixth  centuries,  was  plainly  visible  to  the 
practiced  eye. 

"Le  paganisme  se  degageait  derriere  la  couche  chretienne, 
souvent  fort  transparente.  A  cela  se  melaient  des  traits  d'un 
monde  plus  vieux  encore,  quo  j'ai  retrouve  chez  les  Lapons. 
En  visitant,  en  1870,  avec  le  prince  Napoleon,  les  huttes  d'un 
eamipement  de  Lapons,  pres  de  Trom&oe,  je  cms  plus  d'une 
fois,  dans  des  types  de  femmes  et  d'enfants,  dans  certains 
traits,  dans  certaines  habitudes,  voir  ressusciter  devant  moi 
mes  plus  anciens  souvenirs."  Souv.,  87-8. 


334  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVEBSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

For  the  possibility  of  going  to  Paris  he  was  indebted,  next 
to  his  own  industry  and  talents,  to  his  sister  Henriette.  In 
the  summer  of  1838  he  had  won  all  the  prizes  of  his  class  at 
Tregiiier  college,  an  achievement  which  enabled  his  sister,  then 
a  school-teacher  in  Paris,  to  procure  him!  admission  without 
cost  to  the  famous  little  boarding-school,  Saint-Nicolas  du 
Ohardonnet.  Lett.  Sem.,  1-2.  He  was  in  his  sixteenth  year. 
After  a  two  days'  journey — there  were  no  railroads  of  course 
— ,  he  was  set  down  among  scenes  as  novel  to  him;  as  if  he  had 
comle  direct  from  Tahiti  or  Timibuctoo. 

"Un  lama  bouddhiste  on  un  faquir  mrusulman,  transporte  en 
un  clin  d'oeil  d'Asie  en  plein  boulevard,  serait  moins  surpris 
que  je  ne  le  fus  en  tombant  subitement  dans  un  milieu  aussi 
different  de  celui  de  mes  vieux  pretres  de  Bretagne."  Souv., 
172. 

Nor  was  it  his  immjediate  surroundings  alone, — mother, 
teachers,  companions  and  playmates — of  which  he  was  de- 
prived  by  this  change  of  abode;  all  his  habits  of  life  were 
broken  through.  Even  the  church  itself,  Parisian  Catholi- 
cism, was  so  widely  different  from  the  Catholicism  of  Tre- 
guier  in  which  he  had  grown  up,  as  to  be  in  effect  a  different 
religion. 

"Ma  venue  a  Paris  fut  le  passage  d'une  religion  a  une  autre. 

.  .  .  Ce  fut  la  crise  la  plus  grave  de  ma  vie."  Souv., 
172-3. 

This  sharp  contrast  between  the  old  and  the  new  could 
hardly  fail  to>  invite  comparison  and  provoke  criticism.  The 
Treguier  in  his  memory  and  the  Paris  around  him,  the  naive 
sincerity  of  the  vie  spontanee  and  the  polish  and  tact  of  the 
vie  reflechie,  were  too  incongruous  to  exist  side  by  side  in  the 
same  mind  without  starting  the  machinery  of  reflection,  com- 
parison and  criticism,.  Up  to  this  time  his  ideas  and  ideals 
had  been  shaped  by  authority,  example  and  habit;  they  were 
now  to  be  placed  on  a  rational  basis  of  his  own  construction. 

In  later  life  Kenan  saw  very  clearly  the  imtmense  signifi- 
cance of  this  change.  He  indeed  declares  it  to  have  been  the 
primary  cause  not  only  of  his  leaving  the  church,  but  of  all  the 


BKAUEB, THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.  335 

subsequent  phases  of  development  to  which,  this  separation  in 
turn  was  to  lead. 

"II  est  bien  probable  que,  si  un  incident  exterieur  n'etait 
venu  me  tirer  brusquement  du  milieu  honnete,  m,ais  borne,  o<u 
s'etait  passee  mon  en-f  ance,  j'aurais  conserve  toute  ma  vie  la  foi 
qui  m'etait  apparue  d'abord  comme  I'expression  absolue  de  la 
verite."  Souv.,  130-1;  158. 

"An  fond,  quand  je  m'etudie,  j'ai  en  effet  tres  peu  change; 
le  sort  m'avait  en  quelque  sorte  rive  des  Tenfance  a  la  fonction 
que  jo  devais  accomplir.  J'etais  fait  en  arrivant  a  Paris; 
avant  de  quitter  la  Bretagne,  ma  vie  etait  ecrite  d'avance.v 
Souv.,  73. 

The  effects  of  his  transplantation  were  still  further  inten- 
sified by  his  going  home  for  the  sumjmer  vacations.  In  this- 
way  the  contrast  was  kept  fresh  in  his  mind.  We  may  imag- 
ine the  reflections  of  the  young  student,  modernized  and 
rationalized  more  and  more  as  the  years  went  by,  and  with  the 
same  exemption  he  had  always  enjoyed  from  manual  toil,  as 
he  contemplated  the  customs  and  studied  the  minds  of  the  un- 
sophisticated, naively  religious,  sincere,  conservative,  virtuous 
rustics  around  him. 

At  school,  too,  during  his  three  years  at  Saint  Nicolas,  the  in- 
tellectual atmosphere  was  as  different  as  possible  from  that  at 
Treguier  College.  He  had  come  to  Paris,  he  says,  with  a  com- 
plete moral  training,  but  ignorant  to  the  last  degree.  With  the 
exception  of  mathematics  and  ancient  languages,  in  which  he 
had  laid  a  good  foundation,  he  had  everything  to  learn.  Of  sci- 
ence, history  and  modern  literatures  he  knew  nothing.  It 
was  a  great  surprise  to  him,  he  tells  us,  when  he  found  that 
there  was  such  a  thing  as  a  learned,  lay-man.  He  discovered 
that  antiquity  and  the  church  are  not  everything,  and  ceased 
to  look  upon  the  death  of  Louis  XIV  as  marking  the  end  of 
the  world. 

"Le  monde  s'ouvrit  pour  moi.  .  .  Saint-Nicolas  etait  a 
cette  epoque  la  maison  la  plus  brillante  et  la  plus  mondaine. 

.  .  Mes  vieux  pretres  de  Bretagne  savaient  bien  mieux  les 
mathemlatiques  et  le  latin  que  mes  nouveaux  maitres;  mais  ils 


336  BULLETIN   OF   THE    UNIVERSCTY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

vivaient  dans  des  catacombes  sans  lumiere  et  sans  air.  Ici, 
Tatmosphere  du  siecle  circulait  librement.  Hugo  et  La- 
martine  me  remplissaient  la  tete.  Je  compris  la  gloire,  que 
j 'avals  cherchee  si  vaguement  a  la  voute  de  la  chapelle  de  Tre- 
guier.  .  .  Les  mots  talent,  eclat,  reputation  eurent  un  sens 
pour  moi.  J'etais  perdu  pour  Tideal  modeste  que  mes  anciens 
maitres  mfavaient  inculque."  Souv.,  185-6. 

His  early  ideals,  though  not  in  reality  discarded,  were  laid 
aside  for  a  time,  and  a  new  direction  given  to  his  ambition. 
His  three  years  at  Saint  Nicolas  had  completely  transformed 
him).  From  a  poor  little  country  lad  struggling  vainly  to 
emerge  from!  his  shell,  he  had  grown  to  be  a  young  man  of  re- 
markable alertness  and  quick  perceptions.  Souv.,  195. 

When  from  this  school  he  passed,  in  1841,  to  the  theological 
seminary  at  Issy,  he  was  obliged  once  mtore  to  adjust  himself 
to  a  different  medium,  in  respect  both  of  teachers  and  studies. 
His  new  instructors  recalled  to  his  mind  the  venerable  priests 
of  Treguier  College,  who  had  always  seemed  to  him:,  with  their 
heavy,  old-fashioned  copes,  like  the  magi,  from  whose  lips 
came  the  eternal  truths.  Souv.,  11.  His  readings,  too,  again 
became  mjore  austere.  The  superficial  rhetoric  of  Saint  Nicr 
olas2  as  he  retrospectively  calls  it, — somewhat  unfairly,  it 
would  seem.  Of.  Lett.  Sem.,  38,  131 — was  replaced  by  nat- 
ural philosophy,  logic,  mjathemtatics  and  history.  Hugo  and 
Lamartine  were  exchanged  for  Pascal  and  Malebranche,  and 
he  applied  himself,  besides,  to  Eiuler  and  Leibnitz,  Descartes, 
Locke,  Eeid,  and  Dugald  Stewart. 

Among  the  texts  which  served  as  a  basis  for  instruction  at 
Issy;  during  two  years,  one  was  destined  to  be  of  special  sig- 
nificance in  .his  mental  evolution.  This  was  the  so-called 
Philosophic  d-e  Lyon,  a  kind  of  Cartesian  scholasticism  com- 
piled in  the  eighteenth  century  by  the  Jansenist  arch-bishop 
of  Lyons,  and  which  bears  the  ominous  title:  Institutiones 
Philosophicae,  Auctoritate  D.  D.  Archiepiscopi  Lugdunensis 
Ad  Usum  Scholarum  Suae  Dioecesis  Editae. 

This  treatise  is  divided  into  three  parts,  dealing  respectively 
with  logic,  metaphysics  and  physics.  The  following  sample, 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      337 

laken  almost  at  random,  may  serve  to  indicate  the  general  char- 
acter and  method  of  this  work: 

"Part  III,  Physica  Specialis,  sen  de  Terra  et  Corporibus 
Terrestribus.  Sectio  Prima,  Capitis  Primi:  De  Igne. 

Propositio:  Ignis  est  fluidum,  ubique  diffusum,  cujus  partes 
sunt  tenuissimae,  elasticae,  rigidae,  motuque  pernicissimo  agi- 
tatae." 

Various  questions  are  then  discussed  concerning  the  proper- 
ties of  fire  and  the  mode  of  its  action  upon  bodies,  and  finally 
directions  given  for  experiments  with  fire.  Whenever  it  seems 
to  the  author  that  the  propositions  affirmed  in  the  text  are 
likely  to  be  called  in  question,  a  number  of  possible  objections 
are  disposed  of,  by  hook  or  by  crook,  under  the  separate  head- 
ing: Solvuntur  Objecia. 

In  this  separate  heading  Renan  very  soon,  took  a  special  in- 
terest, and  more  often  than  not  the  objections  discussed  were 
his  own,  i 

"Ces  objections  sont  ensuite  resolues,  souvent  d'une  maniere 
qui  laisse  tout©  leur  force  aux  idees  heterodoxes  qu'on  pretend 
reduire  a  neant  Ainsi,  sous  le  couvert  de  refutations  faibles, 
tout  Fensemble  des  indees  modernes  ve.na.it  a  no^us.'7  Souv., 
248. 

Thus  was  his  critical  faculty  provoked  and  his  rationalism 
encouraged  more  and  more,  and  his  Catholic  faith  undermined, 
even,  by  the  very  studies  which  were  intended  to  establish  that 
faith  on  firnii  and  stable  foundations. 

"Dans  un  tel  systcme,"  he  writes  nearly  half  a  century  la- 
ter, "la  raison  est  avant  toute  chose,  la  raisoii  prouve  la  reve- 
lation, la  divinite  de  I'ficriture  et  Tautorite  de  1'figlise.  Cela 
fait,  la  porte  est  ouverte  a  toutes  les  deductions.  .  .  .  Ce 
n'est  pas  ma  faute  si  mes  maitres  m'avaient  enseigne  la  lo- 
gique,  et,  par  leurs  argumentations  impitoyables,  avaient  fait 
de  mon  esprit  un  tranchant  d'acier."  Souv.,  281,  303.  Also 
cf.  246,  296-7,  341,  318-19,  389. 

The  first  result  of  this  course  in  theological  dialectics,  which 
at  least  afforded  an  excellent  drill  in  deductive  logic,  was  to 
destroy  completely  "Renan's  confidence  in  scholastic  methods  of 
9 


338  BULLETIN   OF   THE    UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

testing  and  establishing  truth.  Souv.,  250.  Yet  it  was  by 
mjeans  of  these  very  methods  that  his  growing  doubts  were  to 
be  dispelled  and  his  tottering  faith  renewed.  The  result 
might  have  been  predicted. 

Still  further  were  his  rationalistic  tendencies  encouraged  by 
the  extreme  solitude  to  which  his  manner  of  living  condemned 
him  in  the  seminaries.  During  his  two  years  at  Issy,  he  tells 
us,  he  never  once  sought  permission  to  see  Paris.  It  is  true 
that  he  indulged  in  occasional  outings  with  the  rest  of 
the  school  (Lett.  Sera.,  58,  70,  107,  113,  114,  119,  144,  149- 
50,  163,  174,  223,  288)  ;  but  at  home  he  appears  to  have  lived, 
to  himself,  like  the  veriest  hermit. 

His  books  were  his  world.  Even  in  recreation  hours,  instead 
of  joining  in  the  games,  he  would  pass  the  time  on  a  seat  in  the 
grounds,  reading  philosophic  disquisitions  about  the  existence 
of  God,  (how  significant!)  and  trying  to  keep  warm  in  the  win- 
ter by  wearing  several  overcoats. 

Such  a  life  of  reflection  and  study,  of  introspective  seclu- 
sion and  turning-away  from  matters  of  present  and  practical 
moment,  combined  with  physical  inaction,  was  certain  to  leave 
permanent  traces  in  his  mind  no  less  than  his  body. 

"Ma  croissance  etait  a  peine  achevee;  ma  taille  se  voutait. 
Mais  ma  passion  Pemporta.  Je  m'y  livrai  avec  d'autant  plus 
de  securite  que  je  la  croyais  bonne.  C' etait  une  sorte  de  fu- 
reur;  mais  pouvais-je  croire  que  Tardeur  de  penser,  que 
je  voyais  louer  .  .  .  f  fit  blamable  et  dut  me  mener  a  un 
resultat  que  j'eusse  repousse  de  toutes  mes  forces  si  j'avais  pu 
1'entrevoir  ?"  Souv.,  244-5. 

'His  reason  for  being  so  exclusively  devoted  to  books  at  this 
timte  becomes  clear  on  reading  his  letters,  especially  those  to 
his  sister.  He  was  busy  transferring  the  faith  of  his  child- 
hood from  the  rock  of  tradition  to  the  arid  sands  of  Cartesian 
psychology;  and  his  sister  was  the  only  person  in  the  world  to 
whomi  he  could  turn  for  effective  sympathy  in  this  struggle  to 
get  rid  of  his  doubts  through  a  process  of  rational  conviction. 
But  she  was  now  far  away.  Since  January,  1841,  she  had 
left  Paris  to  accept  a  position  as  governess  in  Poland,  which  in 


BRATJER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EKNEST  KENAN.  339 

those  days  was  several  weeks  distant,  and  where  she  remained  in 
bitter  exile  for  ten  long  years.  It  is  to  this  separation  that  we 
owe  the  beautiful  volume,  Letires  Iniimes,  every  reader  of 
which  has  learned  to  pronounce  the  name  of  Henriette  Kenan 
with  profound  respect. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  her  letters  did  more  than  any 
other  single  influence  to  determine  the  course  of  Renan's  life. 
Cf.  Lett.  Sem,  1-2,  26,  33,  102,  104,  136,  161,  173,  259,  327. 
It  is  true  that  she  never  attempted  to  influence  her  brother's 
beliefs  directly,  but  her  indirect  influence  was  all  the  greater. 
Again  and  again  she  exhorts  him,  implores  himi,  to  be  honest 
with  the  truth;  to  make  no  concessions  to  fear,  nor  compro- 
mise with  expediency.  Truth  and  duty  alone,  his  own  rea- 
son and  his  own  conscience,  the  mjost  absolute  intellectual  and 
moral  integrity,  she  never  wearies  of  insisting,  must  decide  so 
weighty  a  question.  Cf.  Lett  Sem.,  326. 

When  his  studies  were  drawing  to  a  close  and  the  time  ap- 
proached for  him  to  decide  irrevocably  whether  w  not  he 
would  continue  in  his  priestly  career,  she  sent  him,  through  a 
friend,  out  of  her  own  hard-earned  savings,  the  sum]  of  1,500 
francs  for  immediate  needs,  in  order  that  he  might  feel 
entirely  free,  so  far  as  irrelevant  considerations  of  livelihood 
were  concerned,  to  decide  either  for  or  against  remaining  in 
the  church. 

But  with  all  her  womanly  sympathy  and  inexhaustible  sis- 
terly love  it  is  certain  that  the  net  result  of  her  influence  was 
only  to  exalt  still  further  the  office  of  reason  in  the  process  of 
forming  and  sifting  religious  beliefs.  By  always  insisting 
that  he  must  fight  out  the  battle  for  himself  and  think  his  own 
way  out  of  his  difficulties,  guided  by  reason  and  conscience 
alone,  she  still  further  confirmed  his  own  conception  of  reason 
as  the  sole  and  ultimate  arbiter  of  all  truth.  It  is  an  interest 
ing  fact  that  this  same  sister,  the  guardian  angel  of  his  early 
life,  as  Madame  Darmsteter  very  propeorly  calls  her,  who  in 
his  childhood  had  taken  himi  by  the  hand  on  winter  evenings 
to  prayers  in  the  village  cathedral,  sheltered  from  snow  and 
rain  under  the  ample  folds  of  her  cloak;  this  same  sister  in 


34:0  BULLETIN    OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

later  years,  his  cloud  by  day  and  pillar  of  fire  by  night,  as  he 
himself  describes  her,  was  to  lead  him  away  from  that  self- 
same faith  in  which  she  had  cradled  his  earliest  youth. 

And  if  it  is  true  that  hers  was  the  leading  influence  in  her 
brother's  apostacy,  must  we  not  say  that  his  very  decision  to 
repress  or  ignore  all  the  promptings'  of  emotion  or  passion,  and 
to  follow  pure  reason  alone,  was  itself  the  result  of  a  passional 
impulse :  the  omnipotent  love  of  a  sister  ?  It  was  not  merely 
his  own  faith  in  reason ;  it  was  still  more  his  faith  in  his  sister's 
faith,  that  led  to  this  crisis  in  his  life. 

This  chapter  has  failed  of  its  purpose  if  it  has  not  brought 
into  clear  relief  the  powerful  contrast  between  the  environmen- 
tal influences  at  work  on  Renan  during  his  studies  in  Paris,  and 
those  which  had  moulded  his  character  in  Brittany  up  to  his 
sixteenth  year. 

His  removal  to  Paris,  seven  years  of  diligent  study  and  ex- 
tensive reading,  and  much  reflection;  an  intellectual  and  spir- 
itual solitude  broken  only  by  the  frequent  letters  of  his  distant 
sister,  who  essentially  reinforced  the  ultra-rationalistic  ten- 
dencies of  his  favorite  authors:  all  these  influences  from 
within  and  without  combined  to  superimpose  on  his  ear- 
lier character  a  second  self,  and  make  him  a  man  of  opposite 
temperaments  and  correspondingly  opposite  ideals.  The 
saintly  and  the  worldly  ideals,  for  ever  at  feud  in  literature  as 
in  life,  are  reflected  in  his  writings  alternately,  according  as 
the  Treguier  or  the  Parisian  self  is  holding  the  pen. 

Before  concluding  this  chapter  with  an  estimiate  of  Kenan's 
life  and  work  as  a  whole,  it  may  be  of  interest  to  note  with 
what  feelings  he  himself  looked  back  upon  his  career.  We 
shall  find  that  his  judgment  is  different  according  as  he  con- 
templates his  past  life  from  the  point  of  view  of  greatest  enr 
joyment  for  himself,  or  of  making  the  most  of  his  opportun- 
ities in  behalf  of  humanity  at  large. 

Few  great  writers  have  been  more  deeply  convinced  that  life 
is  a  good, — the  mere  living.  His  Souvenirs  concludes  with  the 
words : 

"Mon  experience  de  la  vie  a  done  ete  fort  douce,  et  je  ne 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      341 

crois  pas  qu'il  y  ait  eu  beaucoup  d'etres  plus  heu- 

reux  que  moi.  .  .  .  J'ai  tant  joui  dans  cette  vie,  que  je 
n'ai  vraiment  pas  le  droit  de  reclaimer  une  compensation 
d'outre-tombe.  L'infinie  bonte  que  j'ai  rencontree  en  ce  monde 
m'inspire  la  conviction  que  Peternite  est  remplie  par  une  bonte 
non  moindre,  en  qui  j'ai  une  confiance  absolue.  L'existence 
qui  m'a  ete  donnee  sans  que  je  1'eusse  demandee  a  ete  pour 
moi  un  bienfait.  Si  elle  m'etait  offerte,  je  Paccepterais  de 
nouveau  avec  reconnaissance."  Sonv.,  373-8. 

Similar  statements  abound  in  his  books.  From  a  hedon- 
istic point  of  view  no  one  ever  surveyed  his  own  life  with  more 
genuine  self-satisfaction. 

"Tout  pese,  si  j'avais  a  recommencer  ma  vie,  avec  le  droit 
d'y  faire  des  ratures,  je  n'y  changerais  rien,"  Souv.,  362. 

aSon  ideal  ne  depasse  pas  la  realite,"  complains  M.  Seailles, 
<CI1  ne  congoit  pas  mieux  que  la  vie  d'un  homme  commen§ant 
comane  il  a  commence  pour  finir  comnie  il  finit."  E,  R.,  324. 

But  Renan  has  himself  forestalled  this  criticism.  For  a 
very  different  tone  is  adopted  in  speaking  of  his  own  past  when- 
ever he  considers  what  might  have  been  done,  with  his  talents 
and  opportunities,  for  civilization  at  large  through  the  ad- 
vancement of  science. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  rational  progress  was,  after  all, 
his  highest  ideal,  and  the  advancement  of  science  his  real  re- 
ligion. No  one  familiar  with  his  work  as  a  whole  will  dispute 
his  own  confession  on  this  point: 

"Les  mathematiques  et  Tinduction  physique  ont  toujours 
ete  les  elements  fondamentaux  de  mon  esprit,  les  seules  pier- 
res  de  ma  batisse  qui  n'aient  jamais  change  d'assise  et  qui  ser- 
vent  toujours."  Souv.,  251.  Cf.  Dr.  Ph.,  111.  Cf.  Lett 
Sem.,  5,  15,  16,  41,  164,  344. 

It  is  said  that  after  his  death  there  was  found  in  his  desk 
a  piece  of  paper  on  which  he  had  written  the  words: 

"De  tout  ce  que  j'ai  fait,  c'est  le  Corpus  que  j'aime 
le  mieux."  This  was  the  Corpus  Inscriptionum  Semiticarum. 

Rerian's  predilection  for  positive  science  and  exact  scholar- 
ship explains  his  frequent  regrets  at  having  devoted  his  life 


342  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

to  history  and  literature,  instead  of  to  natural  science.26  When- 
ever in  later  life  he  recalled  the  extreme  interest  he  had  early 
felt  in  biological  science,  and  compared  his  own  achievements 
with  the  undying  fame  of  a  Darwin,  he  seems  to  have  looked 
with  envy  upon  the  work  of  his  English  contemporary,  whose 
epoch-making  demonstrations  he  might,  as  he  later  believed, 
have  partly  anticipated. 

"Je  serais  sorti  du  seminaire  sans  avoir  fait  d'hebreu  ni  de 
theologie?  La  physiologic  et  les  sciences  naturelles  m'aurai- 
ent  entraine ;  or,  je  peux  bien  le  dire,  Pardeur  extreme  que  ces 
sciences  vitales  excitaient  dans  mon  esprit  me  fait  croire  que, 
si  je  les  avais  cultivees  d'une  fagon  suivie,  je  fusse  arrive  a 
plusieurs  des  resultats  de  Darwin,  que  j'entrevoyais."  Souv., 
262-3. 

"C'est  a  en  donner  le  frisson/7  exclaims  M.  Scherer,  "et  nous 
Favons  echappe  belle.  M.  Renan,  je  n'en  doute  pas,  avait 
tout  ce  qu'il  faut  pour  etre  un  Darwin,  mais  Darwin,  lui,  ne 
nous  aurait  pas  rendu  notre  Renan."  fit.  litt.  con,,  VIII,  p. 
98. 

But  Renan's  readers  doubtless  have  no  occasion  to  regret  his 
alienation  from  natural  science;  nor,  most  probably,  have  the 
readers  of  Darwin.  Renan  could  hardly  have  improved  upon 
the  Origin  of  Species,  to  say  the  least;  and  who  would  have 
written  the  Vie  de  Jesus? 

The  simple  truth  is  that  Renan's  regret  over  what  -might 
have  been  was,  as  usual,  a  quarrelling  with  the  inevitable ;  for 
it  is  safe  to  say,  in  view  of  his  dominant  interests  at  the  time, 
that  he  never  was  really  free  to  exchange  the  library  for  the 
laboratory.  At  every  step  in  his  progress,  from  his  schooldays 
at  Treguier  to  his  apostacy  in  1845,  and  thence  forward,  his 
work  in  the  future  seems  predetermined,  in  general  outline  at 
least,  by  the  intellectual  and  spiritual  momentum  acquired 
through  his  work  in  the  past.  Not  indeed  in  the  sense  that 
no  other  course  was  possible,  but  in  the  sense  that  no  other 
could  have  seemed  reasonable.  It  is  not  meant  that  the  im- 
pelling necessity  was  a  species  of  fatalism  independent  of  his 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      343 

own  personality ;  it  was  simply  his  own  endeavor  to  make  the 
most  of  past  acquisitions. 

His  entrance  upon  a  theological  career,  to  begin  with,  was 
not  in  any  sense  a  matter  of  free  choice.  Almost  fromi  in- 
fancy he  had,  been  destined  for  the  priesthood. 

"Petals  ne  pretre  a  priori,  comme  tant  d'autres  naissent 
miilitaires,  miagistrats."  Souv.,  153.  Of.  ibid.,  309. 

"Mes  maitres  me  rendirent  tellement  impropre  a  toute  be- 
sogne  temfporelle,  que  je  fus  frappe  d'une  marque  irrevocable 
pour  la  vie  spirituelle."  Souv.,  135 ;  also  140.  Cf.  Lett. 
Sem.,  196-7,  202,  238,  279. 

Fatherless  at  the  age  of  five,  his  early  education  was  left 
entirely  to  women  and  priests.  In  the  little  Treguier  seminr 
ary,  everything,  example  no  less  than  precept,  impelled  him  in 
the  direction  of  theology.  All  his  fellow  students,  unless  they 
failed  in  their  studies,  became  priests  as  a  matter  of  course. 
Souv.,  137,  153-4.  Studious  and  gifted  as  he  was,  therefore, 
the  possibility  of  a  lay  career  never  for  a  moment  entered 
his  mind.  His  teachers  were  his  living  ideals ;  and  his  highest 
ambition  was  to  be  like  unto  them, — a  priest.  Souv.,  II ;  140. 
How  indeed  can  a  child  be  properly  said  to  choose  a  calling, 
having  no  comparative  knowledge  whatever,  either  of  the  pro- 
fessions among  which  he  is  expected  to  choose,  nor  of  his  own 
capacities  or  aptitudes  for  such  professions? 

In  his  later  period  Kenan  took  every  opportunity  to  say  pleas- 
ant things  about  his  early  teachers,  and  about  the  education  they 
imparted.  Souv.,  134—5.  It  was  to  those  stern-visaged,  aus- 
tereKmannered  monks,  he  very  truthfully  says,  that  he  owed  the 
best  that  was  in  him.  Souv.,  11.  But,  of  course,  these  men 
were  as  far  as  possible  from!  creating  in  their  pupils  an  interest 
for  natural  science,  as  he  further  explains,  Souv.,  130-5,  and 
his  admiration  for  their  persons  merely  shows  how  strong  was 
the  bond  by  which  he  was  bound  to  the  church.  Even  after  his 
transfer  to  Paris,  in  the  autumn  of  1838,  there  was  no  provo- 
cation, during  his  four  years  at  St.  Nicolas,  and  in  fact  no  op- 
portunity for  a  change  of  career.  Souv.,  169,  180,  195.  It  is 
quite  certain,  indeed,  according  to  numerous  passing  allusions 


344  BULLETIN    OF    THE    UNIVERSITY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

in  his  letters  of  the  time,  that  his  interest  in  science  was  not 
aroused  till  1841,  when  he  entered  the  seminary  at  Issy.  It 
was  there  that  he  first  developed  that  aversion  for  metaphysics 
and  admiration  of  positive  science  which  he  retained  to  the  end. 
Souv.,  250,  297-8. 

Here,  then,  for  the  first  time,  was  there  a  parting  of 
the  ways,  and  an  opportunity  to  change  his  course;  and 
the  question  arises  why,  despite  his  recently  acquired  en- 
thusiasm for  science  and  distrust  of  metaphysics,  he  still 
went  on  with  his  theological  course.  There  were  several 
reasons.  Apart  from  the  influence  of  his  directors  and  con- 
fessors, the  power  of  mental  inertia  and  of  daily  routine, 
and  what  may  be  called  the  contagion  of  personal  and  material 
surroundings,  his  letters  of  the  time  make  it  plain  that,  between 
Issy  and  St.  Sulpice,  in  reality  only  different  branches  of  the 
same  institution,  there  was  no  halting-place.  There  was  no 
inducement  to  change,  and  there  was  every  inducement  to  go  on. 
It  is  1rue  that,  at  this  critical  period  of  his  life,  he  was  contin- 
ually agitated  by  religious  doubts,  provoked  by  his  readings  in 
philosophy  and  encouraged  by  the  letters  of  his  sister  (Cf.  Lett. 
Int.,  39  .  But  he  had  not  gone  far  enough  yet  in  his  studies  to 
be  entirely  certain  that,  in  this  conflict  between  doubt  and 
dogma,  doubt  was  right  and  dogma  wrong.  Souv.,  319.  It 
was  not  till  several  years  later,  when  suspicion  had  ripened  into 
conviction,  that  he  had  the  courage  to  break  with  his  past;  a.nd 
even  then  the  immediate  occasion  was  an  external  pressure. 
Souv.,  392-3.  Indeed,  when  we  consider  his  sister's  constant 
warnings  against  hasty  and  final  committal  to  a  career  he  mio-ht 
one  day  regret,  the  fact  that  he  did  not  change  alone  affords  a 
strong  presumption  that  he  could  not.  His  professors,  more- 
over, who  had  the  advantage  of  being  also  his  confessors,  urged 
him  onward  in  his  clerical  course,  Souv.,  260-1,  271-2,  405; 
and  their  reasons,  all  the  miore  persuasive  for  his  own  indecision 
and  lack  of  financial  means,  finally  prevailed  over  the  gentler,, 
and  it  must  be  admitted  the  wiser,  counsels  of  his  sister. 

The  only  other  period  of  his  life  when  he  mjight  reasonably 
have  turned  to  natural  science  was  immediately  after  his  seces- 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.  345 

sion  from  the  church,  in  1845.  The  opportunity  was  all  the 
more  favorable  as  his  new  position  brought  him,  into  intimate 
relations  with  M.  Berthelot,  then,  like  himself,  laying  the  foun- 
dations of  his  future  greatness.  But  here  again  his  letters  show 
that  the  course  he  actually  pursued  was  inevitable.  He  was 
now  22  years  old,  well  versed  in  Hebrew  and  biblical  studies 
generally,  and  with  a  power  over  the  pen  which  gave  promise  of 
success  as  a  writer.  On  the  other  hand,  there  was  nothing  in 
his  prospects  to  tempt  him  to  abandon  the  way  on  which  he  had 
now  gone  so  far.  A  change  to  biological  science  would  appear 
to  have  been  the  least  possible  of  all,  for  he  lacked  at  this  junc- 
ture, as  he  himself  declares,  the  most  essential  quality  of  the 
scientist:  the  capacity  for  specialization,  Souv.,  397-9;  402. 
Cf.  A.  S.,  11-12;  Seailles,  E.  K,.,  31. 

In  truth,  the  struggles  involved  in  his  recent  apostacy  ha,d 
made  too  deep  a  groove  in  h.is  mind ;  he  was  too  much  preoccu- 
pied in  thought  and  feeling  with  the  creeds  he  had  just  dis- 
carded, to  be  able  to  settle  down  calmly  to  the  patient  plodding- 
of  laboratory  experimentation.  The  inner  momentum  of  his 
whole  being,  naturally  enough,  impelled  him  in  the  direction  of 
religious  reform,  and  there  was  no  external  influence  to  deflect 
him  from-  this  path.  Like  St.  Paul — the  comparison  is  his 
own — his  purpose  in  life  was  summed  up  in  the  wish:  ffcupio 
ommes  fieri  quails  et  ego  sum/'  Souv.,  404.  In  his  then  con- 
dition of  mind,  secular  science  seemed  to  him  unworthy  a  mo- 
ment's serious  thought,  save  in  so  far  as  it  might  take  the  place 
of  religion  in  human  life.  A.  S.,  38-9.  Cf.  So<uv.,  398. 

"J'etais  terriblement  depayse,"  he  writes  of  this  period 
nearly  half  a  century  later.  "lAmivers  me  faisa.it  Peffet  d'un 
desert  sec  et  f raid.  Du  moment  que  le  christianisme  n'etait  nas 
la  verite,  le  reste  me  parut  indifferent,  frivole,  a  peine  digne 
d'interet.  I/ecroulement  de  ma  vie  sur  elle-meme  mje  laissait 
un  sentiment  de  vide  comnie  celui  qui  suit  un  acces  de  fievre  on 
un  amour  brise."  Souv.,  330. 

"Si  la  science  devait  rester  ce  qu'elle  est,  il  faudrait  la  subir 
en  la  maudissant ;  car  elle  a  detruit,  et  elle  n'a  pas  rebati ;  elle 
a  tire  Fhomme  d'un  doux  sommeil,  sans  lui  adoucir  la  realite."" 
A.  S.,  93. 


-346  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

We  must  not  forget  that  when  Renan  left  the  church,  he  was 
not  merely  discarding  a  creed,  but  renouncing  a  livelihood  as 
well,  and  a  career  for  which  all  his  past  life  had  aimed  to  pre- 
pare him.  Lett  Sem.,  279.  Such  a  step  is  not  taken  without 
;a  prolonged  intellectual  and  spiritual  struggle.  It  was  the 
battle  of  conscience  against  self-interest,  of  spirit  against  the 
claims  of  matter,  if  we  may  so  express  it,  subverting  the  very 
foundations  of  his  spiritual  self.  Such  a  crisis  must  perforce 
leave  its  mlark  in  the  mind  and  temperament  of  the  victim.  So 
with  Renan.  It  was  impossible  for  him  to  begin  work,  as  it 
were  de  novo,  in  a  field  unrelated  to  these  recent  struggles.  The 
most  pressing  need  of  the  mordent,  he  seems  to  have  felt,  was  to 
rebuild,  in  mjore  stately  form  if  possible,  the  shattered  mansions 
•of  his  faith.  Destruction  called  for  reconstruction,  very  nat- 
urally; and  this  led  to  an  independent,  historical  study  of  the 
Christian  religion,  eventually  resulting  in  the  well-known  vol- 
umes :  Les  Origines  du  Christiamsme  and  Uhistoire  du  Peuple 
d' 'Israel,  together  with  numerous  articles  and  essays  on  related 
subjects.  * 

"Une  seule  occupation  me  parut  digne  de  remplir  ma  vie: 
c'etait  de  poursuivre  mes  recherches  critiques  sur  le  christia- 
nisme  par  les  moyens  beaucoup  plus  larges  que  m'offrait  la 
science  lai'que."  Souv.,  343. 

"Le  livre  le  plus  important  du  dix-neuvieme  siecle,"  he 
•writes  in  1848,  "devrait  avoir  pour  titre:  Histoire  critique 
des  Origines  du  Christianisme.  Oeuvre  admirable  que  j'envie 
a  celui  qui  la  realisera,  et  qui  sera  celle  de  mon  age  mur,  si  la 
inort  et  tant  de  f  atalites  exterieures  .  .  .  ne  viennent  m'en 
empecher."  A.  S.,  279.  Cf.  ibid.  185 :  "Cette  merveilleuse 
histoire  qui,  executee  d'une  maniere  scientifique  et  definitive, 
revolutionnerait  la  pensee." 

At  the  time  of  his  apostacy,  therefore,  in  1845,  the  plan  of 
his  life  was  already  determined.  Indeed,  he  says  this  himself : 

"L'idee  qu'en  abandonnant  Tfiglise,  je  resterais  fidele  a  Jesus, 
s'empara  de  moi,  et,  si  j'avais  ete  capable  de  croire  aux  appari- 
tions, j'aurais  certainement  vu  Jesus  mie  disant:  "Abandonne- 
jnoi  pour  etre  mpn  disciple."  Cette  pensee  me  soutenait, 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  BENAN.      347 

hardissait.  Je  peux  dire  que,  des  lors,  la  Vie  de  Jesus  etait 
ecrite  dans  mon  esprit.  La  croyance  a  Teminente  personnalite 
de  Jesus,  qui  est  Tame  de  ce  livre,  avait  ete  ma  force  dans  ma 
lutte  contre  la  theologie.  Jesus  a  bien  reellement  toujours  ete 
mon  maitre."27  Souv.,  B.,  214.  Of.  A.  S.,  278-9. 

Tlie  fact  is  that,  notwithstanding  all  his  contradictions  of  de- 
tail, Kenan's  life  and  s^^^  as  a  whole  is  remarkable  for  its 
logical  development,  ^BBy  in  the  sense  of  being  an  almost 
passive  product  of  antecedent  conditions,  or  environmental 
pressure ;  but  in  the  higher  sense  of  adhering  to  the  principles 
and  maturing  the  plans  of  his  early  youth.  Cf .  Seailles,  E.  R., 
41. 

There  are  few  great  men  in  whose  lives  the  formative 
power  of  circumstances  is  more  evident,  or  less  interfered 
with  by  their  own  wills;  and  one  of  his  most  characteristic 
traits,  without  doubt,  is  the  predominance  of  intellect  and  feel- 
ing over  the  will.  As  Mr.  Babbitt  says,  the  masculine  religion 
of  the  will  was  sacrificed  to  the  feminine  religion  of  the  heart. 
•  Cf.  Hahrenholtz,  E.  K,  93. 

But  when  we  contemplate  the  circumstances  of  his  life,  this 
is  not  in  the  least  surprising.  We  have  already  noted  in  pass- 
ing that  everything  in  his  life,  from  earliest  childhood  on, 
favored  a  subordination  of  the  will  to  feeling  and  intellect. 
We  recall  that  he  was  brought  up  by  women  and  priests.  Of. 
F.  Det.,  XXX;  Souv.,  153 ;  YIII-IX,  14-15,  33-4,  114.  His 
delicate  health  as  a  child  debarred  him  from  participating  in 
the  self-asserting,  will-developing,  rough-and-tumble  sports  of 
the  boys,  who  laughed  at  his  delicacy  and  called  him  "made- 
moiselle." In  his  home  there  was  no  father,  and  his  mother  and 
sister,  as  well  as  the  girl  playmates  of  whom  he  was  so  fond, 
did  much  to  encourage  this  "feminine  religion  of  the  heart." 
The  very  poverty  and  simplicity  of  his  life  at  home,  with  no 
opportunity  for  manual  labor,  decided  the  nature  of  his  tasks. 
For  reflectioni  and  study  he  had  an  abundance  of  time,  as  well 
as  abundant  encouragement  and  good  opportunities.  His  bril- 
liant miental  endowments  were  apparent  at  once,  and  the  dis- 
tinction gained  in  the  class-room  amply  consoled  him  for  the 


348  BULLETIN    OF    THE    UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

taunts  of  the  boys  in  the  play-grounds,  thus  encouraging  still 
further  the  development  of  reason  at  the  expense  of  the  will, 
and  of  mind  at  the  expense  of  his  body. 

We  should  remember,  too,  his  years  of  brooding  solitude  in 
Paris,  where  the  feminine  influences  of  mother,  sister  and  play- 
mates were  replaced  by  the  rationalistic  influences  of  Cartesian 
philosophy.  A  religion  of  reason  replaced  the  religion  of  feel- 
ing ;  but  there  was  nothing  during  his  student  years  to  encour- 
age- the  development  of  an  active  will,  and  much  to  discourage 
it.  And  the  same  is  true  of  his  later  life. 

His  very  respect  for  the  truth,  and  especially  his  theory  that  in 
the  quest  for  truth  all  personal  bias  should  be  suppressed,  would 
tend,  so  far  as  this  theory  was  carried  out  in  his  own  practice, 
still  further  to  develop  his  intellect  at  the  cost  of  his  will.  Such 
an  attitude  must  favor  compromise,  and  never  can  lead  to 
blustering  self-assertion.  Kenan  was  at  once  too  sincere  and 
too  clear-headed  a  man  to  be  tempted  to  dogmatize  on  any  one 
side  of  a  debatable  question. 

"Un  esprit  eclaire  se  dit  a  lui-meme:  Si,  depuis  que  la 
raison  existe,  taut  de  milliers  de  symboles  ont  eu  la  pretention 
de  presenter  la  verite  complete,  et  si  cette  pretention  s'est  tou- 
jours  trouvee  vaine,  est-il  bien  probable  que  je  sois  plus  heureux 
que  taut  d'autres  et  que  la  verite  ait  attendu  ma  venue  ici-bas 
pour  faire  sa  definitive  revelation  ?"  C.  d'Angl.,  198-9. 

"Si  une  societe,  si  une  philosophic,  si  une  religion  eut  pos- 
sede  la  verite  absolute,  cette  societe,  cette  philosophic,  cette  re- 
ligion aurait  vaincu  les  autres  et  vivrait  seule  a  I'heur'e  qu'il  est. 
Tons  ceux  qui,  jusqu'ici,  ont  cru  avoir  raison  se  sont  trompes,. 
nous  le  voyons  clairement.  Pouvons-nous,  sans  folle  outrecui- 
dance,  croire  que  Pavenir  ne  nous  jugera  pas  coinme  nous 
jugeons  le  passe  ?  Souv.,  71.  Cf.  A.  S.,  446-7. 

This  conviction,  joined  with  a  sincerity  which  in  him  was 
second  nature,  led  him  to  show  an  unusual  regard  for  opponents. 
NX)  one  ever  saw  more  clearly,  or  recognized  more  candidly,  the- 
soul  of  truth  in  things  erroneous,  or  of  good  in  things  evil. 

"Ici,  je  plaide  un  peu  contre  moi-meme;  mais  je  ne  suis  pas 
un  pretre ;  je  suis  un  penseur ;  comme  tel  je  dois  tout  voir.  Un 


BKAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EllNEST  KENAN".  349 

ouvrage  bien  eompkt  ne  doit  pas  avoir  besoin  qu'on  le  refute. 
L'envers  de  chaque  pensee  doit  y  etre  indique,  de  maniere  que 
le  leeteur  saisisse  d'un  soul  coup  d'oeil  les  deux  faces  opposees 
dont  se  compose  toute  verite."  Dr.  Ph.,  256. 

One  of  the  central  features  of  all  his  philosophy  was  the  belief 
'that  truth  and  error,  good  and  evil,  beauty  and  ugliness,  wisdom 
and  folly,  and  other  such  opposites,  shade  off  into  one  another  by 
gradations  as  imperceptible  as  the  colors  in  a  dove's  neck. 
Souv.,  70-1. 

"Ne  rien  aimer,  ne  rien  hair  absolument,  devient  alors  une 
sagesse."  Souv.,  71. 

"L'i impression  des  choses  humaines  n'est  complete  que  si  on 
fait  une  place  a  1'ironie  a  cote  des  larmes,  a  la  pitie  a  cote  de  la 
colere,  an  sourire  a  cote  du  respect,"  Dr.  Ph.,  V.  Alsa,  cf. 
I-II. 

Such  convictions,  when  not  only  preached  but  lived,  as  in 
Kenan's  case  they  were,  have  of  course  no  tendency  to  develop 
a  strong,  active  will.  One  of  his  latest  critics,  Mr.  Babbitt,  is 
quite  right  when  he  says : 

"Everything  tends  to  assume  in  the  intelligence  of  Renan 
the  form  of  an  acute  antimony — reason  and  sentiment,  the 
classic  and  the  romantic,  the  rual  and  the  ideal,  science  and 
morality.  He  is  unable  to  fuse  together  and  reconcile  these 
contradicto<ry  terms  in  the  light  of  a  higher  insight.  Instead  of 
choosing  between  opposite  and  equally  plausible  conclusions,  he 
sets  athe  different  lobes  of  hisi  brain"  to  dialoguing  about  them. 
Such  a  state,  if  prolonged,  would  lead  to  a  paralysis  of  the  will." 
Souv.,  B.,  Introd.,  XXVII. 

The  judgment  of  another  critic,  still  more  unfavorable,  is  also 
true: 

"After  all  is  said  one  cannot  but  feel  that  there  is  a  touch  of 
something  unwholesome  in  Kenan's  writings,  though,  doubtless, 
nothing  whatever  of  it  in  his  life,  which  was  as  blamieless  as  it 
was  kindly  and  gracious.  There  was  too  little  of  fierceness  and 
indignation  against  what  was  false  and  foul,  too  mtuch  tolerance 
for  the  partially  untrue  and  the  partially  unclean.  To  put  the 
matter  shortly,  no  one  who  loves  the  manliness  and  sincerity  of 


350  BULLETIN    OF    THE    UNIVERSITY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

the  puritan  spirit  can  fail  to  feel  a  certain  disgust  at,  and  con- 
tempt for,  Kenan's  standpoint  in  regard  to  both  morality  and 
religion."  Spectator,  79 :  897  fT. 

Bnt  surely  no  less  true  are  the  words  with  which  his  bio- 
grapher concludes  the  story  of  his  life: 

"Veracity,  like  charity,  covers  a  multitude  of  sins  .  .  . 
Do  we  not  crave  above  all  things  from  a  gifted  man,  working  in 
Kenan's  intellectual  sphere,  that  he  shall  tell  us  what  he  really 
and  truly  thinks  and  feels,  whether  the  world  likes  it  or  not?'y 
Espinasse,  E.  R,  235. 

And  sincere  he  certainly  was,  throughout  life.  Whatever 
may  be  said  of  the  truth  of  his  teachings,  his  sincerity  is  beyond 
question.  If  he  failed  to  see  human  relations  and  eternal  real- 
ities in  the  right  perspective,  this  was  the  fault  of  his  instru- 
ment, not  of  his  purpose.  On  this  point  there  is  no  disputing 
his  own  testimony: 

"Ce  que  j'ai  toujours  en,  c'est  1'amour  de  la  verite.  Je  veux 
qu'on  mette  sur  ma  tombe  (ah  !  si  elle  pouvait  etre  au  milieu  du 
cloitre!  mais  le  cloitre,  c'est  1'eglise,  et  1'eglise,  bien  a  tort,  ne 
veut  pas  de  moi),  je  veux,  dis-je  qu'on  mette  sur  ma  tombe: 
Veritatem  dilexi.  Oui,  j'ai  aime  la  verite  .  .  .  J'ai  de- 
chire  les  liens  les  plus  chers  pour  lui  obeir.  Je  suis  sur  d' avoir 
biem  fait  .  .  .  Cei  temoignage,  je  le  porterai  haut  et  ferine 
sur  nia  tete  au  jugement  dernier."  Disc.,  215-16.  Of.  E. 
Det,  XXXIV;  Souv.,  305-6;  Seailles,  E.  R,  22,  24,  315. 
Also  the  letter  to  his  friend  Cbgnat,  Sep.  11,  1846. 

But  perhaps  this  paper  has  been  too  unappreciative  and,  on 
the  whole,  too  unsympathetic;  and  lest  his  truth-loving  spirit 
should  have  cause  to  reproach  his  expositor  with  neglecting  his 
greatest  miessage  to  the  world,  sincerity  and  truthfulness,  it 
seems  only  fair  at  this  point,  in  bidding  our  author  a,  long  fare- 
well, to  allow  him  a  final  word  in  defence  of  his  own  position  on 
the  subjects  discussed  in  this  paper. 

"Dans  cette  grande  crise  que  1'avenement  de  1'esprit  positif 
fait  subir  de  nos  jours  aux  croyances  morales,  j'ai  defendu 
plutot  qu'amioindri  la.  part  de  1'ideal.  Je  n'ai  pas  ete  de  ces 
esprits  timides  qui  croient  que  la  verite  a  besoin  de  penombre  et 


B BAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.  351 

que  Tinfini  craint  le  grand  air.  Pai  tout  critique,  et,  quoi 
ciu'on  dise,  j'ai  tout  maintenu.  J'ai  rendu  plus  de  services  au 
bieii  en  ne  dissimulant  rien  de  la  realite  qu'en  enveloppant  ma 
pensee  de  ces  voiles  hypocrites  qui  ne  trompent  personne^ 
Notre  critique  a  plus  fait  pour  la  conservation  de  la  religion 
que  toutes  les>  apologies.  Nous  avons  trouve  a  Dieu  un  riche 
ecrin  de  synonymes.  Si  nos  raisons  de  croire  aux  reparations 
d'outre-tombe  peuvent  semibler  freles,  celles  d'  autrefois,  etaient 
elles  beaucoup  plus  fortes  ?  Tesie  David  cum  Sibylla!  .  .  . 
L'odre  social,  eomme  Tordre  theologique,  provoque  la  question: 
Qui  sait  si  la  verite  n'est  pas  triste?  L'edifice  de  la  societe 
Jiumaine  porte  sur  un  grand  vide.  Nous  avons  ose  le  dire. 
Rien  de  plus  dangereux  que  de  patiner  sur  une  couche  de  glace 
sans  songtr  combien  oette  couche  est  mince.  Je  n'ai  jaanais  pu 
croire  que,  dans  aucun  ordre  de  choses,  il  fut  mauvais  d'y  voir 
trop  clair.  Toute  verite  est  bonne  a  savoir.  Car  toute  verite 
clairement  sue  rend  fort  ou  prudent,  deux  chose®  egalement 
necessaires  a  ceux  que  leur  devoir,  une  ambition  imprudente  ou 
leur  mauvais  sort  appellent  a  se  meler  des  affaires  de  cette 
pauvre  humanite."  Dr.  Ph.,  262-4.  Cf.  Monod,  Renan^ 
36-4G. 


352  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY  OF    WISCONSIN. 


APPENDIX  A:     NOTES. 

Note  1. — It  is  interesting  to  compare  the  view  of  a  professional 
modern  psychologist.  Prof.  James,  distinguishing  between  "refined" 
or  "universal"  supernaturalism,  and  "piecemeal"  supernaturalism,  in- 
clines to  affirm  the  latter  on  the  identical  ground  on  which  it  is 
rejected  by  Renan. 

"For  refined  supernaturalism,"  he  writes,  "the  world  of  the  ideal 
has  no  efficient  causality,  and  never  bursts  into  the  world  of  phe- 
nomena at  particular  points.  .  .  .  Universalistic  supernatural- 
ism  surrenders,  it  seems  to  me,  too  easily  to  naturalism.  ...  In 
this  universalistic  way  of  taking  the  world,  the  essence  of  practical 
religion  seems  to  me  to  evaporate.  ...  In  spite  of  its  being  so 
shocking  to  the  reigning  intellectual  taste,  I  believe  that  a  candid  con- 
sideration of  piece-meal  supernaturalism  and  a  complete  discussion  of 
all  its  metaphysical  bearings  will  show  it  to  be  the  hypothesis  by 
which  the  largest  number  of  legitimate  requirements  are  met."  Var. 
Kel.  Exp.,  521-3. 

Note  2.  "La  notion  du  surnaturel,  avec  ses  impossibilites,  n'ap- 
parait  que  le  jour  6u  nait  la  science  experimental  de  la  nature. 
L'homme  etranger  a  toute  idee  de  physique,  qui  croit  qu'en  priant  il 
change  la  marche  des  nuages,  arrete  la  maladie  et  la  mort  meme,  ne 
trouve  dans  le  miracle  rien  d'extraordinaire."  V.  J.,  41. 

"La  croyance  au  miracle  est,  en  effet,  la  consequence  d'un  etat 
intellectual  oii  le  monde  est  considers  comme  gouverne"  par  la  fan- 
taisie  et  non  par  des  lois  immuables.  Sans  doute,  ce  n'est  pas  ainsi 
que  1'envisagent  les  supernaturalistes  modernes,  lesquels,  force's  par 
la  science,  qu'ils  n'osent  froisser  assez  hardiment,  d'admettre  un  ordre 
stable  dans  la  nature,  supposent  seulement  que  1'action  libre  de  Dieu 
peut  parfois  le  changer,  et  congoivent  ainsi  le  miracle  comme  une 
derogation  a  des  lois  etablies.  Mais  ce  concept,  je  le  repete,  n'etait 
nullement  celui  des  hommes  primitifs.  Le  miracle  n'etait  pas  congu 
alors  comme  surnaturel.  L'idee  de  surnaturel  n'apparait  que  quand 
1'idee  des  lois  de  la  nature  s'est  nettement  formulae  et  s'impose  meme 
a  ceux  qui  veulent  timidement  concilier  le  merveilleux  et  I'expgrience. 
.  Pour  les  hommes  primitifs,  au  contraire,  le  miracle  etait  par- 
faitement  naturel  et  surgissait  a  chaque  pas,  ou  plutot  il  n'y  avait  ni 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERTSTEST  RE^AN.  353 

lois  ni  nature  pour  ces  ames  nai'ves,  voyant  partout  action  immediate 
d'agents  libres.  .  .  Ce  n'est  pas  d'un  raisonnement,  mais  de  tout 
1'ensemble  des  sciences  modernes  que  sort  cet  immense  resultat:  il  n'y 
a  pas  de  surnaturel."  A.  S.,  45-6. 

Note  3.  Renan's  position  on  this  question  is  more  fully  set  forth 
in  his  article  la  Metaphysique  et  son  avenir,  1860,  and  again,  three 
years  later,  in  a  letter  to  Mr.  Berthelot: 

"Si  Ton  entend  par  metaphysique  le  droit  et  le  pouvoir  qu'a  I'homme 
de  s'elever  audessus  des  faits,  d'en  voir  les  lois,  la  raison,  1'harmonie, 
la  poesie,  la  beaute  .  .  .  il  y  a  une  metaphysique.  .  .  Mais 
si  Ton  veut  dire  qu'il  existe  une  science  premiere  contenant  les  prin- 
cipes  de  toutes  les  autres,  une  science  qui  peut  a  elle  seule,  et  par  des 
combinaisons  abstraites,  nous  amener  &  la  verity  sur  Dieu,  le  monde, 
rhomme,  je  n3  vois  pas  la  necessite  d'une  telle  categoric  du  savoir 
humain.  .  .  II  n'y  a  pas  de  veritS  qui  n'ait  son  point  de  depart 
dans  1'experience  scientifique,  qui  ne  sorte  directement  ou  indirecte- 
ment  d'un  laboratoire  ou  d'une  bibliotheque,  car  tout  ce  que  nous 
savons,  nous  le  savons  par  1'etude  de  la  nature  ou  de  1'histoire."  Frag., 
282-4.  Cf.  ibid.,  263,  265.  C.  d'Agl.,  206. 

"J'ai  nie  autrefois  1'existence  de  la  metaphysique  comme  science 
a  part  et  progressive;  je  ne  la  nie  pas  comme  ensemble  de  notions 
immuables  a  la  fagon  de  la  logique.  Ces  sciences  n'apprennent  rien, 
mais  elles  font  bien  analyser  ce  que  Ton  savait.  En  tout  cas,  elles 
sont  totalement  hors  des  faits.  Les  regies  du  syllogisme,  les  axiomes 
fondamentaux  de  la  raison  pure,  seraient  vrais  comme  les  mathema- 
tiques,  quand  meme  il  n'y  aurait  personne  pour  les  percevoir. 
Mathematiques  pures,  logique,  metaphysique,  autant  de  sciences  de 
1'eternel,  de  rimmuabie,  nullement  historiques,  nullement  exp^ri- 
mentales,  n'ayant  aucun  rapport  avec  1'existence  et  les  faits."  Frag., 
174-5. 

Note  4.  "II  n'est  pas  stir  que  la  Terre  ne  manque  pas  sa 
destinee,  comme  cela  est  probafrlement  arrivS  a  des  mondes  innom- 
brables;  il  est  meme  possible  que  notre  temps  soit  un  jour  considers 
comme  le  point  culminant  apres  lequel  1'humanite  n'aura  fait  que 
dechoir;  mais  1'univers  ne  connait  pas  le  decouragement;  il  com- 
mencera  sans  fin  1'oeuvre  avortee;  chaque  echec  le  laisse  jeune,  alerte, 
plein  d'illusions.  .  .  Courage,  courage,  nature!  .  .  Obstine-toi; 
repare  pour  la  millionieme  fois  la  maille  de  filet  qui  se  casse.  .  . 
Vise,  vise  encore  le  but  que  tu  manques  depuis  I'eternitS.  .  .  Tu 
as  1'infini  de  1'espace  et  1'infini  du  temps  pour  ton  experience.  Quand 
10 


354  BULLETIN   OF   THE    UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

on  a  le  droit  de  se  tromper  impunement,  on  est  toujours  sur  de  reus- 
sir."  Souv.,  XX-XXI. 

"The  universe  .  .  obtains  its  object  by  an  infinite  variety  of 
germs.  What  Javeh  desires  always  happens.  Let  us  not  be  trou- 
bled; if  we  are  among  those  who  are  going  astray,  who  are  running 
counter  to  the  supreme  will,  that  is  of  little  consequence.  Humanity 
is  one  of  the  countless  ant-hills  among  which  the  experiment  of 
reason  is  being  carried  on  in  the  midst  of  space;  if  we  miss  our  goal, 
others  will  reach  it."  P.  Isr.,  11:454-5;  ibid.  vol.  V,  361. 

Note  5.  The  same  view  is  taken  in  his  Etudes  d'histoire  religieuse, 
p.  419.: 

"Dieu,  Providence,  immortalite,  autant  de  bons  vieux  mots,  un  peu 
lourds  peut-etre,  que  la  philosophic  interpretera  dans  des  sens  de 
plus  en  plus  raffines,  mais  qu'elle  ne  remplacera  jamais  avec  avantage. 
Sous  une  forme  ou  sous  une  autre,  Dieu  sera  toujours  le  resume"  de 
nos  besoms  suprasensibles,  la  categorie  de  1'ideal  (c'est  &  dire  la 
forme  sous  laquelle  nous  concevons  1'ideal."  Cf.  Frag.,  250;  A.  S., 
479. 

Note  6.  "Our  normal  waking  consciousness,  rational  conscious- 
ness, as  we  call  it,"  writes  Prof.  James  in  his  latest  book,  "is 
but  one  special  type  of  consciousness,  whilst  all  about  it,  parted  from 
it  by  the  filmiest  of  screens,  there  lie  potential  forms  of  consciousness 
entirely  different.  .  .  No  account  of  the  universe  in  its  totality 
can  be  final,  which  leaves  these  other  forms  of  consciousness  quite 
disregarded.  .  .  They  may  determine  attitudes,  though  they  can- 
not furnish  formulas,  and  open  a  region,  though  they  fail  to  give  a 
map.  At  any  rate  they  forbid  a  premature  closing  of  our  accounts 

with  reality.     . 

.     .     If  you  have  intuitions  at  all,  they  come  from  a  deeper  level 

of  your  nature  than  the  loquacious  level  which  rationalism  inhabits. 
.  .  The  truth  is  that  in  the  metaphysical  and  religious  sphere,  ar- 
ticulate reasons  are  cogent  for  us  only  when  our  inarticulate  feelings 
of  reality  have  already  been  impressed  in  favor  of  the  same  conclu- 
sions." Var.  Rel.  Exp.,  388,  73,  74.  Prof.  James  explains  that  he  is 
dealing  for  the  moment  with  the  is,  not  with'  the  ought.  All  he  con- 
tends for  is  that  the  sub-conscious  and  non-rational  does,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  hold  primacy  over  reason  in  the  religious  realm.  Cf.  ibid.,  pp. 
422-4,  427,  456. 

Note  7.  "How  do  we  know,"  asks  Prof.  James,  "that  conscious- 
ness is  generated  de  novo  in  each  particular  brain?  May  not 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      355 

consciousness  exist  anterior  to  the  brain,  behind  the  scenes,  co-eval 
with  the  world? 

The  production  of  such  a  thing  as  consciousness  in  the  brain  is  the 
absolute  world-enigma, — something  so  paradoxical  and  abnormal  as  to 
be  a  stumbling  block  to  Nature,  and  almost  a  self-contradiction.  Hum. 
Im.,  21. 

Even  though  our  soul's  life  (as  here  below  ft  is  revealed  to  us)  may 
be  in  literal  strictness  the  function  of  a  brain  that  perishes,  yet  it  is 
not  at  all  impossible,  but  on  the  contrary  quite  possible,  that  the  life 
may  still  continue  when  the  brain  itself  is  dead."  Ibid.,  11-12. 

Note  8.  Compare  the  famous  declaration  of  Huxley: 
"If  there  is  one  thing  plainer  than  another,  it  is  that  neither  the 
pleasures  nor  the  pains,  of  life  in  the  merely  animal  world  are  distrib- 
uted according  to  desert;  for  it  is  admittedly  impossible  for  the  lower 
orders  of  sentient  beings  to  deserve  either  tfie  one  or  the  other.  If 
there  is  a  generalization  from  the  facts  of  human  life,  which  has  the 
assent  of  thoughtful  men  in  every  age  and  country,  it  is  that  the  vio- 
lator of  ethical  rules  constantly  escapes  the  punishment  which  he  de- 
serves; that  the  wicked  flourishes  like  the  green  bay-tree,  while  the 
righteous  begs  his  bread;  that  the  sins  of  the  fathers  are  visited  upon 
the,  children;  that,  in  the  realm  of  nature,  ignorance  is  punished  just 
as  severely  as  wilful  wrong;  and  that  thousands  upon  thousands  of  in- 
nocent beings  suffer  for  the  crime,  or  the  unintentional  trespass,  of 
one."  Evolution  and  Ethics,  Lond.,  1893,  p.  12. 
So  likewise  felt  Goethe: 

"Denn  unfiihlend 
1st  die  Natur: 
Es  leuchtet  die  Sonne 
Uber  bose  und  gute, 
Und  dem  Verbrecher 
Glanzen  wie  dem  Besten 
Der  Mond  und  die  Sterne. 

Wind  und  Strome, 
Donner  und  Hagel 
Rauschen  ihren  Weg 
Und  ergreifen, 
Voriibereilend, 
Einen  und  den  andern. 

Auch  so  das  Gliick 
Tappt  unter  die  Menge, 
Fasst  bald  des  Knaben 


356  BULLETIN   OF   THE    UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

Lockige  Unschuld, 
Bald  auch  den  kahlen 
Schuldigen  Scheitel. 

Nach  ewigen,  ehrnen, 
Grossen  Gesetzen 
Miissen  wir  alle 
Unseres  Daseins 
Kreise  vollenden.     .     .     " 

Note  9.  "I  have  said  nothing,"  writes  Prof  James  of  his  Gifford 
Lectures,  "about  immortality  or  the  belief  therein,  for  to  me  it  seems 
a  secondary  point.  If  our  ideals  are  only  cared  for  in  'eternity/  I  do 
not  see  why  we  might  not  be  willing  to  resign  their  care  to  other 
hands  than  ours.  Yet  I  sympathize  with  the  urgent  impulse  to  be 
present  ourselves,  and  in  the  conflict  of  impulses,  both  of  them  so 
vague  yet  both  of  them  noble,  I  know  not  how  to  decide.  It  seems  to 
me  it  is  eminently  a  case  for  facts  to  testify."  Var.  Rel.  Exp.,  524. 

But  in  the  case  of  many  people,  if  not  most,  it  is  the  death  of  a 
loved  one,  child,  parent,  or  friend,  that  reinforces  this  "urgent  im- 
pulse to  be  present  ours'elves,"  and  it  is  very  hard  to  see  how  such 
people  can  be  willing  to  leave  the  hoped-for  reunion  "to  other  hands 
than  their  own." 

In  complete  contrast  with  these  statements  is  the  belief  of  Emer- 
son: 

"If  you  love  and  serve  men,  you  cannot  by  any  hiding  or  stratagem 
escape  the  remuneration.  Secret  retributions  are  always  restoring 
the  level,  when  disturbed,  of  the  divine  justice.  It  is  impossible  to 
tilt  the  beam.  All  the  tyrants  and  proprietors  and  monopolists  of  the 
world  in  vain  set  their  shoulders  to  heave  tfie  bar.  Settles  forever- 
more  the  ponderous  equator  to  its  line,  and  man  and  mote,  and  star 
and  sun,  must  range  to  it,  or  be  pulverized  by  the  recoil."  Lectures 
and  Biogr.  Sket.,  1868,  p.  186. 

Note  10.     Compare  the  statement  of  Sidgwick,  Methods,  438: 
"And,  therefore,  I  should  judge,  from  a  strictly  utilitarian  point  of 
view,  that  any  attempt,  such  as  Bentham  made,  to  dispense  with  the 
morality  of  instinct  and  tradition,  would  be  premature  and  ill-advised."  • 

Note  11.  From  a  passage  in  the  Souvenirs  it  appears  that,  as  man 
is  duped  by  Nature,  so  Nature  in  turn  may  be  duped  by  man.  The 
following  story  is  put  in  the  mouth  of  Kenan's  mother,  but  she  is 
plainly  expressing  his  own  views: 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAI*.      357 

"Tout  n'est  au  fond  qu'une  grande  illusion,  et  ce  qui  le  prouve, 
c'est  que,  dans  beaucoup  de  cas,  rien  n'est  plus  facile  que  de  duper  la 
nature  par  des  singeries  qu'elle  ne  sait  pas  distinguer  de  la  r6alite\ 
Je  n'oublierai  jamais  la  fille  de  Marzin.  .  .  qui,  folle  par  sup- 
pression du  sentiment  maternel,  prenait  une  buche,  remmaillottait  de 
chiffons,  lui  mettait  un  semblant  de  bonnet  d'enfant,  puis  passait  les 
jours  &  dorloter  dans  ses  bras  ce  poupon  fictif,  £  le  bercer,  &  le  serrer 
centre  son  sein,  §L  le  couvrir  de  baisers.  .  .  II  y  a  des  instincts  pour 
qui  1'apparence  suffit  et  qu'on  endort  par  des  fictions.  .  .  Que 
veux-tu!  Ces  pauvres  folles  prouvent  par  leurs  ggarements  les  saintes 
lois  de  la  nature  et  leur  inevitable  fataliteV'  Souv.,  41-2. 

Note  lla.  An  interesting  comparison  at  this  point  is  again  fur- 
nished by  Prof.  James.  Commenting  on  the  favorite  utterance  of 
Margaret  Puller:  "I  accept  the  universe,"  and  Carlyle's  sardonic  re- 
ply. "Gad!  she'd  better!"  he  writes: 

"At  bottom  the  whole  concern  of  both  morality  and  religion  is  with 
the  manner  of  our  acceptance  of  the  universe.  Do  we  accept  it  only 
in  part  and  grudgingly,  or  heartily  and  altogether?  .  .  .  Morality 
pure  and  simple  acce'pts  the  law  of  the  whole  which  it  finds  reigning, 
so  far  as  to  acknowledge  and  obey  it,  but  it  may  obey  it  with  the 
heaviest  and  coldest  heart,  and  never  cease  to  feel  it  as  a  yoke.  But 
for  religion,  in  its  strong  and  well-developed  manifestations,  the  serv- 
ice of  the  higher  never  is  felt  as  a  yoke.  Dull  submission  is  left  far 
behind,  and  a  mood  of  welcome,  which  may  fill  any  place  on  the  scale 
between  cheerful  serenity  and  enthusiastic  gladness,  has  taken  its 
place.  .  •  .  It  makes  a  tremendous  emotional  and  practical  differ- 
ence to  one  whether  one  accept  the  universe  ra,  the  drab  discolored 
way  of  stoic  resignation  to  necessity,  or  with  the  passionate  happi- 
ness of  Christian  saints."  Var.  Rel.  Exp.,  41. 

Note  12.  "The  assertion  that  mortality  is  in  any  way  depend- 
ent on  certain  philosophical  problems,"  says  Prof.  Huxley,  "produces 
the  same  effect  on  my  mind  as  if  one  should  say  that  a  man's  vision 
depends  on  his  theory  of  sight,  or  that  he  has  no  business  to  be  sure 
that  ginger  is  hot  in  his  mouth,  unless  he  has  formed  definite  views 
as  to  the  nature  of  ginger." 

"If  it  is  demonstrated  that  without  this  or  that  theological  dogma 
the  human  race  will  lapse  into  bipedal  cattle,  more  brutal  than  the 
beasts  by  reason  of  their  greater  cleverness,  my  next  question  is  to 
ask  for  the  proof  of  the  dogma.  If  this  proof  is  forthcoming,  it  is  my 
conviction  that  no  drowning  sailor  ever  clutched  a  hencoop  more 
tenaciously  than  mankind  will  hold  by  such  dogma,  whatever  it  may 


358  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

be.  But  if  not,  then  I  verily  VeltSve  that  the  human  race  will  go  on 
its  evil  way;  and  my  only  consolation  lies  in  the  reflection  that,  how- 
ever bad  our  posterity  may  become,  so  long  as  they  hold  by  the  plain 
rule  of  not  pretending  to  believe  what  they  have  no  reason  to  believe, 
because  it  may  be  to  their  advantage  so  to  pretend,  they  will  not  have 
reached  the  lowest  depths  of  immorality." 

In  behalf  of  the  same  view  may  be  cited  one  of  the  greatest  names 
in  modern  ethics,  Prof.  Sidgwick: 

"I  am  so  far  from  feeling  bound  to  believe  for  purposes  of  practice 
what  I  see  no  ground  for  holding  as  a  speculative  truth,  that  I  can- 
not even  conceive  the  state  of  mind  which  these  words  seem  to  de- 
scribe, except  as  a  momentary,  half-wilful  irrationality,  committed  in 
a  violent  access  of  philosophic  despair."  Methods,  5th  ed.,  507. 

Note  13.  This  remained  Renan's  attitude,  more  or  less  con- 
sistently, throughout  life.  Nature  and  nurture  had  combined  to  in- 
oculate his  childhood  with  a  temperamental  idealism  which  not  even 
the  rudest  reverses  of  life  were  able  entirely  to  efface. 

Nearly  half  a  century  later  he  writes  of  himself: 

"En  fait,  je  n'ai  d'amour  que  pour  les  caracteres  d'un  ide"alisme 
absolu,  martyrs,  he"ros,  utopistes,  amis  de  fimpossible.  De  ceux-la 
seuls  je  m'occupe;  ils  sont,  si  j'ose  le  dire,  ma  spe"cialiteV'  Souv.,  123. 

"Je  n'abandonnai  nullement  mon  gout  pour  1'deal;  je  1'ai  plus  vif 
que  jamais,  je  1'aurai  toujours.  Le  moindre  acte  de  vertu,  le  moindre 
grain  de  talent,  me  paraissent  infiniment  supe"rieurs  a  toutes  les  rich- 
j,  a  tous  les  succes  du  monde."  Souv.,  122. 


Note  13a.  "What  right  have  we,"  asks  Dr.  Maudsley,  "to  be- 
lieve nature  under  any  obligation  to  do  her  work  by  means  of  com- 
plete minds  only?  She  may  find  an  incomplete  mind  a  more  suitable 
instrument  for  a  particular  purpose.  It  is  the  work  that  is  done,  and 
the  quality  in  the  worker  by  which  it  was  done,  that  is  alone  of  mo- 
ment; and  it  may  be  no  great  matter  from  a  cosmical  standpoint,  if  in 
other  qualities  of  character  he  was  singularly  defective, — if  indeed 
he  were  hypocrite,  adulterer,  eccentric,  or  lunatic."  Quoted,  with  ap- 
proval, by  Prof.  James,  Var.  Rel.  Exp.,  19. 

Note  14.  "Happiness,"  says  Prof.  James,  "like  every  other  emo- 
tional state,  has  blindness  and  insensibility  to  opposing  facts  given 
it  as  its  instinctive  weapon  for  self-protection  against  disturb- 
ance. When  happiness  is  actually  in  possession,  the  thought  of  evil 
can  no  more  acquire  the  feeling  of  reality,  than  the  thought  of  good 
can  gain  reality  when  melancholy  rules.  To  the  man  actively  happy, 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERXEST  RENAI*.  359 

from  whatever  cause,  evil  simply  cannot  then  and  there  be  believed 
in.  Var.  Rel.  Exp.,  88;  also  cf.,  90. 

But  this  exactly  is  the  problem,  why  happiness  rather  than  melan- 
choly should  continue  in  possession. 

Renan  has  attempted  himself  to  explain  his  constant  cheerfulness, 
but  as  usual  his  explanations  do  not  agree  very  well  with  each  other. 
He  is  specially  fond  of  attributing  his  temperamental  cheerfulness  to 
his  descent  from  a  Celtic  ancestry.  Disc.,  217. 

"Je  suis  double,"  he  writes  in  the  Souvenirs,  "quelque  fois  une 
partie  de  moi  rit  quand  1'autre  pleure.  C'est  la  1'explication  de  ma 
gaite.  Comme  il  y  a  deux  hommes  en  moi,  il  y  en  a  toujours  un  qui 
a  lieu  d'etre  content."  p.,  145. 

The  explanation  offered  in  the  Souvenirs  is  more  serious,  and  on 
the  whole,  correct: 

"Ma  paix  d 'esprit  est  parfaite.  D'un  autre  cote,  j'ai  trouve1  une 
bonte  extreme  dans  la  nature  et  dans  la  sociSte.  .  .  Je  n'ai  ren- 
contre" sur  mon  chemin  que  des  hommes  excellents.  .  .  Une  bonne 
humeur,  difficilement  alterable,  rgsultat  d'une  bonne  sant§  morale, 
rgsultat  elle-meme  d'une  ame  bien  e'quilibre'e  et  d'un  corps  suppor- 
table malgr6  ses  dSfauts,  m'a  jusqu'ici  maintenu  dans  une  philosophic 
tranquille,  soit  qu'elle  se  traduise  en  optimisme  reconnaissant,  soit 
qu'elle  aboutisse  a  une  ironie  gaie.  Je  n'ai  jamais  beaucoup  souf- 
fert  "  p.  374. 

Note  15.  It  would  not  be  hard  to  find  in  Kenan's  books  many 
other  passages  in  which  the  same  doctrine  is  expressed  or  implied. 
Here,  e.  g.,  is  another  from  the  Souvenirs: 

"Et  maintenant  je  ne  demande  plus  au  bon  genie  qui  m'a  tant  de 
fois  guide,  conseillee,  console,  qu'une  mort  douce  et  subite,  pour  1'heure 
qui  m'est  fix§e,  proche  ou  lointaine.  Les  stoiciens  soutenaient  qu'on 
a  pu  mener  la  vie  bienheureuse  dans  le  ventre  du  taureau  de  Phalaris. 
C'est  trop  dire.  La  douleur  abaisse,  humilie,  porte  a  blasphemer. 
La  seule  mort  acceptable  est  la  mort  noble,  qui  est  non  un  accident 
pathologique,  mais  une  fin  voulue  et  prScieuse  devant  1'Eternel.  La 
mort  sur  le  champ  de  bataille  est  la  plus  belle  de  toutes,  etc.  Souv., 
376. 

Note  16.  It  is  from  this  point  of  view  that  we  must  interpret 
Kenan's  frequent  suspicions  that  morality  and  religion  may  be  nothing 
more,  after  all,  than  cosmic  illusions.  In  the  course  of  evolution  only 
such  traits  of  mind  and  character  have  come  down  to  our  own  times 
as  were  not  incompatible  with  the  requirements  of  successful  life 


360  BULLETIN"   OF   THE    UNIVERSITY   OF    WISCONSIN. 

under  set  cosmic  conditions.     This  is  concisely  and  clearly  expressed 
in  the  following  passage: 

"Une  humanite  plus  intelligente,  ou  tous  verraient  clair,  ne  serait 
pas  viable;  elle  periraic  dans  son  germe  meme,  et  par  consequent  elle 
n'existe  pas."  Dial.,  30. 

Note  17.  The  same  attitude  appears  to  have  been  taken  by  Renan 
during  the  siege  of  Paris,  in  1870.  The  Journal  of  the  Goncourts 
records  the  following  scene: 

"Berthelot  continue  ses  revelations  desolantes,  au  bout  desquelles 
je  m'e'crie:  'Alors  tout  est  fini,  il  ne  nous  reste  plus  qu'zi  el  ever  une 
generation  pour  la  vengeance' " — "Non,  non,  crie  Renan,  qui  s'est 
leve,  la  figure  toute  rouge,  pas  la  vengeance,  perisse  la  France,  perisse 
la  patrie,  il  y  a  au-dessus  le  Royaume  du  Devoir,  de  la  Raison." — "Non, 
non,  hurle  toute  la  table,  il  n'y  a  rien  au-dessus  de  la  patrie  .  .  ." 
Renan  s'est  leve  et  se  promene  autour  de  la  table,  la  marche  mal 
e"quilibree,  ses  petits  bras  battant  1'air,  citant  a  haute  voix  des  frag- 
ments de  1'Ecriture  sainte,  en  disant  que  tout  est  la."  E.  de  Goncourt, 
Journal,  2  serie,  I  vol.,  p.  28.  But  cf.  Renan's  letters  to  M.  Strauss, 
written  at  this  time;  aiso  Seailles,  E.  R.,  265,  note  1. 

Note  18.  Renan's  progress  from  radicalism  to  conservatism  can 
be  broadly  traced  in  his  attitude  towards  the  French  Revolution 
at  different  periods  of  his  life.  In  the  Avenir  de  la  science  he  is  still 
a  fervent  admirer  of  that  great  event,  as  appears  from  the  following 
foot-note: 

"L'ann§e  1789  sera  dans  1'histoire  de  1'humanite  une  ann£e  sainte. 
.  Le  lieu  ou  1'humanite  s'est  proclamee,  le  Jeu  de  Paume,  sera 
un  jour  un  temple;  on  y  viendra  comme  a  Jerusalem,  quand  1'eloigne- 
ment  aura  sanctifie  et  caracterise'  les  faits  particuliers  en  symboles 
des  faits  g6neraux.  Le  Golgotha  ne  devint  sacre  que  deux  ou  trois 
siecles  apres  Je"sus."  A.  S.,  note  6. 

The  same  attitude  is  taken  in  his  letters  during  the  period  between 
his  apostacy  from  the  church  in  1845  and  the  coup  d'etat  of  1851:  In 
a  letter  from  St.  Malo,  for  example,  Sept.,  1847,  to  his  friend  Berthe- 
lot, he  gravely  argues:  If  the  sublimities  of  the  Christian  religion 
have  prevailed  over  its  narrowness  and  its  primitive  superstitions, 
why  should  the  sublimity  of  the  Revolution  be  unable  to  efface  its 
horrors?  The  critic  will  see  both  sides,  to  be  sure,  as  he  sees  them 
both  in  Christianity;  but  the  religionist  will  see  only  the  sublime,  just 
as  in  Christianity.  Corr.,  32. 

With  this  youthful  enthusiasm  we  may  contrast  what  he  has  to  say 
on  the  same  subject  in  1858,  in  his  article  on  M.  Cousin: 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      361 

"Ail  fond,  la  Revolution  frangaise,  qu'on  prend  toujours  comme  un 
fait  general  de  1'histoire  du  monde  (Hegel  lui-meme  a  commis  cette 
erreur),  est  un  fait  tres  particulier  a  la  France,  un  fait  gaulois,  si 
j'ose  le  dire,  la  consequence  de  cette  vanite"  qui  fait  que  le  gaulois 
supporte  tout,  excepte"  1'  inSgalite  des  rangs  sociaux,  et  de  cette 
logique  absolue  qui  le  porte  a  reformer  la  societe"  sur  un  type  ab- 
strait, — again  like  himself  in  the  A.  S., — sans  tenir  compte  de  1'histoire 
et  des  droits  consacres."  Mor.  Grit.,  98-9.  CT.  Q.  C.,  III-IV,  86,  380; 
also  R6f.  int.,  248. 

From  a  passage  in  the  Souvenirs  it  appears  that  his  early  enthus- 
iasm for  the  Revolution  was  caught  from  his  mother,  and  that  he  was 
well  aware  of  the  inconsistency  of  his  statements  in  regard  to  it: 

"J'ai  pris  d'elle  un  gout  invincible  de  la  Revolution,  qui  me  1'a  fait 
aimer  malgrg  ma  raison  et  malgre  tout  le  mal  que  j'ai  dit  d'elle.  Je 
n'efface  rien  de  ce  que  j'ai  dit;  mais,  depuis  que  je  vois  1'espece  de 
rage  avec  laquelle  des  ecrivains  Strangers  cherchent  a  prouver  que  la 
Revolution  frangaise  n'a  etc"  que  honte,  folie,  et  qu'elle  constitue  un 
fait  sans  importance  dans  1'histoire  du  monde,  je  commence  a  croire 
que  c'est  peut-etre  ce  que  nous  avons  fait  de  mieux,  puisqu'on  en  est 
si  jaloux."  Souv.,  105. 

We  may  note,  too,  in  passing,  that  Renan's  early  radicalism  in  mat- 
ters of  social  policy  was  simply  the  application  to  secular  institutions 
of  that  same  intellectual  temper  of  ultra-rationalism  which  had  re- 
cently forced  him  out  of  the  church.  Indeed,  we  should  hardly  expect 
a  young  man  who  had  just  set  aside  the  supposedly  sacred  authorities 
and  traditions  of  the  church,  to  show  much  respect  for  authority  and 
tradition  in  secular  matters. 

He  was  certainly  influenced,  too,  in  these  matters,  during  the 
years  immediately  following  his  withdrawal  from  the  church,  by  his 
intimate  relations  with  the  young  Berthelol.  It  was  in  the  autumn  of 
1845  that  they  first  made  each  other's  acquaintance.  Renan  was  22 
years  old,  and  Berthelot  18,  and  so  completely  did  they  stand  at  the 
same  point  of  view,  t~at  friendship  at  once  became  a  kind  of  intel- 
lectual partnership. 

"Notre  ardeur  d'apprendre  e"tait  egale;  nos  cultures  avaient  Ste" 
tres  di verses.  Nous  mimes  en  commun  tout  ce  que  nous  savions; 
.  Berthelot  m'apprit  ce  qu'on  n'enseignait  pas  au  se"minaire;  de  mott 
c6t6,  je  me  mis  en  devoir  de  lui  apprendre  la  th6ologie  et  I'h6breu.  .  . 
Notre  honnetete  et  notre  droiture  s'embrasserent.  .  .  Nos  discus- 
sions 6taient  sans  fin.  .  .  Nous  passions  une  partie  des  nuits  a 
chercher,  a  travailler  ensemble.  .  .  La  crise  de  1848  nous  6mut 
profondement.  .  .  Notre  amiti6  consista  en  ce  que  nous  nous  ap~ 
prenions  inutuellement,  en  une  sorte  de  commune  fermentation  qu'une 


362  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

remarquable  conformite  d'organisation  intellectuelle  produisait  en 
nous  devant  les  mSmes  objets.  Ce  que  nous  avions  vu  a  deux  nous 
paraissait  certain.  .  .  II  faut  que  les  questions  sociales  et  philoso- 
phiques  soient  bien  difficiles,  pour  que  nous  ne  les  ayons  pas  resolues 
dans  notre  effort  de"sespere."  Souv.,  334-7. 

The  results  of  this  co-operative  intellectual  fermentation  are  pre- 
served in  Kenan's  Avenir  de  la  science,  that  great  Pourana,  as  he  him- 
self calls  it,  from  which  most  of  his  later  inspirations  were  drawn. 
A.  S.,  XI.  Cf.  Seailles,  &.  R.,  40-1. 

Kenan's  radicalism  was  destined  to  be  short-lived,  however.  The 
events  of  1848  had  already  shaken  rudely  his  confidence  in  democracy, 
and  the  coup  d'etat  of  1851  destroyed  it  completely.  A.  S.,  IV. 

His  mission  to  Italy,  moreover,  during  1849-50,  besides  developing 
new  interests  and  awakening  his  artistic  instinct,  had  taught  him  the 
valuable  lesson  that  different  peoples  need  different  institutions,  and 
that  a  government  which  is  good  for  one  country  may  be  very  bad  for 
another.  Within  a  year  after  writing  the  Avenir  de  la  science  he  had 
so  far  changed  his  ground,  he  himself  tells  us,  especially  with  refer- 
ence to  socialism,  that  he  wondered  how  he  ever  embraced  the  views 
so  enthusiastically  espoused  in  that  work.  It  was  for  this  reason 
among  others  that  the  book  was  not  published  till  more  than  forty 
years  later.  A.  S.,  IX. 

Note  19.  This  attitude  seems  at  first  glance  to  be  contradicted 
by  his  unlimited  admiration  of  all  the  forms  of  culture  achieved 
by  ancient  Athens.  Souv.,  57-72.  But  Athenian  democracy,  as  he  ex- 
pressly admits  in  that  famous  rhapsody,  was  virtually  an  aristocracy, 
based  on  slavery. 

"II  y  a  eu  un  peuple  d'aristocrates,  un  public  tout  entier  compose" 
de  connaisseurs,  une  democratic  qui  a  saisi  des  nuances  d'art  telle- 
ment  fines  que  nos  raffines  les  apergoivent  a  peine.  II  y  a  eu  un  pub- 
lic pour  comprendre  ce  qui  fait  la  beaute  des  Propylees  et  la 
superiority  des  sculptures  du  Parthenon."  Souv.,  61. 

Note  20.  Kenan's  conception  of  civil  liberty  coincides  exactly  with 
that  of  Herbert  Spencer: 

"La  liberte",  c'est  le  droit  qu'a  tout  homme  de  croire  et  de  faire  ce 
que  bon  lui  semble  dans  les  limites  ou  le  droit  semblable  des  autres 
n'est  point  atteint."  Mor.  Grit.,  159. 

Note  20a.  "L'me"galite  est  legitime  toutes  les  fois  que  1'inegalite 
est  nScessaire  au  bien  de  I'humanite.  Une  societe  a  droit  a  ce 
-qui  est  necessaire  a  son  existence,  quelque  apparente  injustice  qui  en 


BRATJER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.  363 

re"sulte  pour  1'individu.  .  .  La  possibility  et  les  besoins  de  la  so- 
ciete,  les  inte'rets  de  la  civilisation  priment  tout  le  reste.  .  .  Je 
vais  jusqu'a  dire  que,  si  jamais  1'esclavage  a  pu  €tre  n6cessaire  a 
1'existence  de  la  societe,  1'esclavage  a  ete  Iggitime;  car  alors  les 
esclaves  ont  et6  esclaves  de  1'humanite,  esclaves  de  1'oeuvre  divine, 
ce  qui  ne  rgpugne  pas  plus  que  1'existence  de  tant  d'etres  attaches 
fatalement  au  jong  d'une  idee  qui  leur  est  superieure  et  qu'ils  ne  com- 
prennent  pas.  A.  S.,  378-9.  Cf.  ibid.,  notes  156  and  157: 

"On  est  parfois  tenter  de  se  demander  si  1'humanite  n'a  pas  e"te"  trop 
tot  emancipee.  .  .  Comment  fera  rhumanitS,  avec  une  liberte  in- 
dividuelle  aussi  developpee  que  la  nStre,  pour  conquerir  les  deserts? 
.  Les  grandes  choses  ne  se  font  pa  sans  sacrifice,  et  la  religion, 
conseilldre  des  sacrifices,  n'est  plus!  Je  me  berce  parfois  de  1'espoir 
que  les  machines  et  les  progres  de  la  science  appliquee  compenseront 
un  jour  ce  que  I'humanitS  aura  perdu  d'aptitude  au  sacrifice  par  le 
progres  de  la  reflection." 

This  doctrine  was  often  reaffirmed  by  Renan  in  his  later  period,  and 
is  developed  at  length  in  his  Dialogues  and  his  Drames. 

The  practice  of  vivisection,  and  the  killing  of  animals  for  food,  is 
justified  by  Renan  on  the  same  general  ground  as  slavery: 

"Les  animaux  qui  servent  a  la  nourriture  de  l'homme  de  g§nie  ou 
de  I'homme  de  bien  devraient  etre  contents,  s'il  savaient  S,  quoi  ils 
servent.  Tout  depend  du  but,  et  si  un  jour  la  vivisection  sur  une 
grande  Schelle  etait  necessaire  pour  decouvrir  les  grands  secrets  de 
la  nature  vivante,  j'imagine  les  etres,  dans  1'extase  du  martyre  volon- 
taire,  venant  s'y  offrir  couronnes  de  fleurs.  Le  meurtre  inutile  d'une 
mouche  est  un  acte  blamable;  celui  qui  est  sacrifi£  aux  fins  ideales  n'a 
pas  droit  de  se  plaindre,  et  son  sort,  au  regard  de  rinfini  (r<y  S«o> ), 
est  digne  d'envie."  Dial.,  129-30.  Cf.  A.  S...  IX,  387. 

But  Renan  himself  has  repeatedly  asserted,  both  before  and  after 
writing  this  passage,  that  these  transcendental  ends  are  not  known,  and 
very  probably  cannot  be  known: 

"Rien  ne  nous  indique  quelle  est  la  volonte  de  la  nature,  ni  le  but 
de  1'univers."  A.  S.,  XVI.  Cf.  Frag.,  318-9. 

Taking  the  two  statements  together,  it  would  seem  that  he  is  him- 
self refuting  the  very  proposition  which  his  arguments  are  intended 
to  establish.  For  if  the  sacrifice  of  individual  lives  and  liberties  is 
legitimate  only  when  made  for  certain  supposedly  transcendental  ends 
of  Nature,  it  would  seem  that  these  ends  must  be  known  before  the 
sacrifice  can  be  legitimate.  It  must  be  admitted  that  Renan's  ideal- 
ism, in  the  present  instance  again,  is  more  beautiful  than  true. 


364  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

Note  21.  That  this  is  not  merely  the  doctrine  of  one  of  Kenan's- 
characters  but  truly  his  own,  is  shown  by  the  following  passages  from, 
his  article  on  Amiel: 

"Les  societes  de  temperance  reposent  sur  d'excellentes  intentions, 
mais  sur  un  malentendu.  Je  ne  connais  qu'un  argument  en  leur 
faveur.  M.  T.  .  .  me  disaft  un  jour  que  les  maris  de  certains  pays,, 
quands  ils  n'ont  pas  ete  temperants,  battent  leurs  femmes.  Voila  qui 
est  horrible,  assurement;  il  faudrait  tacher  de  corriger  cela.  Mais,  au 
lieu  de  supprimer  1'ivresse  pour  ceux  qui  en  ont  besoin,  ne  vaudrait-il 
pas  mieux  essayer  de  la  rendre  douce,  aimable,  accompagnee  de  sen- 
timents moraux?  II  y  a  tant  d'hommes  pour  lesquels  1'heure  de 
1'ivresse  est,  apres  1'heure  de  1'amour,  le  moment  ou  ils  sont  les  meil- 
leurs."  F.  Det.,  383-4. 

In  the  following  passage  he  attempts  to  defend  this  attitude  on  phil- 
osophic grounds: 

"Eh  bien!  1'etat  d'ame  que  M.  Amiel  appelle  dedaigneusement. 
'Te'picure'isrne  de  1'imaglnation"  n'est  peut-etre  pas,  pour  cela,  un 
mauvais  parti.  La  gaiete  a  cela  de  tres  philosophique  qu'elle  semble 
dire  a  la  nature  que  nous  ne  la  prenons  pas  plus  au  serieux  qu'elle  ne 
nous  prend  nous-memes.;  si  le  monde  est  une  mauvaise  farce,  par 
la  gaiete"  nous  la  rendons  bonne.  D'un  autre  cote",  si  une  pens6e 
indulgente  et  bienveillante  preside  a  Funivers,  nous  entrons  bien  mieux 
par  la  resignation  joyeuse  dans  les  intentions  de  cette  pensee  supreme,. 
que  par  la  morne  raideur  du  sectaire  et  I'^ternelle  j6re"miade  du  croy- 
ant."  F.  D6t,  396-7. 

And  again: 

"Amiel  se  demande  avec  inquietude:  Qu'est-ce  qui  sauve?  Eh! 
mon  Dieu!  c'est  ce  qui  donne  a  chacun  son  motif  de  vivre.  Le  moyen 
de  salut  n'est  pas  le  meme  pour  tous.  Pour  Tun,  c'est  la  vertu;  pour 
1'autre,  1'ardeur  du  vrai;  pour  un  autre,  1'amour  de  1'art;  pour  d'autres, 
la  curiosite,  1'ambition,  les  voyages,  le  luxe,  les  femmes,  la  richesse; 
au  plus  bas  degre,  la  morphine  et  1'alcool.  Les  hommes  vertueux 
trouvent  leur  recompense  dans  la  vertu  meme;  ceux  qui  ne  le  sont  pas 
ont  le  plaisir."  F.  De"t,  382-3. 

In  spite  of  the  offensively  frivolous  tone  of  these  passages, — and 
they  might  easily  be  multiplied, — there  is  a  grain  of  truth  in  Kenan's 
contention.  This  is  more  clearly  and  less  objectionably  put  by  Prof. 
James : 

"The  sway  of  alcohol  over  mankind  is  unquestionably  due  to  its 
power  to  stimulate  the  mystical  faculties  of  human  nature,  usually 
crushed  to  earth  by  the  cold  facts  and  dry  criticisms  of  the  sober  hour. 
Sobriety  diminishes,  discriminates,  and  says  no;  drunkenness  expands, 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.      365 

unites,  and  says  yes.  It  is  in  fact  the  great  exciter  of  the  Yes 
function  in  man.  It  brings  its  votary  from  the  chill  periphery  of  things 
to  the  radiant  core.  It  makes  him  for  the  moment  one  with  truth. 
Not  through  mere  perversity  do  men  run  after  it.  To  the  poor  and 
the  unlettered  it  stands  in  the  place  of  symphony  concerts  and  of  liter- 
ature; and  it  is  part  of  the  deeper  mystery  and  tragedy  of  life  that 
whiffs  and  gleams  of  something  that  we  immediately  recognize  as 
excellent  should  be  vouchsafed  to  so  many  of  us  only  in  the  fleeting 
earlier  phases  of  what  in  its  totality  is  so  degrading  and  poisoning. 
The  drunken  consciousness  is  one  bit  of  the  mystic  consciousness, 
and  our  total  opinion  of  it  must  find  its  place  in  our  opinion  of  that 
larger  whole."  Var.  Rel.  Exp.,  387. 

Note  22.  "I/impossibillte"  ou  il  se  voyait  de  plus  en  plus  de  faire 
des  sottises  1'autorisait  a  dire  toute  celles  qui  lui  passaient  par 
la  tete;  il  se  rendait  cette  justice  qu'il  n'avaft  fait  aucun  mal;  il  ne 
songeait  pas  qu'ecrire,  c'est  agir,  et  qu'on  a  sa  part  des  fautes  de  tous 
ceux  dont  on  affaiblit  la  conscience  et  la  volonte"."  E.  R.  XII.  Also  292. 

In  reply  one  might  quote  from  Renan: 

"Tout  ce  qui  eleve  I'homme  et  le  ramene  au  soin  de  son  ame  I'am6- 
liore  et  1'epure;  la  qualite  des  doctrines  importe  assez  peu.  Les  lec- 
teurs  capables  de  trouver  du  gout  a  un  e"crit,  sont  capables  aussi  d'en 
decouvrir  le  venin,  s'il  y  en  a."  Mor.  Grit,  VII.  Cf.,  Dial.,  32-40;  Eccl., 
88;  F.  Det.,  426-7.  Souv.  149-50. 

But  such  statements,  even  if  they  were  quite  true,  would  not  remove 
the  objection;  and  for  once  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  Renan  is  wrong 
and  his  critic  right. 

Note  22a.     Compare  the  statement  of  Amiel: 

"Juger  notre  6poque  au  point  de  vue  de  1'histoire  universelle, 
1'histoire  au  point  de  vue  de  periodes  geologiques,  la  geologie 
au  point  de  vue  de  rastronomie,  c'est  un  affranchissement  pour 
la  pensee.  Quand  la  dure"e  d'une  vie  d'homme  ou  de  peuple  nous  ap- 
parait  aussi  microscopique  que  celle  d'un  moucheron,  et,  inversement, 
la  vie  d'un  ephemere  aussi  infinie  que  celle  d'un  corps  celeste  avec 
toute  sa  poussiere  de  nations,  nous  nous  sentons  bien  petits  et  bien 
grands,  et  nous  pouvons  dominer  de  toute  la  hauteur  des  spheres  notre 
propre  existence  et  les  petits  tourbillons  qui  agitent  notre  petite  Eu- 
rope." Journ.,  Jl.  20,  1848. 

Note  23.  For  the  general  question  of  heterogeneous  personalities, 
the  reader  is  referred  to  James,  Var.  Rel.  Exp.,  166-'88.  The  divided 


366  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

self  and  the  process  of  Us  unification,  and  to  the  numerous  references 
there  given  to  other  treatments  of  the  same  subject. 

Note  24.  This  same  doctrine  of  objective  reason  as  being  "not 
merely  the  only  legitimate  source  of  belief,  which  perhaps  it  may  be, 
but  the  only  source  of  legitimate  beliefs,  which  it  assuredly  is  not," 
is  clearly  expressed  also  in  his  article  UExamen  de  conscience  phi- 
losophique,  1888: 

"Le  premier  devoir  de  1'homme  sincere  est  de  ne  pas  influer  sur  ses 
propres  opinions,  de  laisser  la  rSalite"  se  refle'ter  en  lui  comme  en  la 
chambre  noire  du  photographe.  .  .  Devant  les  modifications  internes 
de  notre  re"tine  intellectuelle,  nous  devons  rester  passifs.  .  .  Nous 
n'avons  pas  le  droit  d'avoir  un  de"sir,  quand  la  raison  parle;  nous 
devons  ecouter,  rien  de  plus;  prets  a  nous  laisser  trainer  pieds  et 
poings  lies  ou  les  meilleurs  arguments  nous  entrainent.  La  production, 
de  la  verite  est  un  phe"nomene  objectif,  etranger  au  moi,  qui  se  passe 
en  nous  sans  nous,  une  sorte  de  precipite"  chimique  que  nous  devons 
nous  contenter  de  regarder  avec  curiosite"."  F.  De"t.,  401-2. 

In  accordance  with  this  theory  Renan  believed  that  the  progress  of 
reason  is  inevitable  and  irresistible.  No  man  can  choose  what  he  will 
or  will  not  believe. 

"S'il  y  a  quelque  chose  de  fatal  au  monde,  c'est  la  raison  et  la  sci- 
ence. Les  orthodoxes  sont  vraiment  plaisants  dans  leurs  coleres 
contre  les  libres  penseurs,  comme  s'il  avait  de"pendu  d'eux  de  se  de- 
velopper  autrement,  comme  si  Ton  e"tait  maitre  de  croire  ce  que  Ton 
veut."  A.  S.,  93.  Cf.  F.  Det,  402.  In  recent  years  this  question  as  to 
the  proper  attitude  of  mind  in  the  pursuit  of  truth,  has  been  much  dis- 
cussed, especially  with  reference  to  the  role  which  the  will  and  the 
intellect  respectively  play  in  what  may  be  called  the  psychology  of  re- 
ligious belief.  Hermann  Lotze  seems  to  have  done  more  than  any 
one  else  in  the  last  century  to  inaugurate  this  reaction  against  the 
agnostic  doctrine  (see  his  Microcosmos,  Eng.  tr.,  4th  ed.,  1890,  vol.  2, 
pp.  571-8,  659,  678;  also  the  introductory  pages  of  his  Outlines  of 
Philosophy  of  Religion.  A  powerful  impetus  was  given  to  the  move- 
ment by  Mr.  Balfour's  Foundations  of  Belie?;  but  perhaps  the  most 
lucid  discussion  in  brief  compass  is  that  of  Prof.  James,  in  his  well- 
known  essay  The  Will  to  Believe. 

Note  25.  This  view  of  his  apostacy  conflicts,  it  is  true,  with  his 
own  account  in  the  Souvenirs;  but  his  own  version,  written  some 
thirty  years  after  the  event,  seems  distorted  by  historical  perspective, 
or  imperfect  remembrance: 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  KENAN.  367 

He  is  certainly  mistaken  when  he  says,  for  example: 
"Ma  foi  a  ete  detruite  par  la  critique  historique,  non  par  la  scolas- 
tique,  ni  par  la  philosophie.  L'histoire  de  la  philosophic  et  1'espSce  de 
scepticisme  dont  j'etais  atteint  me  retenaient  dans  le  christianisme 
plutot  qu'elles  ne  m'en  chassaient  Je  me  repStais  souvent  ces  vers. 
que  j'avais  lus  dans  le  vieux  Brucker: 

Discussii  fateor,  sectas  attentius  omnes, 

Plurima  quaesivi,  per  singula  quaeque  cucurri, 

Nee  quidquarn  inveni  melius  quam  credere  Christo."  Souv.,  258. 

"Dans  cette  grande  lutte  engagee  entre  ma  raison  et  mes  croyances, 
j'evitai  soigneusement  de  faire  un  seul  raisonnement  de  philosophie 
abstraite.  .  .  Mes  raisons  furent  toutes  de  1'ordre  philologique  et 
critique;  elles  ne  furent  nullement  de  1'ordre  m6taphysique,  de  1'ordre 
politique,  de  1'ordre  moral"  Souv.  297-8.  Cf.  ibid.,  286;  also  Mor.  Cr.^ 
174. 

These  statements  must  be  taken  to  represent  the  process  as  it  ap- 
peared to  his  memory  in  the  retrospect,  rather  than  its  actual  char- 
acter. A  truer  account  is  found  in  his  letters  of  the  time,  which 
are  contemporary  records,  and  addressed,  not  like  the  Souvenirs  ta 
a  promiscuous  public  as  an  Apologia  pro  vita  sua,  but  to  the  only  per- 
son in  the  world  to  whom  he  dared  reveal  the  most  intimate  secrets  of 
his  heart,  his  sister  Henriette.  It  is  to  this  correspondence,  where- 
his  plans  and  prospects,  his  disappointments  and  his  difficulties  are 
frankly  discussed,  that  we  must  turn  for  the  real  causes  of  his  sepa- 
ration from  the  church. 

And  from  these  letters  it  is  very  clear  that  his  apostasy  was  not 
by  any  means  due,  as  he  insists,  exclusively  to  historical  and  textual 
criticism,  but  quite  as  much  to  his  readings  in  philosophy  and  natural 
science.  For  long  before  he  was  capable  of  wielding  the  weapons  of 
textual  criticism,  ana  before  he  had  even  begun  his  studies  in  biblical 
philology,  he  was  being  incessantly  torn  by  religious  doubts  of  the 
very  gravest  nature.  Cf.  A.  S,.  49. 

As  early  as  March,  1842,  before  he  had  begun  either  Hebrew  or 
German  (Lett.  Sem,.,  165,  229),  he  was  already  inoculated  with  the 
germs  of  an  all-questioning  scepticism. 

On  March  23,  1842,  he  writes  to  his  sister: 

"D'ailleurs,  le  propre  de  la  philosophie  est  moins  de  donner  des 
notions  bien  assurees,  que  de  lever  une  foule  de  prejuges.  On  est  tout 
etonne",  quand  on  commence  a  s'y  adonner,  de  voir  que  jusque-la,  on 
a  etc"  le  jouet  de  mille  erreurs,  enracinees  par  1'opinion,  la  coutume,. 
1'education."  Lett.  87;  also  122.  Cf.  Lett.  Sem.,  164,  175. 


368  BULLETIN   OF   THE    UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

Again  on  Sept.  15  of  the  same  year,  he  writes: 

"On  voit  les  choses  d'une  maniere  si  differente;  on  reconnait  tant 
-de  prejuges  et  d'erreurs,  la  ou  Ton  ne  croyait  voir  que  verite,  qu'on 
serait  tenter  d'embrasser  un  scepticisme  universel.  C'est  la  la  pre- 
miere impression  de  1'etude  de  la  philosophic"  Lett.,  96;  also  100. 

And  that  it  was  not  merely  his  secular  beliefs  that  had  grown  un- 
certain, but  his  religious  creed  as  well,  appears  clearly  from  another 
passage  in  the  same  letter,  where  he  discusses  the  choice  of  a  vocation. 
Declaring  that  he  was  not  intended  for  a  secular  calling,  he  continues: 

"Je  ne  dis  pas  ceci  par  le  zele  d'une  devotion  spirituelle:  oh!  non; 
ce  n'est  plus  la  mon  defaut;  la  philosophie  est  merveilleusement  propre 
a  en  corriger  les  exces,  et  une  reaction  trop  violente  est  seule  a 
craindre."  Lett.,  100. 

Even  in  the  Souvenirs  itself  there  are  passages  in  which  the  influ- 
ence of  philosophy  is  explicitly  recognized  as  an  important  factor  in 
the  destruction  of  his  faith;  as  for  example  the  following: 

"La  contradiction  des  travaux  philosophiques  ainsi  entendu  avec  la 
foi  chrStienne  ne  m'apparaissait  point  encore  avec  le  degre  de  clarte" 
qui  bientot  ne  devait  laisser  a  mon  esprit  aucun  choix  entre  1'abandon 
du  christianisme  et  1'inconsequence  la  plus  inavouable."  Souv.,  247; 
also  251;  Cf.  St.  Beuve,  Nouv.  Lund.,  Je.  2,  18S2;  N.  Am.  Rev.,  48-63ff. 

But  the  most  glaring  discrepancy  appears  in  his  attempt  to  account 
for  the  persistent  orthodoxy  of  one  of  his  teachers,  the  erudite  M. 
Lehir.  The  question  could  scarcely  fail  to  present  itself  to  his  mind: 
If  the  study  of  biblical  criticism  proved  so  disastrous  to  the  faith  of  the 
student,  why  was  the  teaching  of  it  compatible  with  the  faith  of  the 
professor? 

"La  verite  de  1'orthodoxie,"  he  writes  of  M.  Lehir,  "ne  fut  jamais 
pour  lui  1'objet  d'un  doute.  .  .  Tout  a  fait  Stranger  a  la  philosophie 
naturelle  et  a  1'esprit  scientifique,  dont  la  premiere  condition  est  de 
n'avoir  aucune  foi  prealable  et  de  rejeter  ce  qui  n'arrive  pas,  il  resta 
.dans  cette  equilibre  ou  une  conviction  moins  ardente  eut  tre'buche'. 
Le  surnaturelle  ne  lui  causait  aucune  repugnance  intellectuelle."  Souv., 
274;  Cf.  A.  S.,  49. 

The  explanation  is  probably  correct;  but  does  it  not  involve  the 
open  admission  that  foremost  among  the  causes  of  his  own  defection 
were  "la  philosophie  naturelle  et  1'esprit  scientifique,"  and  a  "repug- 
nance intellectuelle"  against  supernaturalism?  Cf.  Lett.  S6m.,  5,  15, 
16,  41. 

The  truth  is,  when  Renan  entered  upon  his  theological  studies  at 
St  Sulpice,  in  Sep.  1843,  he  was  virtually  a  disbeliever  already.  From 
the  very  first  the  onus  probandi  was  thrown  on  Christianity.  That 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  KENAN.      369 

was  important.  There  is  all  the  difference  in  the  world  between  be- 
lieving a  creed  until  disproven,  and  disbelieving  it  until  proven;  and 
there  can  be  no  doubt  whatever  that  the  latter  was  Renan's  attitude 
towards  the  Christian  creed  at  the  beginning  of  his  theological  studies. 
It  cannot  be  true  then,  that  his  faith  was  destroyed  by  textual  criti- 
cism of  the  bible,  for  the  excellent  reason  that  none  remained  to  be 
destroyed.  All  that  was  left  for  philology  to  do  was  to  ripen  the  seed 
that  philosophy  and  science  had  sown.  And  that  it  promptly  did. 
By  destroying  the  prestige  of  a  supposedly  infallible  scripture,  phil- 
ology dethroned  the  last  authority  which  still  subdued  his  reason 
and  restrained  his  will.  But  even  here  there  were  powerful  allies. 
Renan  ceased  to  acknowledge  the  authority  of  the  scriptures  not 
merely  because  of  errors  and  contradictions  in  the  text,  but  also,  as 
he  very  significantly  observes  in  one  of  his  letters  of  the  time,  be- 
cause an  inspired  book  would  be  a  miracle.  Souv,  293-5;  Cf.  Dial.  14-22. 
That  was  decisive.  To  imply  a  miracle  was  to  assail  his  most 
cherished  conviction,  the  reign  of  law,  and  to  assert  an  impossible  ab- 
surdity. Dial.,  14-22.  In  his  mind,  the  impossibility  of  miracle  had 
come  to  be  more  than  a  mere  doctrine;  it  had  acquired  all  the 
fixity  of  a  mental  category.  Nothing  could  have  prevailed  at  this 
period  against  his  worship  of  reason.  Had  he  witnessed  a  genuine 
miracle  with  his  own  eyes  he  would  certainly  have  declared  it  hallu- 
cination or  imposture  rather  than  admit  that  the  causal  nexus  of  na- 
ture had  been  broken  through. 

Indeed,  were  any  specific  belief  to  be  named  as  the  cause  of  his 
leaving  the  church,  it  would  be  this  belief  in  the  universality  of  irre- 
fragable natural  law.  In  point  of  fact,  however,  no  one  such  specific 
belief  can  be  named.  He  is  much  nearer  the  truth  when  he  says: 

"Mes  doutes  ne  vinrent  pas  d'un  raisonnement,  ils  vinrent  de  dix 
mille  raisonnements."  Souv.,  284-5;  Mor.  Cr.,  174. 

His  entire  disposition  and  method  had  led  to  this  crisis.  It  was 
not  so  much  his  disbelief  in  any  particular  dogma  that  made  it  impos- 
sible for  him  to  abide  by  the  creed;  it  was  the  rationalism  and  the 
unfinality  of  his  whole  intellectual  temper.  Cf.  James,  Var.  Rel.  Exp., 
pp.  73-74. 

Half  a  century  later,  looking  back  upon  this  intellectual  hypertrophy 
of  his  earlier  period,  he  refers  to  himself  humorously  as 

"Un  jeune  homme,  atteint  d'une  forte  encephalite,  vivant  unique- 
ment  dans  sa  t§te  et  croyant  fre"netiquement  &  la  ve"rite."  A.  S.,  VI. 

Note  26.    Renan  has  made  repeated   confession  of  his  own   disap- 
pointment with  his  labors  in  history: 
11 


370  BULLETIN   OF   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN. 

Je  crains  fort  que  nos  ecrits  de  precision  de  1' Academic  des  inscrip- 
tions et  belles-lettres,  destinees  a  donner  quelque  exactitude  a  1'his- 
toire,  ne  pourissent  avant  d'avoir  ete  lus.  C*est  par  la  chimie  a  un 
bout,  par  1'astronomie  a  un  autre,  c'est  surtout  par  la  physiologie 
genSrale  que  nous  tenons  vraiment  le  secret  de  1'etre,  du  monde,  de 
Dieu,  comme  on  voudra  Fappeler.  Le  regret  de  ma  vie  est  d'avoir 
choisi  pour  mes  etudes  un  genre  de  recherches  qui  ne  s'imposera 
jamais  et  restera  toujours  a  1'etat  d'interessantes  considerations  sur 
une  realite  a  jamais  disparue."  Souv.,  263.  See  also  his  letter  to  M. 
Berthelot,  Aug.,  1863,  in  the  Frag.,  153-4;  also  Disc.,  134-5;  A.  S.,  XIV. 

One  of  his  latest  expressions  of  opinion  as  to  the  probable  future 
of  historical  science  occurs  in  his  preface  to  the  Avenir  de  la  science 
1890: 

"Les  sciences  historiques  et  leurs  auxiliaires,  les  sciences  philo- 
logiques,  ont  fait  d'immenses  conquetes  depuis  que  je  les  embrassai 
avec  tant  d'amour  il  y  a  quarante  ans.  Mais  on  en  voit  le  bout. 
Dans  un  siecle,  I'humanite  saura  a  peu  pres  ce  qu'elle  peut  savoir  sur 
son  passe.  .  .  Le  processus  de  la  civilisation  est  reconnu  dans  ses 
lois  generales.  L'inegalite"  des  races  est  constatee.  Les  titres  de 
chaque  famille  humaine  a  des  mentions  plus  ou  moins  honorables  dans 
1'histoire  du  progres  sont  &  peu  pres  determines."  A.  S.,  XIV. 

For  a  critical  estimate  of  Renan  as  an  historian,  see  the  discussion 
of  M.  Ch.  Seignobos,  Hist.  lang.  litt.  fr.,  t.  VIII,  259-267.  Also  the  esti- 
mate of  M.  Faguet  in  the  same  volume. 

Note  27.  This  is  a  very  interesting  confession;  but  does  it  really 
conform  to  his  own  canon  of  objective  reason?  Des  lors  la  Vie  de 
J6sus  etait  Scrite  dans  mon  esprit."  That  is  to  say,  fifteen  years  before 
it  was  written  the  Vie  de  Jesus  was  complete  in  his  mind.  The  state- 
ment is  doubtless  true,  and  accounts  for  the  fact,  patent  to  all  readers, 
that  the  character  of  Kenan's  Jesus  so  much  resembles  Renan.  But 
how  are  we  to  reconcile  this  confession  with  his  doctrine  that  truth 
must  be  a  product  of  objective  reason,  as  impartial  and  impersonal  as 
a  chemical  precipitate  Cf.  F.  Det.  401-2;  also  Souv.,  274:  "L^esprit 
scientifique,  dont  la  premiere  condition  est  de  n'avoir  aucune  foi 
prealable." 

Is  it  not  palpably  plain  that  in  this  matter  again  Renan's  theory  is 
one  thing  and  his  practice  quite  another?  Or  rather  his  theory  itself 
is  many  things;  for  a  doctrine  fundamentally  opposed  to  the  "chemical 
precipitate"  theory  is  affirmed  no  less  often. 

"La  foi  et  I'amour,  en  apparence  sans  lien  avec  1'mtelligence,  sont 
le  vrai  fondement  de  la  certitude  morale  et  1'unique  moyen  qu'a 


BRATJER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  BEN  AN.  371 

I'homme  de  comprendre  quelque  chose  au  probleme  de  son  origine  et 
de  sa  destinSe."  Mor.  Crit.  II. 

Is  not  this  the  most  subjective  conceivable  conception  of  truth? 

But  why  dwell  longer  on  these  perpetual  contradictions?  Is  Renan 
alone,  after  all,  in  falling  thus  short  of  his  own  ideals?  Let  the  con- 
sistent man,  if  he  knows  himself,  throw  the  first  stone!  In  the  present 
instance,  Renan  is  the  more  pardonable  as  the  ideal  to  be  attained  is 
probably  a  mere  fiction.  For  the  truth  seems  to  be,  as  Mr.  Balfour  and 
others  have  tried  to  show,  that  the  doctrine  of  an  objective  reason, 
universally  applied,  is  itself  an  unrealized — and  perhaps  unrealizable — 
subjective  ideal. 


372  BULLETIN  OF  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  WISCONSIN. 


APPEsNDIX  B:     BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The  number  of  books,  pamphlets  and  magazine  articles  written 
about  Renan  is  of  course  much  too  large  to  be  catalogued  here.  Most 
of  them,  especially  those  provoked  by  the  Vie  de  Jesus,  are  of  a  con- 
troversial nature,  and  give  little  or  no  help  towards  a  comprehension 
of  Renan  and  his  work.  Among  the  best  are  the  following: 

I.     BIOGRAPHICAL. 

Boissier,  G:     Fun6railles  de  M.  E.  Renan,  1895. 

Cognat,  J.:     Renan,  hier  et  aujourdhui,  1883. 

Dannesteter,  Mary  J.:     La  Vie  d'Ernest  Renan,  1898. 

Denais,  J:     Du  S6minaire  au  Pantheon,  Paris,  1893. 

Duff,  Sir  M.  E.  Grant:     Ernest  Renan.    In  Memoriam,  1893. 

Espinasse,  F.:     Life  of  Renan,  1895. 

Frenzel,  K:     Renan  und  Henriette.    Cosmopolis,  Dec.,  1896. 

Loth,  J.:  Renan  au  College  de  Treguier.  In  Annales  de  Bretagne,  vol- 
VIII  (1892),  pp.  124-9  (the  Palmares  of  Trgguier  College  for  the 
years  1836-7). 

Mahrenholtz,  R.:  Ernest  Renan.  In  Zeitschrift  f.  fr.  Sprache  u.  Lit., 
Bd.  XVI,  50-93. 

Paris,  G.:     Penseurs  et  Poetes,  1896. 

Platzhoff,  Eduard:     Ein  Lebensbild  von  Ernest  Renan,  Dresd,  1900. 

Perraud,  Mgr.:     Souvenirs  et  impressions,  1893. 

Sch6rer,  Melanges  d'histoire  religieuse,  2nd  ed.,  1865. 

Renan,  Ernest:  Lettres  du  Se"minaire  (1838-1846),  Paris,  1902.  Let- 
tres  Intimes  de  Ernest  et  de  Henriette  Kenan,  1896.  Correspon- 
dance,  E.  Renan  et  M.  Berthelot,  1898.  Souvenirs  d'enfance  et  de 
jeunesse,  dixieme  ed.,  1884.  Ma  Soeur  Henriette. 

II.  CRITICAL  WORKS. 

Allier,  R.:     La  philosophic  d'Ernest  Renan,  1894. 
Bodner,  S.:     Mikrokosmos,  vol.  2,  pp.  88-190,  Berlin,  1898. 
Bourget,  P.:     Essais  de  psych,  contemp.,  1883. 
Brandes,  G.:     Eminent  Authors  of  the  19th  Cent.,  1887. 
Brunetiere,  F.:     Nouveaux  essais  litt.  cont,  1895. 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RENAN.  373 

Darmesteter,  James:     Notice  sur  la  vie  et  les  oeuvres  de  M.  Renan, 

1893. 

Denis,  Ch.:     La  Critique  irreligieuse  de  Renan,  1898. 
Desportes,  H.  et  Bourmand,  F.:     E.  Renan,  sa  vie  et  son  oeuvre,  1893. 
Faguet,  E.:     Politiques  et  moralistes,  3e  se"rie,  1900. 
France,  A. :     La  Vie  littgraire,  vols.  1  and  2. 

Hutton,  R.  H.:     Criticism  on  contemporory  thought,  vol.  2,  1894. 
Labanca,  B.:     La  "Vita  di  Gesu"  di  Ernesto  Renan  in  Italia,  1900. 
Ledrain,  A.:     Renan,  sa  vie  et  ses  oeuvres,  1892. 
Lemaitre,  Jules:     Les  Contemporains,  vols.  1  and  4. 

Impressions  de  theatre,  vol.  1. 
Monod,  G.:     Renan,  Taine  et  Michelet,  1894. 
Paris,  G.:     Penseurs  et  Poetes,  1896. 

Pellissier,  G.:     Le  Mouvement  Iitt6raire  au  XIXe  siecle,  1894. 
Platzhoff,  Ed.:     E.  Renan,  seine  Entwickelung  und  Weltanschauung, 

1900. 

Rod,  E.:     Les  IdSes  morales  du  temps  present,  1891. 
Sainte-Beuve,  Nouveaux  Lundis,  vols.  II  (1&62~),  and  VI  (1863). 
Samtsbury,  G.:     Miscellaneous  Essays,  1892. 
ScheYer,  Edm.:     Etudes  sur  la  litt.  contemp.,  vols.  IV,  VII,  VIII,  IX, 

X. 

Seailles,  G.:     Ernest  Renan,  1895. 
Verne,  M.:     Revue  de  Belgique,  1898. 
Vogii6,  E.  M.  de:     Heures  d'histoire,  1893. 
Wyzewa:     Nos  Maftres,  1895. 


III.  MAGAZINE  ARTICLES. 

The  very  numerous  magazine  articles  about  Renan  can  be  readily 
found  from  the  following  works : 

Poole's  Index  to  Periodical  Literature,  1802,  to  date.  There  is  now  a 
very  convenient  abridgment  of  this  work  covering  the  period  from 
1815-1899  in  a  single  volume. 

Cumulative  Index  to  a  Selected  list  of  Periodicals  (for  current  num- 
bers). 

Bibliographie  der  Deutschen  Zeitschriften-Lffleratur,  mit  Einschluss 
von  Sammelwerken  und  Zeitungen,  Leipz.  1897.  This  work  begins 
with  the  year  1896. 

Repertoire  Bibliographique  des  Principales  Revues  Frangaises,  Paris, 
1898.  This  begins  with  1897. 


374  BULLETIN  OF  THE  UNIVEKSITY  OF  WISCONSIN. 

Catalogo  Metodico  degli  Scritti  Contenuti  nelle  Pubblicazioni  Perio- 
diche  italiane  e  straniere.  The  first  volume  of  this  work  was  pub- 
lished at  Rome  in  1885,  but  the  indexing  begins,  for  the  more  im- 
portant periodicals,  with  their  first  volume. 

IV.     GENERAL  BIBLIOGRAPHIES. 

The  best  general  bibliography  of  Renan  in  existence  is  that  of  Mr. 
John  P.  Anderson,  of  the  British  Museum,  which  was  published  as 
an  Appendix  to  The  Life  of  Ernest  Renan,  by  Fr.  Espinasse,  Lond., 
1895. 

In  this  work  are  listed,  in  chronological  order,  the  various  editions 
of  Renan's  writings,  down  to  1895;  and  a  very  extensive  catalogue  is 
given  of  books  on  Renan,  in  the  various  languages  of  Europe,  besides 
a  large  number  of  articles  from  English  and  French  magazines. 

This  bibliography  is  reprinted,  with  less  detail  and  a  few  unimpor- 
tant omissions,  by  Hugo  Paul  Thieme,  in  his  b'rochure:  La  Litterature 
Frangaise  du  dix-neuvieme  Siecle,  Paris  and  Leipzig,  1897;  and  the 
following  books,  besides  a  number  of  magazine  articles,  are  added 
to  Mr.  Anderson's  list: 

Brunetiere,  Nouveaux  Essais,  1895. 

Darmesteter,  J.:     Selected  Essays,  1895. 

Deschamps,  G.:     La  Vie  et  les  Livres,  1896. 

Felix,  C.  J.:     M.  Renan  et  sa  Vie  de  Jesus,  18~63. 

Guettee,  F.  R.:     Du  Discours  d'ouverture  de  M.  Renan,  1862. 

Hello,  Era.:     M.  Renan  et  la  Vie  de  Jesus,  1863. 

Lanson,  G.:     Hist.  d.  1.  Litterature  Franc.,  1S95. 

Naudet,  F.:     Notes  sur  la  Litterature  Moderne,  I-II,  1885-8. 

Rod,  Ed.:     Les  Idees  Morales  du  Temps  Present,  1891. 

Wyzewa:     Nos  Maitres,  1895. 

The  following  works  should  be  added  to  the  bibliographies  of  MM. 
Anderson  and  Thieme: 

1.  Renan's  own  works: 
Les  antiquites  egyptiennes  et  les  fouilles  de  M.  Mariette,  souvenirs  de 

mon  voyage  en  Egypte,  Rev.  d.  d.  Mond.,  1865. 
Documents  epigraphiques  recueillis  dans  le  nord  de  1'Arabie  par  M.  C. 

Doughty,  publics  et  expliques  par  E.  Renan,  1884. 
Introduction  to  Book  III  of  the  "Hundred  Greatest  Men,"  by  F.  Max 

Mueller  and  E.  Renan,  Lond.,  1885. 
Melanges  d'histoire  et  de  voyages,  1890. 
Lettres  Intimes  de  Ernest  Renan  et  Henriette  Renan,  1842-5,  second 

ed.,  1896. 


BEAUER, THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  KENAN.      375 

Same  translated  into  English  by  Lady  Mary  Loyd,  N.  Y.,  1896. 

Oeuvres  choisies  (In  Colin's  series  of  Pages  Unoisies),  1897. 

Ernest  Renan  et  Marcelin  Berthelot,  Correspondance,  1847-'92.  Pub- 
lished by  M.  Berthelot  in  1898. 

Etudes  sur  la  politique  religieuse  du  regne  de  Philippe  le  Bel,  1899. 
(A  reprint  from  the  Hist.  Litt.  d.  1.  Fr.,  vols.  26,  27  and  28.) 

Pri£re  sur  1'Acropole.  Compositions  de  H.  Bellery-Desfontaines, 
gravees  par  Eugene  Froment,  1899.  For  an  estimate  of  this  beau- 
tiful edition  d'art  of  a  chapter  from  Kenan's  Souvenirs  d'Enfance, 
see  the  article  by: 

Janin,  Cl.:    Le  livre,  a  propos  d'une  edition   d'art  de  la  Priere   sur 
1'acropole,  in  the  Gazette  des  Beaux  Arts,  third  series,  vol.  24,  pp. 
253-264,  Paris,  1900. 
Another  portion  of  the  Souvenirs,  with  very  fine  illustrations,  was 

published  in  Paris  in  1901,  under  the  title: 

Le  broyeur  de  lin.  Avec  preface  des  Souvenirs  d'Enfance  et  de  Jeu- 
nesse.  Vingt-sept  eaux-fortes  originales  de  Ed.  Rudaux. 

Lettres  du  Seminaire  (1838-1848),  Paris,  1902. 

An  annotated  edition  of  the  Souvenirs,  with  an  introductory  article 
which  is  the  best  brief  treatment  in  print  of  Renan  and  his  work, 
by  Irving  Babbit,  published  by  Heath  and  Company,  1902. 

A  catalogue  of  Renan's  library  was  published  in  Paris  in  1895,  mak- 
ing a  book  of  495  pages. 
2.  Biographical  and  critical  works: 

Aurevilly,  J.  Barbey  de:  Les  Oeuvres  et  les  Hommes  au  dixneuvi£me 
siecle,  vol.  8,  1887.  A  very  adverse  criticism. 

Bersot,  Era.:  M.  Ernest  Renan.  In  his  Essais,  1864,  vol.  2,  pp. 
264-80;  509-24.  Reviews  of  R's  Mor.  Grit,  and  of  his  V.  J. 

Bodner,  Sigm.:     Mikrokosmos,  vol.  2,  88-190,  Berl.,  1898. 

Boissier  Gaston:     Funerailles  de  M.  E.  Renan,  Paris,  1895. 

Bonghi,  Ruggiero:  La  "Tempesta"  di  W.  Shakspeare  e  il  "Calibano" 
di  E.  Renan.  Reale  Accademia  di  scienze  morale  e  politiche, 
Atti,  1879,  XV:  9. 

Bussy,  Ch.  de  (i.  e.,  Marchal,  Chas.):     Renan  en  famille,  Paris,  1866. 

Cassel,  Paul  S.:  Preussen  und  Deutschland.  Eine  Antwort  an  Ernest 
Renan.  Berl.,  1870. 

Church,  R.  W.:  Occasional  papers  selected  from  the  Guardian,  the 
Times  and  the  Sat.  Rev.,  1846-90,  2  vols.,  Lond.,  1897.  (Reviews 
of  R's  Les  Apotres,  Hibbert  lecture,  and  the  Souv.) 

Crelier,  H.  J.:  M.  Ernest  Renan  trahissant  le  Christ  par  un  roman, 
etc.,  second  ed.  Paris,  1864. 

Cuoq,  J.  A.:  Jugement  errone"  de  M.  E.  Renan  sur  les  langues  sau- 
vages.  Montreal,  1864. 


376  BULLETIN  OF  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  WISCONSIN. 

Denais,  J.:     Du  SSminaire  au  Pantheon,  Paris,  1893. 

Denis,  Ch.:     La  Critique  irreligieuse  de  Renan,  Paris,  189s. 

Desportes   H.   et   Bourmand   F.:     Ernest   Renan.     Preface   par  J.   de 

Biez,  Paris,  1893. 

Deutsch,  Em.:     Literary  Remains,  Lond.,  1874. 
Eminent    Persons.     Biographies    reprinted    from    the    Times,    Lond., 

1892-7   (vol.  5). 

Espinasse,  Fr.:     The  life  of  Ernest  Renan,  1895. 
Faguet,  Em.:     Politiques  et  Moralistes  du  19e  siecle,  3e  serie,  1900. 
FSlix,  N. :     M.  Renan  et  sa  Vie  de  J6sus,  Paris,  1863. 
Frenzel,  Karl:     Renan  und  Henri ette,  Cosmopolis,  Dec.,  1896. 
Furness,  W.  H.:     Remarks  on  Renan's  Life  of  Jesus.     Phil.,  1865. 
Gratry,  A.  J.  A.:     Les  Sophistes  et  la  Critique,  Paris,  1864. 
Griswold,   Hattie:     Personal    Sketches    of   Recent  Authors,    Chicago, 

1898. 

Harrisse,  Henry:     M.  Ernest  Renan. 

Hutchison,  Wm.  G.:     Introd.  to  Renan's  Poetry  of  the  Celtic  Races. 
Hutton,    R.    H.:     Criticism   on   Contemporary    Thought,    Lond.,    1894, 

vol.  2. 

Janet,  P.:     La  philosophie  et  M.  Renan,  Paris,  1858. 
Labanca,  B.:     La  "Vita  di  Gesu"  9i  Ernesto  Renan  in  Italia;   studio 

storico-critico,  Roma,  1900. 
Littre",  M.  P.  Emile:     La  Science  au  point  de  vue  philosophique,  Paris, 

1873.     (Review  of  R's  Hist.  Semitic  Languages.) 
Loth,  J.:     Renan  au  College  de  TrSguier.     In  Annales  de  Bretagne, 

vol.  VIII,  pp.  121,  124-9   (1892). 
Mahrenholtz,   R.:     A   carefully  written   article   on   Renan's   life   and 

work,  in  Zeitschrift  f.  franz.  Sprache  u.  Lit.,  XVI:  pp.  50-93. 
Negri,    G.:     Segni   dei   tempi;    profili   e    bozzetti    letterari.     (Ernesto 

Renan  e  rincredulita  moderna.)     Milano,  1893. 
Paris,   Gaston:     Penseurs   et   Poetes,   2e  ed.,   Paris,   1896.     (Discours 

prononces  au  nom  du  College  de  France,  aux  funerailles  d'Ernest 

Renan.) 

Pearson,  C.  H.:     Reviews  and  Critical  Essays,  Lond.,  1896. 
Pellissier,  G.:     Literary  Remains  in  France  in  19th  Cent.,  N.  Y.,  1897. 
Perraud,  Mgr.:     A  propos  de  la  mort  et  des  funerailles  de  M.  Ernest 

Renan,  Souvenirs  et  Impressions,  Paris,  1393. 
Platzhoff,  Eduard:  E.  Renan,  seine  Entwickelung  und  Weltanschauung. 

Inaugural-Dissertation   der  philosophischen  Fakultat  der  Univer- 

sitat  Bern  zur  Erlangung  der  Doktorwiirae,  Dresden  und  Leipzig, 

1900. 
Ernest  Renan;    ein  Lebensbild,   Dresden,  etc.,   1900.     (Vol.  9 

in  "Manner  der  Zeit.") 


BRAUEB, THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ElRNEST  KENAN.  377 

Poitou,   M.   Eug.:     Les   philosophes  frangais  contemporains   et  leurs 

systemes  religieux,  Paris,  1864.    M.  Renan  et  1'Allemagne.    Let- 

tre  ouverte  d'un  Allemand,  Wiesbaden,  IB79. 
Ritter,  Dr.  H.:     E.  Renan  iiber  Naturwiss.  u.  Geschichte,  1865. 
Robinson,  A.   M.  P.  (Mde.  Darmesteter) :     La  Vie  de  Ernest  Renan, 

Paris,  1898. 

Secre"tan,  Ch.:     Essais  de  philos.  et  de  litt,  pp.  368-71,  1896. 
Simon,  J.:     Quatre  Portraits,  Paris,  1896. 

Smalley,  Geo.:     London  Letters  and  Some  Authors,  vol.  I,  N.  Y.,  1891. 
Strong,  Aug.  H.:     Christ  in  Creation,  and  Ethical  Monism,  Phil.,  1899. 

(pp.  332-363.) 
Stuart,  H.:     Paris  Days. 
Tollemache,   L.   A.:     Essays,   Mock-Essays   and   Character  Sketches, 

1898. 

Vattier,  G.:     Gale"rie  des  Acad6miciens,  3e  sSrie,  Paris, 
Verne,  Maurice:     E.  Renan.     In  Revue  de  Belgique,  1898. 
Vogue,  E.  M.  de:     Heures  d'Histoire,  Paris,  1893. 


378  BULLETIN  OF  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  WISCONSIN. 


APPENDIX  C:   ABBREVIATIONS  EMPLOYED,  AND 
EDITIONS;  QUOTED. 

(Unless  otherwise  stated,  the  author  is  Renan.) 


Amiel,  Journ.  —  Fragments  d'un  Journal  Intime,  7th  ed.,  Geneve,  1897. 
/Ant—  L'Ante-christ. 


—  Apostles,  N.  Y.,  1866. 

Averr.  —  Averroes  et  1'Averroisme,  4th  ed.,  1882. 
^A.  S  —  L'Avenir  de  la  Science,  8th  ed.,  1894. 

Cant.  —  Le  Cantique  des  Cantiques,  7th  ed.,  1891. 

C.  d'Angl,  —  Conferences  d'Angleterre,  1880. 

Darmesteter,  Agn.  M.  F.  —  The  Life  of  Ernest  Renan,  1898. 
v/Dial.  —  Dialogues  et  Fragments  philosophiques,  4th  ed.,  1895. 

Disc.  —  Discours  et  Conferences,  3rd  ed.,  1887. 
v^Dr.  Ph.  —  Drames  philosophiques,  1888. 

Eccl.  —  L'Ecclesiaste,  3rd  ed.,  1890. 

E.  R.  —  Ernest  Renan. 

Espinasse,  Fr.  —  Life  of  Ernest  Renan,  Lond.,  1895. 
Frag.,  see  Dial. 

F.  Det—  Feuilles  Detachees,  9th  ed.,  1892. 
Fort.  Rev.  —  Fortnightly  Review. 
Found.  Bel.  —  Foundations  of  Belief. 

-4list.  Rel.—  Etudes  d'histoire  religieuse,  7th  ed.,  1864. 
James,  Var.  Rel.  Exp.  —  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  1902. 
Job—  Le  Livre  de  Job,  5th  ed.,  1894. 

/•"*/  Lang.  Se"m.  —  Histoire  generate  des  langues  semitiques,  1863. 
Lett.  Sem.—  Lettres  du  Seminaire  (1838-46),  1902. 

(1842-5),  4th  ed.,  1896. 

Lett.  Sem.  —  Lettres  du  Seminaire  (1838-46-,  1902. 
v  M.-Aur.  —  Marc-Aurele^et  la  fin  du  monde  antique,  1882. 

Monod,  Renan,  Taine  et  Michelet,  1894. 
v^Alor.  Crit.  —  Essais  de  morale  et  de  critique,  4th  ed.,  1889. 
Nouv.  Hist.  Rel.  —  Nouvelles  etudes  d'histoire  religieuse,  1884. 
Or.  Lang.  —  De  1'Origine  du  Langage,  3rd  ed.,  1859. 
>j>  P.  Isj.  —  History  of  the  People  of  Israel,  Boston,  1894-5. 


BRAUER THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ERNEST  RE3STAJ5T.  379 

v/Peup.  Se"m. — De  la  part  des  peuples  se"mitiques  dans  1'histoire  de  la 

civilisation,  7th  ed.,  1875. 

M3.  C. — Questions  Contemporaries,  3rd  ed.,  1870. 
Re"f.  Int. — La  Re"forme  intellectuelle  et  morale,  4th  ed.,  1884. 
Se"ailles — Ernest  Renan,  2nd  ed.,  1895. 
Sidgwick,  Henry— Methods  of  Ethics,  5th  ed. 
v/Souv. — Souvenirs  d'enfance  et  de  jeunesse. 
J.— La  Vie  de  J6sus,  9th  ed.,  1863. 


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